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Preface and acknowledgements
The nineteenth-century precedent of humanitarian intervention was little known 
until recently. Most international relations and international law scholars as well 
as diplomats are unaware that humanitarian intervention has a longer history 
and is not simply a post-Cold War phenomenon. In the nineteenth century it was 
invoked and recognized by European states, public opinion and international 
jurists, from the three-power intervention in the Greek War of Independence 
(1821–32) until the more controversial US intervention in Cuba in 1898, but also 
with regard to other instances short of the use of armed force in cases of humani-
tarian plight from Peru to the Congo and from Naples to Russia. 
But even among the few who are aware of the nineteenth-century experience 
there has been a reluctance to include it as a precedent, in view of the different 
circumstances and standards reigning prior to 1918, not least the embarrassing 
‘civilized–barbarians’ dichotomy. Only a handful of international lawyers have 
used the nineteenth-century ‘doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention to butttress 
contemporary thinking on the idea.1
In recent years the claim that the nineteenth century was a heyday of humani-
tarian intervention has been made more convincing with Gary Bass’s Freedom’s 
Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (2009). Lesser known is a lengthy 
paper by Tonny Brems Knudsen given at a conference in 2009.2 These two works, 
as well as a lecture by André Mandelstam3 in the inter-war period and a chapter 
by Martha Finnemore4 in the mid-1990s, convinced us that a book on our part was 
in order.
The idea for this book matured following a workshop on humanitarian inter-
vention at the University of Malmö in March 2010, where a paper on humanitarian 
intervention in the nineteenth century by one of the authors of this volume was 
well received.5 By the time we had secured a contract with Manchester University 
Press, a second book appeared, edited by Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim, 
Humanitarian Intervention: A History (2011) and when writing our book, a 
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third book was published, Davide Rodogno’s Against Massacre: Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence of a European Concept 
and International Practice (2012). Ours is the fourth book in English. Why yet 
another volume on the history of humanitarian intervention?
The book by Bass, well researched and written in an engaging manner to 
reach a wide audience, brings to life three cases of intervention in the nineteenth 
century, but does not deal with international law and the views of international 
jurists in those days (which is basic, for humanitarian intervention evolved as a 
concept or doctrine of international law), or with political theory and philosophy 
(for instance making only passing mention of J. S. Mill). 
The Simms and Trim edited volume is an important scholarly book but is not 
focused on the nineteenth century: it begins with the sixteenth century and ends 
with interventions in the 1990s. ‘Humanitarian intervention’ is understood very 
broadly to include humanitarianism, and not as understood in the study of inter-
national law and international relations, namely as armed intervention to end 
suffering in humanitarian plight or protracted internal wars. Moreover, that book 
is not concerned with international law and the views of international lawyers in 
the nineteenth century. Having said this, we have benefited from several excellent 
chapters in the book, notably those by Trim on the Renaissance roots of humani-
tarian intervention, Rodogno on the Lebanon/Syria case, Schulz on the 1875–78 
Balkan crisis and Sewell on the 1898 US intervention in Cuba.
Rodogno’s book is crisp and persuasive as regards its subject matter, humani-
tarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire and the Orientalist gaze of the 
Europeans, and its overall thrust is closer to what we had in mind when we started 
writing our book, though ours is broader; we cover not only the Ottoman Empire 
but also include specific chapters on political theory and the thinking behind 
international law.
This book is an attempt at a comprehensive presentation of humanitarian 
inter vention in theory and practice. It starts with a brief presentation of the 
present situation and debate and then moves centuries back in time, with the 
genesis of the idea in the Renaissance followed by the nineteenth-century 
 civilization–barbarity dichotomy, with its concomitant Eurocentric/Orientalist 
gaze towards the Ottomans. We continue with the pivotal international law 
dimension, examining the arguments of advocates and opponents of humani-
tarian intervention from the 1830s until the 1930s, concluding the first part of the 
book with international political theory and intervention. In the second part, four 
case studies are examined in detail in five chapters: the Greek case (1821–32), the 
Lebanon/Syria case (1860–61), the Balkan crisis and Bulgarian case (1875–78) in 
two chapters and the US intervention in Cuba (1895–98). 
This volume is of course a joint venture. This is the case with five chapters, 
namely chapters 3, 6, 7, 8 and 11. The other six chapters have been written by one 
author, namely chapter 9 by Ada Dialla and chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 by Alexis 
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Heraclides. Note that all the translations from the original languages are by the 
two authors unless otherwise stated.
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Humanitarian intervention today
Humanitarian intervention – that is, military intervention aimed at saving 
innocent people in other countries from massive violations of human rights 
(primarily the right to life) – entered public consciousness around 1990 as never 
before in the course of the twentieth century. It has earned a central place in 
scholarly research and in the preoccupations of decision-makers and inter-
national organizations and has captured the imagination of the wider public in 
a fashion few other political subjects have achieved in the post-Cold War world.1 
Ironically, it is in the limelight not due to its general acceptance but because of 
its controversial character, which has led to acrimonious debates. At the two 
ends of the scale there is, on the one hand, rejection, with the notion seen as non-
sensical, an ‘oxymoron’,2 the hallmark of deceit and, on the other, its acceptance 
as one of the clearest manifestations of altruism, the epitome of human solidarity 
and compassion (the ‘good Samaritan’), the willingness to face great risk and 
consider able loss to save the lives of ‘strangers’, with no gains. 
Interestingly, rejection of, and sheer incredulity with, ‘humanitarian inter-
vention’ is shared across the ideological spectrum, from realist scholarship in 
international relations to Marxism and other forms of leftist critique, as well as 
pacifism. From the realist line of reasoning, which has its origins in Thucydides, 
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza, so-called ‘humanitarian’ or other ethical 
concerns have no place in international politics and are damaging to rational 
foreign policy. More scathing is a critique from Carl Schmitt, who argued that 
‘war in the name of humanity, is not war for the sake of humanity, but a war 
wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military 
opponent’, identifying itself with humanity and denying it to the enemy.3 He adds 
(as if he were a Marxist) that it has been used as ‘an ideological instrument of 
imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle 
of economic imperialism … whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat’.4 
The question of intervention for humanitarian reasons poses agonizing 
dilemmas. There is the tension between the sanctity of life (saving human beings) 
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and the veneration of sovereignty and independence; and there is the tension 
between doing something salutary in a humanitarian crisis if the United Nations 
Security Council is paralysed and abuse in the name of humanitarianism by inter-
vening states. Most liberals opt for saving lives5 and for intervening, exceptionally, 
even without the authorization of the United Nations, provided the interven-
tion has gained wide international legitimacy and the plight is so appalling that 
the interest in global humanity overrides narrowly defined national interest.6 
Realists of course discard ethics in foreign affairs (with exceptions, such as those 
realists who take seriously the ‘morality of states’7) and regard only threats to 
vital interests worthy of intervention, and intervention for humanitarian reasons 
a delusion, or as bogus. Most leftist thinkers, such as Noam Chomsky,8 Edward 
Said, Tariq Ali,9 Jacques Derrida or Jean Baudrillard denounced the 1999 inter-
vention in Kosovo and the whole idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’, as have 
other critical thinkers in more scholarly manner, such as Anne Orford,10 Antony 
Anghie11 and Costas Douzinas.12 For them, intervention is by definition abusive, 
the diktat of the powerful, a form of blatant neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
But a minority of leftist thinkers, who put a premium on self-determination and 
saving the weak from the strong, are favourable to such interventions, albeit in 
very exceptional cases, such as Jürgen Habermas,13 Michael Walzer14 and the 
more controversial Bernard Kouchner, with his droit d’ingérence.15
Most international lawyers are opposed to such interventions, emphasizing 
state sovereignty and independence. There has, though, been a shift, which is 
far from insignificant, in that during the Cold War, among those opposed, the 
majority were against the whole notion, while in the post-Cold War era most are 
opposed to intervention only if it does not obtain UN authorization. Students 
of international relations are more nuanced, especially non-realists,16 with those 
in the field of international ethics, cosmopolitans in particular, who tend to be 
less burdened by sovereignty, supporting unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
followed more guardedly by communitarians, from Michael Walzer in the late 
1970s onwards.17 They, together with international lawyers supportive of humani-
tarian intervention even without a UN mandate, disagree mainly as to the level 
of onslaught that warrants intervention, which ranges from systematic violations 
of fundamental human rights to a situation akin to genocide,18 and the point at 
which to intervene: early on or late in a conflict, when all attempts to stop the 
humanitarian plight peacefully have failed.
During the Cold War, humanitarian intervention was generally considered 
beyond the pale, although even then a minority of international lawyers supported 
armed intervention on humanitarian grounds.19 Some states, notably the US in the 
cases of the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983), Belgium in Congo 
(1960–61), Belgium and the US in Congo (1964) or France in the Central African 
Republic (1979), had justified their actions on humanitarian grounds. But the near 
consensus is that only three military interventions qualify as humanitarian given 
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that they put an end to widespread loss of life: India’s intervention in East Pakistan 
(1971) (hundreds of thousands of civilians dead and almost nine million refugees 
fleeing to India), which led to the creation of Bangladesh; Vietnam’s overthrow 
of the heinous Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot in Cambodia (1979) (with up 
to two million civilian deaths mainly from disease and malnutrition in forced 
labour camps); and the overthrow of Amin’s odious regime in Uganda (with 
300,000 citizens murdered by Amin’s thugs) by Tanzania (1979). Interestingly, 
all three intervening states did not justify their action on humanitarian grounds 
(with the partial exception of India20) but on grounds of self-defence, and all three 
intervened mainly for instrumental reasons, especially Vietnam. The first two 
interventions faced heavy wind internationally, notably in the UN (especially the 
Vietnamese invasion), even though they both saved many lives.21 
Following the end of the Cold War, the first post-bipolar decade witnessed 
unprecedented interventionism on humanitarian grounds: safe haven for the 
Kurds of northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1992–95), the intervention 
of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia 
(1990–96), the US-led intervention in Haiti (1994), French-led forces in Rwanda 
(1994), NATO’s intervention in Serbia and Kosovo (1999) and the Australian-led 
intervention in East Timor (1999). 
In Rwanda effective French intervention came very late, following three 
months of genocidal massacre by the Hutus of more than 800,000 Tutsis and many 
moder ate Hutus.22 The peacemaking intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia headed 
by Nigeria23 and NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation took place without authoriza-
tion by the UN Security Council. NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation gave rise to a 
heated discussion not only because of its lack of UN endorsement but also due to 
the choice of means (high-altitude aerial bombardment), which led to hundreds of 
civilian deaths, more intense ethnic cleansing by the repugnant Milosevic regime, 
thousands of refugees, considerable destruction of infrastructure and environ-
mental pollution.24 Many had feared that this Kosovo precedent would open a 
Pandora’s box but this did not come about, partly due to these unintended conse-
quences. In the second part of 1999, the Australian-led peacekeeping operation in 
East Timor took place with UN sanction, with no mismatch between the military 
means and humanitarian ends, and it turned out to be peaceful.25 With the onset 
of the new millennium – and with ‘9/11’ and its repercussions as far as US priorities 
were concerned (the ‘war on terror’) – the idea of humanitarian intervention 
seemed to have ‘evaporated’,26 although there were at least two candidates, Sierra 
Leone and Sudan’s Darfur. The next humanitarian interventions took place 
more than a decade later: the NATO-led operation in Libya (February–October 
2011) and the French peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic 
(December 2013), both authorized by the UN Security Council.27
In the wake of the Kosovo experience, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
pondered: ‘On the one hand is it legitimate for a regional organisation to use 
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force without a UN mandate? On the other is it permissible to let gross and 
systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, 
continue unchecked?’28 Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 
1999, he expressed his strong reservations about NATO’s unauthorized interven-
tion in Kosovo and Serbia but added: ‘If in those dark days and hours leading 
to the genocide [in Rwanda] a coalition of States had been prepared to act 
in the defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council 
authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror 
to unfold?’29 And he challenged the member-states to come up with a new vision 
of sovereignty.30 
The Annan challenge was taken up by the Canadian-sponsored twelve-person 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which 
responded by subsuming humanitarian intervention under the novel concept of 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P or RtoP).31 The aim of the R2P approach was to 
‘shift the terms of the debate’;32 it amounts to a ‘rhetorical trick’ of flipping the coin 
and shifting the emphasis from the controversial right to intervene for humani-
tarian reasons to the ‘less confrontational idea of a responsibility to protect’,33 but 
the substance remains the same. 
In 2005 at intergovernmental level, the Outcome Document of the UN World 
Summit (15 September) made it a primary responsibility of states to protect their 
population against ‘genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing’; if they fail to do so, a ‘timely and decisive response’ becomes the 
responsibility of the international community. The ICISS had suggested that the 
permanent members of the Security Council refrain from using the veto in such 
cases as long as their vital interests are not at stake but this was unacceptable to the 
US, Russia and China.34 The first test case of R2P was the intervention in Libya.35 
 Given the situation during the Cold War and the interventionism of the 1990s 
and the ongoing debate, the general impression is that humanitarian interven-
tion is basically a recent phenomenon, but in fact the concept of humanitarian 
intervention had been established in the nineteenth century. 
Before moving back in time (in chapter 2), let us identify the main issues at 
stake in the present-day debate on the question of intervening or not interven-
ing militarily for humanitarian reasons. Putting aside the proverbial question 
of whether ‘violent means can ever serve humanitarian ends’,36 today’s debate 
includes six main questions and at least three secondary ones. 
The first question concerns the legality–legitimacy spectrum. Is legality through 
UN authorization indispensable? Is non-authorized intervention by definition 
illegal or is it perhaps legal given an alternative reading of the UN Charter?37 Can 
intervention be condoned if it appears legitimate even though it is technically 
illegal, as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded in its 
detailed report?38 Another tack is the contention that one is faced with a complex 
legal problem39 which may or may not be resolved on an ad hoc basis. 
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A second question is where to place the threshold for intervening with or 
without UN authorization: on systematic human rights violations (such as 
systematic discrimination akin to apartheid or ‘internal colonialism’), on 
something more grave, such as so-called egregious crimes (i.e. ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity), or only at the level of mass extermination 
and genocide?40 
A third issue is in which cases to intervene (with or without UN authoriz-
ation): in a protracted internal war (Liberia, Syria), in a Hobbesian ‘war of all 
against all’ (Somalia), a separatist war (Kosovo) or only to put an end to one-sided 
onslaught (Rwanda), or in all four cases?
A fourth problem is abuse (wrong intentions and ulterior motives) and 
how it can be checked, if at all. UN authorization, collective intervention and 
inter governmental supervision may do the trick but what if they are not forth-
coming? And even if they are, they may still be seen as suspect, for the permanent 
members of the Security Council (as in the case of the Concert of Europe in the 
nineteenth century) can hardly be counted upon – or live up – to being the moral 
consciousness of the world. A related factor is the presence of tangible interests 
as motives and how they can be reconciled with humanitarian motives and 
intentions, especially since ‘saving strangers’ on its own is unlikely to provoke 
intervention.41 
Another question is timing. Should intervention take place only after the 
exhaustion of all peaceful means (i.e. as a last resort) or should there be early, 
anticipatory intervention and preventive deployment once egregious crimes have 
been spotted, such as ethnic cleansing, so as to forestall a humanitarian disaster 
(the Kosovo model) and to avoid greater use of military force later, even though 
early intervention would be more difficult to justify internationally?42 
There is also the need for a reasonable estimate of a successful outcome, that 
is, of attaining the humanitarian goals, avoiding ‘noble intentions and bloody 
results’,43 with few deaths of civilians and little destruction of infrastructure 
(sparse ‘collateral damage’).44 There is also the related issue of ensuring that less 
damage is done by intervening than by not intervening.45 
The three secondary questions concern: a quick exit strategy or a longer stay 
for fear that the bloodbath and anarchy will resume;46 how many casualties of ‘our 
soldiers’ are acceptable;47 and the fact that the intervening states are by definition 
more powerful, which smacks of the powerful bullying the weak under a smoke-
screen of righteousness.48
The recent tendency of advocates of humanitarian intervention is to borrow 
from the well developed ‘just war’ doctrine of the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
(see chapter 2), with the criteria for a just war remodelled to fit modern conditions. 
The following ‘just war’ criteria are all regarded as essential for a humani tarian 
intervention to be contemplated: right authority, in the sense of ‘legitimate 
authority’ and not simply legal (factual) authority, which also alludes to ‘failed 
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states’ as illegitimate and not worthy of sovereignty;49 just cause (massive 
suffering); right intention (humanitarian motives genuine and not a ruse); last 
resort; proportional means (good over harm); and a reasonable prospect of 
success, leading to a ‘just peace’.50
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Introduction
Throughout the long nineteenth century and until 1939, ‘intervention’ (originally 
a French term) or ‘interference’ (the original British term) was ‘Protean’, covering 
an array of manifestations ‘from a speech in Parliament by Palmerston to the 
partition of Poland’.1 Not only was the scope of intervention wide, but its meaning 
and consequences remained contentious.
The Argentinean diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo points out, in his acclaimed 
1870 treatise, that on intervention ‘there are almost as many different opinions 
as there are authors. Some admit it, approving intervention; others condemn it, 
repudiating it; for some it has become a right, others add the idea of duty; others 
see nothing else but a simple fact, a brutal fact, which has its place in history’.2 The 
situation remained the same well into the twentieth century. As Percy Winfield 
put it in the early 1920s, ‘[t]he subject of intervention is one of the vaguest branches 
of international law. We are told that intervention is a right; that it is a crime; that 
it is the rule; that it is the exception; that it is never permissible at all’.3 
Following the Second World War the problem with intervention continued to 
be discussed in the international law and international relations literature.4 In the 
post-Cold War era, with increasing interventionism, interest hardly diminished, 
the main focus now being on humanitarian intervention, which is even more 
contentious.5 
But two things are clear. Intervention meant then – and today 6 – ‘coercive’, 
‘dictatorial interference by a State in the [internal or external] affairs of another 
State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things’.7 
Moreover, non-intervention was – and is – the rule, intervention the exception.8 
It is often assumed that the non-intervention norm was established in the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In fact non-intervention was established as a principle 
of international law in the first half of the eighteenth century by jurists Christian 
Wolff and Emer de Vattel.9 Thereafter non-intervention became a fully fledged 
legal principle associated with the principles of sovereignty and independence. 
Half a century later, Kant lent considerable weight to this new norm in his quest 
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for principles assuring peace, with his Preliminary Article 5 on non-intervention 
in his Toward Perpetual Peace (see chapter 5).
In the course of the long nineteenth century, five positions on the matter can 
be discerned in international law and international political theory: (1) strict 
adherence to non-intervention; (2) exceptions limited to instances of threats to 
national interests; (3) exceptions to include protracted civil wars when a state 
has collapsed into anarchy; (4) exceptions to include national struggles against 
alien rule, especially in order to offset a previous intervention in support of the 
incumbent government; and (5) exceptions to include intervening in order to stop 
massacres and other atrocities.
The English term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was coined by the British 
jurist and aesthete William Edward Hall in 1880 in his acclaimed International 
Law (renamed the very same year A Treatise on International Law).10 It appears 
in a footnote and not in the main text,11 which might imply that the author 
was unaware of having launched a new term or was reluctant to do so. In fact 
he had not conceived a new concept but the English term that was to stick, 
for other terms had previously been used, such as ‘intervention in the general 
interests of humanity’12 and ‘intervention for humanity’, which correspond to 
the French term in use, intervention d’humanité,13 or ‘intervention on the ground 
of humanity’, inter vention ‘on behalf of the interests of humanity’,14 all with the 
same meaning.15
From the 1830s until the 1930s humanitarian intervention was understood as 
inter fering ‘for the purpose of vindicating the law of nations against outrage’,16 ‘in 
the interests of humanity for the purpose of stopping religious persecution and 
endless cruelties in times of peace and war’.17 According to Antoine Rougier (in a 
seminal 1910 survey of the literature), ‘intervention on the grounds of humanity 
is properly that which recognizes the right of one state to exercise an inter-
national control over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when 
contrary to the laws of humanity’.18 Ellery Stowell (in 1921) defined humanitarian 
intervention, with the nineteenth-century experience in mind, ‘as the reliance 
upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another 
state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed 
the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with 
reason and justice’.19
Unquestionably, humanitarian intervention as such is a nineteenth-century 
concept and doctrine. But the wider idea of rescuing those tyrannized and 
maltreated has older roots. It was arguably a Renaissance idea, though admittedly 
within a different normative context, when theology intermingled with the ‘law of 
nations’ (international law), then just taking its very first steps. 
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The origins of the idea of humanitarian intervention: 
just war and against tyranny
The just war doctrine
The original just war doctrine was not concerned with intervening in other states 
for humanitarian reasons, but with providing just reasons for resorting to an 
inter-state war. It was only by the sixteenth century, coinciding with the birth of 
international law, then known as jus gentium or law of nations, under the sway of 
natural law, that support for those suffering from tyranny and maltreatment was 
seen as one of the reasons for a just war. 
The just war (bellum justum) doctrine has its origins in ancient Greek and Roman 
thought, and was developed in early Christian and more specifically medieval 
Catholic thinking. This first normative phase regarding war was followed by the 
period between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until 1918 in which waging war, 
even without a pretext, was deemed an attribute of state sovereignty.1 It consisted 
mainly of jus ad bellum (when resorting to war is justified and just) but later 
included jus in bello (appropriate conduct in the use of force). The idea of a just war 
can be seen as a middle road between the tradition of Realpolitik, which regards 
moral dilemmas and the ethics of war as irrelevant in international politics, and the 
alternative world view of pacifism. According to this middle road, war is deplorable 
but under certain circumstances justified and necessary as a last resort.2
Aristotle is credited with having first used the term ‘just war’ (dikaios polemos) 
in his Nicomachean Ethics.3 For ‘the Philosopher’, as he was known in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance, war is just if we are victims of aggression, if we have 
been wronged and if the purpose of the war is to end up with peace. He also 
regarded a war as just if it was waged against those destined by nature to be 
governed by others, ‘slaves by nature’.4 
The Romans rendered the just war idea a clear legal theory, most of all Cicero, 
who maintained that there are two just causes for resorting to war: redressing an 
injury and repelling an invader, with peace the ultimate aim of war.5 
The early Christians condemned war as evil and opposed to the will of God. 
But when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire with the 
Edict of Milan (313), a more positive stance regarding war was called for.6 
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In this context Augustine maintained that war may be evil but nevertheless 
some wars are ordained by Providence because they are just. The essence is a 
just cause: to defend a state from invasion, to safeguard its safety and honour, to 
avenge injuries or to punish another state for its wrongdoing, provided the war 
is not aimed at territorial aggrandizement or revenge and not motivated by a 
delight in violence. The arbiter of whether a war is just is God, which amounted to 
human conscience.7 The aim of all wars should be the restoration of peace, order 
and tranquillity.8
Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century presented the just war tradition as 
a coherent set of rules. For Augustine, the injury provided the just cause for war, 
while for Aquinas it was the culpability of the wrongdoer.9 The great scholastic, 
in his Summa Theologica, presented three conditions as necessary for just war: 
(1) declaration of war by the proper authority; (2) just cause, avenging wrongs 
committed by another state and punishing the guilty state (which is unwilling to 
make amends); and (3) right intention, the motive of resort to armed force being 
‘to do the good and avoid the evil’, to secure peace, rather than lust for power, 
thirst for revenge or a readiness to injure.10 
Aquinas distinguished between the ‘guilty’ and those who were ‘innocent’, 
though he acknowledged that in a war situation the innocent could unintention-
ally be killed. He is also known for the famous ‘double effect’: if an action results 
in both good and bad effects it is permitted, if the latter are not disproportionate 
to the good and insofar as the good effects are intended, while the bad effects are 
unintended and if there is no other way to achieve the good results.11
The next major contribution to just war came from the four founders of inter-
national law as they tend to be regarded today: the Spaniards Francisco de Vitoria 
and Francisco Suarez of the University of Salamanca, the Italian Alberico Gentili 
of Oxford University, and Hugo Grotius.
Vitoria, prompted by the Spanish conquest and cruel treatment of the ‘Indians’ 
in the New World, tried to follow a middle path between the justification for 
conquest, as put forward by Spain and by the Aristotelian philosopher Juan Ginés 
de Sepúlveda, and the doubts about the conquest on ethical grounds raised by 
jurists of the University of Salamanca, such as Domingo de Soto and Diego 
de Covarruvias, and more scathingly by Bartolomé de Las Casas,12 who did 
his utmost to abolish Indian slavery and stop the barbarities committed by his 
Spanish compatriots.13 
According to Vitoria, Spain’s justifications for the conquest were inadequate, 
but the conquest was ultimately beneficial to the ‘American aborigines’ (whom 
he did not regard as slaves by nature) for it brought to the New World a higher 
culture.14 Resort to war should be reluctant, not aimed at the destruction of the 
other country, with moderation in victory. Both sides may believe in the justice of 
their cause, but it is impossible objectively for both to have a just cause: one side 
was objectively righteous while the other was under ‘invisible ignorance’. Vitoria 
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is also known for the principle of distinction (non-combatant immunity): that the 
innocent should not be the object of deliberate killing in a war.15 
Suarez stressed that the method used must be ‘proper’, with ‘due proportion’ at 
the start, during its prosecution and after victory is attained. The innocent should 
be spared and he did not condone waging war against backward non-Christian 
peoples.16 
For Gentili, a war could be just if based on honour, necessity or expediency 
and if it is a last resort. In essence, war ‘cannot be just, unless it is necessary’.17 
He stressed the sparing of the innocent and prisoners of war, and conducting 
war justly with no excesses and cruelty. He also argued that it is possible for both 
belligerents to have a just cause, especially in instances of a ‘disputed right’.18 
For Grotius, just causes are (1) defence of persons and territory, (2) recovery 
of what is due to the aggrieved state, (3) inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, 
(4) sufficient justification, (5) costs and evil from the war not greater than the 
good that would come about from the war, and (6) war as a last resort. Grotius, 
like his predecessors, was also concerned with the jus in bello aspect. Unjust 
causes were the desire to acquire rich lands and conquer others on the pretext that 
it is for their own good.19 
Against tyranny: the monarchomachs, Bodin, Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius
Humanitarian intervention’s possible Renaissance roots 
On the Renaissance roots of humanitarian intervention there is disagreement as 
to the progenitors and as to whether such roots exist in the first place. 
From 1945 until recently, the conventional view was that Grotius was the 
precursor. This tendency is largely due to Hersch Lauterpacht, who had stated (in 
1946) that in Grotius one finds ‘the first authoritative statement of the principle 
of humanitarian intervention – the principle that exclusiveness of domestic 
jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity begins’.20 When humanitarian 
intervention was hatched in the nineteenth century, jurists referred to their con-
temporaries as the fathers of the concept (see chapter 4) but some also mentioned 
Grotius,21 others Emer de Vattel22 and some mentioned both.23
Peter Haggenmacher and Theodor Meron regard the concept as pre-Grotian 
and see Gentili as the progenitor,24 from whom Grotius had picked up the idea 
without mentioning Gentili, despite his obvious debt to him.25 The first to point 
to Gentili’s contribution on this question is probably Gezina van der Molen, in the 
inter-war years, who referred to his idea of ‘the right of intervention on behalf of 
subjects, who are treated cruelly and unjustly by their prince’.26 Meron also refers 
to Suarez as being almost on a par with Gentili. More recently Vitoria has been 
mentioned as the progenitor by an increasing number of scholars. However, the 
view that Grotius is the progenitor lingers on.27 
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There are also two other proposed progenitors, whose contribution has not 
gained wide acceptance: the ‘monarchomachs’, mainly with the work Vindicae 
contra tyrannos (Defence Against Tyrants), and Jean Bodin. 
But other commentators regard the presumed Renaissance roots of the idea 
as far-fetched, given (1) the different contingent and ethical-religious rather than 
juridical basis of action; (2) the absence of the vital non-intervention principle; 
(3) that its advocates had an axe to grind (to save Protestants from religious per-
secution); and (4) that it amounted to ‘cloaked imperialism’, in that humanitarian 
reasons functioned as a justification for the conquest of those labelled ‘infidels’, 
‘barbarians’ or ‘aborigines’.
According to Antoine Rougier, prior to the nineteenth century the idea ‘to 
combat tyranny in a neighbouring State’ as propounded by Grotius and others 
was ‘a vague theory based on examples from Greek antiquity, with a moral rather 
than a juridical character’, within a school of thought (natural law) ‘which did not 
separate law from its ethical foundation’.28 
John Vincent points out that taking up arms ‘on behalf of oppressed subjects 
is plainly to make war on another sovereign’, while the development of the idea of 
humanitarian intervention is closely linked to the modern concept of ‘interven-
tion’, a term not used or known to Grotius.29
In the same vein, Luke Glanville has argued that ‘this right of war to punish 
tyranny and rescue the oppressed was not articulated in terms of an exception 
to a sovereign right of non-intervention in any clear and recognizable sense’;30 it 
was rather a manifestation ‘of the right of the sovereign prince to wage war’ and 
punishment for ‘grievous violations of the law of nature’.31
According to Wilhelm Grewe’s reading of Grotius, his approach is ‘nothing 
other than the doctrine of religious intervention expressed in the language of 
natural law’.32 
The argument that saving people from maltreatment was a justification for 
colonialism and imperialism is levelled mainly at Vitoria and Grotius (see below).
Antiquity and the Middle Ages
Interestingly, Renaissance writers, notably Gentili and Grotius, believed that 
their views on assisting the oppressed had roots in Greek and Roman antiquity. 
In particular they harked back to Cicero and especially to Seneca, whom they 
used to buttress their stance. Grotius also mentions another precursor, Pope 
Innocent IV, and he names Vitoria and three of his Spanish contemporaries as 
being opposed to this view.33 
For Cicero there were two kinds of injustice, one resulting from injury and the 
other from not averting injury to others, if one has the power to do so.34 He asserted 
that ‘those who say that we should think about the interests of our fellow citizens, 
but not those of foreigners, destroy the common society of the human race’.35 
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Gentili and Grotius quote the following dictum by Seneca: that if another 
sovereign ‘remote from my nation harasses his own … the duty which I owe 
to the human race is prior and superior to that which I owe [that sovereign]’.36 
Grotius also refers to two other Seneca maxims: ‘Men have been born to aid one 
another’,37 and ‘I shall come to the aid of the perishing’.38 
In the early thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV, an eminent canon lawyer, 
justified the Crusades on the grounds that the use of armed force was permissible 
in order to prevent or punish the persecution of Christians in ‘infidel’ kingdoms 
and enforce natural law if it was violated (the Saracens were also bound by natural 
law according to Innocent) but this should not lead to wars of conversion to 
Christianity or annexation. Aware that this was open to abuse, he added the need 
for papal authorization.39 
The views of Innocent were obviously self-serving at a time when the papacy’s 
power was at its zenith. Innocent referred to Christians vis-à-vis ‘infidels’ – 
contrary to Gentili, Suarez and Grotius, who referred to humankind – thus it is 
difficult to treat his view through the logic of humanitarian intervention.
Lesser-known origins: the monarchomachs and Bodin
To begin with, there is an earlier possible progenitor, Thomas More, in his Utopia 
(1516).40 The Utopians loathe fighting and fail to see anything glorious in war but 
‘go to war only for good reasons: to protect their own land, to drive invading 
armies from the territories of their friends, or to liberate an oppressed people, in 
the name of humanity, from tyranny and servitude’.41 However, More’s tentative-
ness as to whether Utopia is in all respects ‘the best state of a commonwealth’42 
(note that the Utopians had abolished property and were heathens, contrary to 
More, who was a devout Catholic), not to mention his at times playful approach 
to the Utopians, and the fact that he does not elaborate on this particular point, 
make him a very elusive precursor, if one at all.
The first to draw attention to the contributions of the monarchomachs (those 
who fight monarchs, as coined by the contemporary Scottish jurist William 
Barclay) as well as of Bodin to the theory of intervention is probably the French 
legal historian Adhémar Esmein, in 1900.43 The contribution of the author of 
Vindicae was also alluded to by William Archibald Dunning in his History of 
Political Thought from Luther to Montesquieu (1905),44 and in the 1920s by Ellery 
Stowell,45 by the Calvinist theologian Marc Boegner46 and by Harold Laski.47
Vindicae was published in 1579 in Basle, at the height of the religious wars in 
France and as a reaction to the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre (24 August 1572). 
The author wrote under the pseudonym Stephanus Junius Brutus Celta (the Celt). 
The writer was undoubtedly a Huguenot (French Calvinist) but the authorship of 
the book still remains a mystery. The most likely authors are two distinguished 
personalities of the time, Hubert Languet, a French lawyer and diplomat, and 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   18 22/01/2015   10:53:39
The origins of the idea of humanitarian intervention 19
Philippe de Mornay (known as Duplessis-Mornay), a French theologian and 
activist (the two were close friends).48 The work was mainly known in Europe 
for its ‘resistance theory’, and the doctrine of tyrannicide49 and republicanism as 
popular sovereignty.50 
Other notable works in this tradition were the anonymous pamphlet De jure 
magistratuum (The Right of Magistrates) by theologian Theodore Beza (Calvin’s 
successor in Geneva) and Franco­Gallia, by François Hotman, Professor of Law 
at the University of Geneva, which called for representative government and 
elective monarchy.51 Note that Beza and Hotman were both initially regarded as 
the author of Vindicae.52 
Vindiciae and De jure magistratuum advocated outside intervention if a prince 
persisted in his violent course and if other remedies had been tried but had failed.53 
According to both texts intervention was both a right and a duty of all princes, if 
another prince was a tyrant and ‘persisted in his violent courses’.54 A prince who 
stood idly by ‘and beholdeth the wickedness of a tyrant, and the slaughter of the 
innocent … is worse than the tyrant him selfe’.55 
Are we then to surmise that Languet or Mornay and Beza are the progeni-
tors or among the progenitors of the concept? We need to bear in mind that we 
are dealing with polemical tracts, whose agenda was to save Protestants being 
persecuted for religious reasons.56 As Trim points out, ‘the monarchomach 
authors conceived of “tyranny” in narrow confessional terms. Roman Catholic 
regimes were assumed to be tyrannical, because of the way they “oppressed” 
Protestants’.57 This included the Pope. Hotman, for instance, characterized Rome 
as ‘innately, permanently tyrannical’.58 True, the monarchomachs were primarily 
concerned with the plight of their fellow Protestants. However, in their works 
they also referred to people in general and especially to suffering women and 
children. According to Garnett, Vindicae is not ‘straightforwardly partisan’, at 
least ‘not overtly so’, but addressed to all those who profess the Christian religion, 
‘whether papal or reformed’, pointing to the ‘evil arts’ and ‘pestiferous doctrines’ 
of Machiavelli.59 And Trim acknowledges that ‘whatever the propagandists and 
apologists intended, what many readers would surely have taken away from their 
reading was that extreme violence was intrinsically wrong because of the human 
suffering involved, and this was true for all (or at any rate most) human beings’.60 
Now let us examine Bodin, who has been bypassed on this question even more 
than the monarchomachs.61 The fact that he was (together with Hobbes) the father 
of the concept of sovereignty makes his contribution even more intriguing. Bodin 
was a moderate Catholic vexed by the French onslaught against the Huguenots.62 
In his Six livres de la République (1576) he took a middle road between absolute 
sovereignty without moral considerations and resistance theory, by equipping the 
state or rather a single individual, the monarch, with sovereignty that was absolute, 
indivisible and perpetual. The sovereign had to be just, his rule not arbitrary, and 
the monarch’s sovereignty derived from the sovereignty of the people.63 
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On the question ‘whether a sovereign prince … can be killed if he is cruel, 
oppressive, or excessively wicked’, Bodin asserted that ‘[i]t makes a great 
difference whether we say that a tyrant can be lawfully killed by a foreign prince 
or by a subject’ and added that ‘it is a most beautiful and magnificent thing for a 
prince to take up arms in order to avenge an entire people unjustly oppressed by 
a tyrant’s cruelty, as did Hercules, who travelled all over the world exterminating 
tyrant-monsters and was deified for his great feat’.64 This was probably Bodin’s 
answer to the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre. As an enlightened royalist he 
agreed with the Huguenots that the conflict had been provoked by the monarch, 
but he feared for the existence of the sovereign state and regarded sanctioning 
resistance as the recipe for chaos and anarchy.65 As he had put it for good measure: 
‘I conclude then that it is never permissible for a subject to attempt anything 
against a sovereign prince, no matter how wicked and cruel a tyrant he may be’.66
Arguably Bodin cannot be excluded as one of the earliest progenitors, given his 
more detached and less engagé approach by comparison with the monarchomachs 
and the fact that he placed it within the new principle of sovereignty. 
Mainstream origins: Vitoria, Gentili, Suarez and Grotius
Vitoria in recent years has been singled out (contra Grotius’s view) by an increasing 
number of scholars as the earliest proponent of the idea.67 We will contest this 
view. 
Vitoria pondered whether the practice of ‘human sacrifice’, ‘cannibalism’ and 
other abominable acts by the Indians justified armed intervention and replied 
in the affirmative.68 Las Casas took the opposite line, that interfering to rescue 
a few by killing many was disproportionate and immoral, a remedy worse than 
the disease.69 Vitoria, with reference to the American Indians, asserted that any 
Christian ruler could justifiably intervene to halt the injury of innocent people, 
though that ruler could not eject the adversary from his ancestral lands and 
property.70 For him it did not matter that the Indians fully accepted such religious 
rules and rituals as human sacrifice and did not seek Spanish help to save them.71
Thus what for Innocent was the rescuing of Christians from ‘infidels’, for 
Vitoria it was rescuing innocent victims from ‘barbarians’. In view of Vitoria’s 
rationale – above all his ‘insidious justification’ of the Spanish conquest,72 
presenting it as for the good of the ‘Indians’,73 and ‘intervention in the name 
of humanity’74 as one of the main arguments justifying the overseas Spanish 
conquest75 – it would seem far-fetched to regard him as a genuine progenitor of 
the idea, on any sort of par with Gentili, Grotius and a few others. Vitoria was well 
aware and distressed by the news of the horrible deeds of the conquistadors,76 the 
sheer ‘destruction of the Indians’ (major discussions were taking place on this 
very subject in Spain, not least in the University of Salamanca)77 and was deeply 
shocked by the 1533 ‘butchery’ of the Incas by Pizarro that freezes the blood in 
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one’s veins (as he put it).78 Such acts could hardly be compared, as stressed by 
Las Casas, to occasional ritualized human sacrifices based on the Aztec religion 
and accepted by the people in question.79 In fact Vitoria acknowledged that the 
slaughter of innocent Indians ‘undermined the claim that they were engaged in 
a humanitarian endeavour’80 but did not appear to modify his views on interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds. His prudent stance may have been due to the fact 
that, at the time, Charles V demanded that there should be no writing or lecturing 
on the Indian question.81 
Gentili, based on Ambrose’s postulate ‘fulsome is the justice that protects 
the frail’, regarded the subjects of other states as not ‘outside of the kinship of 
nature and the society formed by the whole world’, adding that ‘if you abolish that 
society, you will destroy the union of the human race, by which life is supported’.82 
According to his De jure belli libri tres (1589), ‘if men clearly sin against the laws of 
nature and of mankind, I believe that anyone whatsoever may check such men 
by force of arms’.83 He asserted that ‘if subjects are treated cruelly and unjustly, 
this principle of defending them is approved by others as well. And they bring 
forward the familiar instance of Hercules, the subduer of tyrants and monsters’.84 
By ‘others’ Gentili almost certainly meant Bodin, whom he greatly admired85 (for 
Bodin’s similar phrase see above). Referring to a blood-thirsty tyrant in another 
country, he stated that ‘If he does not assail my country, but is the bane of his own’, 
then, on the basis of ‘the duty that I owe to the whole human race … I am free 
to act as I please toward him, from the moment when by violating all law he put 
himself beyond the pale of the law’.86 
Suarez was more circumspect and barely fits the role of precursor attributed 
to him by Meron. He suggested, albeit reluctantly, that a prince could resort to 
war when ‘a state worshipping the one God inclines towards idolatry through 
the wickedness of its prince’ to the extent that the prince in question compels his 
‘subjects to practice idolatry’.87 
Now we come to Grotius. The Dutch jurist and diplomat argued that war is 
lawful against those who offend the law of nature,88 but made no reference in this 
regard to Gentili, despite his more than obvious debt to him. He is best known on 
this question for two passages in his celebrated De jure belli ac pacis (1625).89 
The first passage starts thus:90 
Kings … have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries 
committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries 
which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of 
nations in regard to any persons whatsoever. 
He adds further down:91 
Truly it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of others rather than one’s own.… 
And for this cause Hercules was famed by the ancients because he freed from 
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Antaeus, Busiris, Diomedes and like tyrants the lands which … he traversed, not 
for the desire to acquire but to protect, becoming … the bestower of the greatest 
benefits upon men through his punishment of the unjust. 
But he also makes the following curious point: that ‘wars are justly waged against 
those who act with impiety towards their parents … against those who feed on 
human flesh … and against those who practise piracy’.92
The second passage runs thus: ‘If, however, the wrong is obvious, in case 
some Busiris, Phalaris, or Thracian Diomede should inflict upon his subjects such 
treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested in 
human society is not precluded’.93 
Grotius was aware of the danger of abuse94 and was against wars of liberation 
from tyranny, advocating instead ‘a rigid doctrine of non-resistance’.95 As Vincent 
has put it, he ‘made a remarkable concession to the sovereign by denying his 
subjects the right to take up arms when wronged by him’, although he did 
compensate by not denying other states the option ‘to take up arms on their 
behalf ’.96 But as Lauterpacht has pointed out, Grotius mentions no less than seven 
exceptions, including a right of resistance if that sovereign has become the enemy 
of a whole people.97 
Is Grotius, plagiarism apart (given today’s scholarly standards98), one of the 
main progenitors, though not the progenitor, of the idea of interfering for humani-
tarian reasons? Grewe and others99 dispute this and regard Grotius’s stance as no 
more than ‘a doctrine of religious intervention’, especially in view of the historical 
examples he gives, which are cases of religious persecution.100 This may be too 
harsh an assessment, but Grewe may have a point, as seen by Grotius’s reference 
to Innocent as his precursor on this question. But Grotius also mentions examples 
from antiquity and the views of ancient thinkers, trying to give his approach a 
wider, centuries-old validity; further, religious persecution was the main form 
of onslaught during his lifetime. There is, however, another, harsher criticism 
levelled against Grotius, which has come from several authors, who accuse 
him of being an accomplice of European colonialism by widening the scope of 
punishment, and, not least, of being an ideologue of Dutch colonialism in the 
East Indies.101 Richard Tuck argues that ‘[t]he idea that foreign rulers can punish 
tyrants, cannibals, pirates, those who kill settlers [which appears only in the 1625 
edition] … neatly legitimized a great deal of European action against native 
peoples around the world’.102 
With reference to Grotius as well as Vitoria, one could go even further by 
referring to a pithy comment by Carl Schmitt: that by defining the enemy as ‘an 
outlaw of humanity’ because he presumably eats human flesh, a war against him 
can ‘be driven to the most extreme inhumanity’; hence the extermination of the 
indigenous populations.103
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From Westphalia to the French Revolution
The Peace of Westphalia is regarded a landmark, the beginning of a new age 
in international relations and international law.104 This is the conventional view 
held from the nineteenth century onwards, mainly based on the association of 
Westphalia with the principle of sovereignty.105 Upon closer scrutiny, however, 
one cannot discern any reference to sovereignty in its treaties of Münster and 
Osnabrück. Even sovereignty’s implicit endorsement (via the limitation of the 
authority of the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor) is very doubtful.106 Not surpris-
ingly, given the absence of sovereignty, the non-intervention norm is simply ‘not 
reflected at all’ in Westphalia.107 
The meaning attributed to Westphalia is a myth, a retrospective social 
construction due to the emphasis on sovereignty from the nineteenth century 
onwards.108 In any event, from the early or mid-eighteenth century onwards, 
sovereignty and independence, coupled with non-intervention, become cardinal 
principles of international law. Thus by the time ‘humanitarian intervention’ per 
se entered the scene, in the nineteenth century, it had to cope with the principles 
of sovereignty, independence and non-intervention. 
Now let us take the thread from the seventeenth century, where we left it off. 
After Grotius, the German naturalist Samuel Pufendorf opined that anyone ‘may 
justly assist any victim of oppression who invites assistance’.109 Coming to the 
assistance of the oppressed is not only a right but a duty, though an ‘imperfect 
duty’ and not an obligation, as in the case of a contract.110 
The German philosopher and jurist Christian Wolff, exponent of civitas 
maxima (a universal system of law cum universal union of states)111 was against 
any form of intervention or ‘punitive war’,112 even if a ruler treated his subjects 
harshly. Nevertheless, he allowed for peaceful intercession when subjects were 
harshly treated.113 
The main contribution after Grotius on this question came from the Swiss 
diplomat and jurist Emer de Vattel, in his influential Le droit des gens où principes 
de la lois naturelle (1758). For Vattel, states are free and independent and no foreign 
power has the right to intervene or judge their conduct.114 But, he added, ‘if a 
Prince, by attacking the fundamental Laws, gives his people a legitimate reason for 
resisting; if the Tyranny, having become insupportable, brings about an uprising 
of the Nation; any foreign Power has a right to succour an oppressed people who 
ask for its assistance’.115 Intervention can take place if requested by the oppressed 
(as with Pufendorf) and provided that the oppressed have already taken up arms 
and have justice on their side.116 
Worth alluding to also is intervention in the ‘regicidal’ French Revolution as 
conceived by Edmund Burke.117 Burke, ‘in defending magnificently an historic-
ally doomed position’,118 tried to make it more convincing by referring to the 
arguments of Vattel on intervening on the side of the just party.119 Burke also 
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advocated a ‘law of civil vicinity’ as he called it: that if a state insisted on inter-
vening in other states, its ‘civil neighbours’ had the right to intervene against it 
militarily.120 
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Eurocentrism, ‘civilization’ and the ‘barbarians’
In the nineteenth century, the idea of European cultural and moral  superiority 
was at its peak, with a presumed historical mission to civilize the rest of the world 
by expanding European influence and by colonization.1 At the level of the self-
defined Eurocentric international society and law, countries and peoples were 
distinguished as either ‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized’ (‘barbarians’), with Europe the 
basis of comparison, in what came to be known as the ‘standard of civilization’.2 
European international society and the ‘standard of civilization’
International society as it emerged from the Renaissance was the Christian 
society of states, despite the fact that the classic jurists from the sixteenth to the 
mid-eighteenth century (Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and 
Vattel)3 had spoken in terms of universal society, though probably not in the sense 
that we use it today.4 Las Casas and Montaigne and, in the eighteenth century, 
Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Smith, Kant and ‘virtually all the thinkers of 
the Enlightenment’5 referred to the existence of humanity as a whole, though they 
regarded European culture and civilization to be the forefront of progress.6 It was 
in the nineteenth century that a (self-)conception of ‘European society’ replaced 
the one of ‘Christian society’ (though it still had a strong Christian component) 
and civilization.7 
The novel concept of ‘civilization’ (as distinct from the civilized–barbarians 
dichotomy, which is ancient) had been coined in 1757 by Victor Mirabeau, in a 
treatise on population, and a decade later it was used by Ferguson in his Essay 
on the History of Civil Society (1767). ‘Civilization’, once unleashed, took on a 
life of its own, being incorporated into the self-concept of European-centred 
international society.8 
Charles Alexandrowicz has argued that the shrinking of international society’s 
scope to ‘Eurocentrism’ was due to the switch from natural law, which was 
universal, to positivism, with its emphasis on treaty law, sovereignty, inter national 
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personality and recognition (as constitutive of statehood) confined to the 
so-called ‘civilized states’ as original members of the ‘family of nations’.9 This is 
arguable, for many nineteenth century jurists remained partly naturalists10 and, 
more crucially, the previous universality of international law under naturalism 
is debatable, given the foundation of Christianity as a ‘limiting’ and ‘excluding 
concept’.11 There may not be a proven causal correlation between legal positivism 
and Eurocentrism but there is an obvious correlation and interaction between 
them.12 International law for most of the nineteenth century remained mainly 
the law between European states and those of European extraction, and treaties 
with states outside Europe (and America) were unequal, with the sovereignty and 
independence of the Ottoman Empire, China, Siam, Persia and Japan thereby 
limited.13
Civilization linked with progress ‘became a scale by which the countries of the 
world were categorized into “civilized”, barbarous and savage spheres’,14 a distinc-
tion adhered to by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws,15 which was common 
among Enlightenment thinkers from Wolff (‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ nations) 
to Smith and Kant (‘civilized’ and ‘savage’ nations).16 There was also a fourth 
category in vogue, ‘wild men’.17 For nineteenth-century publicists (lawyers and 
other influential commentators on international affairs with a legal dimension), 
only ‘civilized nations’ qualified as full members of the family of nations, while 
‘barbarous nations’ had less legal capacity and even less the ‘savages’. Those in 
the ‘barbarous sphere’ enjoyed only partial recognition and inferior membership 
in the family of nations.18 As for ‘savages’, the belief prevailed that they were 
‘vanishing’, that they ‘were doomed to fall by the wayside’.19 As the esteemed 
British Liberal politician Charles Dilke had put it, ‘[t]he gradual extinction of 
inferior races is not only a law of nature, but a blessing to mankind’.20 
In general, nineteenth-century European and American views ranged from 
racialist (differences due to stage of development, which could be overcome) to 
racist (innate unbridgeable differences) intertwined with the concept of civiliz-
ation. The new concept of ‘race’, introduced in eighteenth-century anthropology 
by Georges Buffon and Johann Blumenbach, came to rank peoples as ‘races’ hier-
archically. The races of mankind were innately unequal according to Arthur de 
Gobineau, with the ‘Aryans’ as the master race. Such racist views were lent greater 
credibility with the advent of social Darwinism.21 The Asians, Africans and native 
Americans were regarded ‘inferior races’, with the so-called ‘white race’ superior 
intellectually, culturally and otherwise.22 
The idea of progress, coupled with the standard of civilization, provided the 
European powers with a handy justification for their global expansion.23 From 
the 1830s onwards, even several liberal thinkers, such as J. S. Mill, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Giuseppe Mazzini and Henry Sidgwick, supported colonization 
in order to bring to these backward peoples the benefits of civilization.24 This 
was also the case with most liberal international lawyers (see below). In the 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the opposite had been the case: Wolff, 
Smith, Hume, Burke, Diderot, Voltaire, Kant, Bentham, Condorcet and Constant 
had been critical of the European imperialist project.25
Jennifer Pitts mentions only two alternative thinkers in nineteenth-century 
Britain critical of British imperialism: the linguist Henry Stanley and the 
polymath Francis Newman (brother of the famous cardinal Newman).26 But the 
most widely known liberal critics of the British Empire were Richard Cobden, 
John Bright and Herbert Spencer.27 In France, Gaston Jèze and Charles Solomon 
were critical of colonial rule but they did not suggest abandoning it, so long as 
it was not brutal.28 It was at the turn of the century that critics of imperialism 
attained a critical mass, comprising mainly radicals, such as John A. Hobson 
in Britain29 (who did not regard imperialism as necessary for capitalism), and 
Marxists, such as Lenin and Bukharin (who regarded imperialism necessary for 
capitalism in its last stage).30 
But let us address the standard of civilization. From the 1860s until 1914 the law of 
‘civilized’ states was the law between states that met the ‘standards of civiliz ation’31 
or ‘standard of civilization’.32 The ‘standard’ was not clearly defined and remained 
‘open-ended’,33 but there was a general understanding of its criteria. According to 
Gerrit Gong, they included the following: (1) safeguard of basic rights, such as life, 
dignity, property, religion; (2) organized bureaucracy and a capacity for military 
self-defence; (3) adherence to the rules of international law, including the laws of 
war; (4) diplomatic relations and communication; and (5) conformity with the 
norms and practices of  ‘civilized’ society.34 The minimum test according to Georg 
Schwarzenberger was a stable government capable of undertaking ‘binding com-
mitments under international law and whether it was able to and willing to protect 
adequately the life, liberty and property of foreigners’.35 More generally, the level 
of civilization was judged with reference to religion, technological develop ment, 
ascribed racial characteristics, economic capacity, political institutions, morality, 
intellectual competence, and sense of nationhood.36 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the religious and racial aspects 
lapsed and emphasis was put on the other ‘minimum standards of civilization’ 
and in this sense the standard opened the way for the inclusion of Japan and 
other non-Christian and non-European states to the ‘family of nations’ and inter-
national law.37
The family of ‘civilized nations’: the views of publicists
The dominant view
In the 1860s and 1870s international law was established as a distinct discipline, 
with the launching of the Revue de droit international et de législation comparée and 
the formation of the Institut de droit international, whose ultimate aim was for 
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international law to become the ‘juridical consciousness of the civilized world’ 
(see chapter 4).38 From then on, international lawyers became increasingly influ-
ential in international affairs, at a time when international relations as a discipline 
did not exist, and thinking in the foreign policy establishment had a legal bent, in 
a deliberate quest for legality or legal rationalization, even on matters of war, ter-
ritorial expansion and imperialism, where Realpolitik considerations dominated 
the scene.39
International law was a matter for the ‘civilized states’, which set the standard 
of entry into the ‘charmed circle’,40 as put by Thomas Erskine Holland, the second 
Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford University. According 
to William Edward Hall, relations between states were akin to a Victorian social 
club: admission was granted to a state if it enjoyed a sufficient degree of European 
culture for its internal rules to be ‘understood or recognized by countries differ-
ently civilised’.41
From the 1830s until the First World War, one can discern a spectrum among 
publicists, from exclusion to inclusion: (1) permanent exclusion; (2) acceptance of 
certain former ‘barbarous’ states but exclusion of Muslim countries; (3) grudging 
acceptance of former ‘uncivilized’ states once they attained the standard, but 
even then less than equality; (4) entry for all non-Europeans states that met 
the standard and full membership; and (5) questioning the distinction or the 
standard. We will refer to the views of key publicists, all of them also influential in 
the humanitarian intervention debate (see chapter 4). 
Among those presuming permanent exclusion, the US diplomat Henry 
Wheaton (the pioneer of international law in his country together with James 
Kent), in his widely read treatise, with eight editions up to 186642 (translated into 
French, Italian, Spanish as well as Chinese and Japanese), asserted that there is ‘no 
universal, immutable law of nations, binding upon the whole human race…. Hence 
the international law of the civilized, Christian nations of Europe and America, is 
one thing; and that which governs the intercourse of the Mohammedan nations 
of the East with each other, and with Christians, is another and very different 
thing’.43 It was ‘the international law of Christendom’ as ‘understood among 
civilized Christian nations’.44 
Similar views were held by Wheaton’s near contemporary, August Wilhelm 
Heffter, of the University of Berlin, author of the most widely read international 
law treatise in Europe until the mid-nineteenth century (translated into many 
European languages, including Greek and Serbian).45 Like Wheaton, he stressed 
Christianity as a basic feature in international law and relegated the relations 
of European states with non-Christian ones to the level of morality and politics 
rather than law.46 
This overall trend continued even in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
According to Henri Bonfils, one of the earliest French international lawyers, 
whose international law treatise ran into several editions after his death,47 
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international law was the product of European and Christian principles and it 
applied only to the civilized nations of European origin. He shared J. S. Mill’s idea 
that international law cannot apply to barbarians, for they cannot reciprocate (see 
chapter 5). Interestingly, however, Bonfils did not subscribe to the domination 
of Europeans over non-Europeans and asserted that civilized states could not 
breach the law in relation to uncivilized nations.48 Ernest Nys of the University of 
Brussels, a distinguished legal historian, divided the world into civilized, barbaric 
and savage peoples and argued that international law as a European creation 
could not be compared to the few agreements between the civilized states and 
barbarians or savages.49
The second category (exclusion of Muslim states) had several adherents. 
Travers Twiss of King’s College London and Oxford University, a publicist active 
in the Institut and intimately involved in British colonial policy as a consultant of 
the Foreign Office,50 toyed with the exclusion of ‘barbarians’ from international 
law, on the grounds that their ‘minds’ are incapable of reciprocity.51 He concluded 
that reciprocity did not arise with Buddhist or Confucian nations, but only with 
Islamic nations, for their moral code, based on the Koran, prohibits relations of 
equality and reciprocity.52 
The Scottish James Lorimer, the Edinburgh Professor of the Law of Nature and 
Nations, though ‘eccentric’53 and extreme even by the standards of the age, was 
highly regarded on the Continent and within the Institut. He was influenced by 
Gobineau’s racist ideas54 and widely known for his tripartite division of civilized–
barbarians–savages.55 Lorimer, like almost all of his contemporary publicists, 
was convinced that international law was Christian and Christianity the highest 
civilization. Oriental communities were akin to immature or irrational individu-
als deprived of legal capacity.56 He believed that non-Christian states based on 
Hinduism and Buddhism could qualify as civilized states, but this was not the 
case with Muslim states, for they sought to become universal.57
From the 1860s onwards, the third category (entry into the coveted club, but 
with fewer rights and capabilities) wielded the widest acceptance and included 
many heavyweight publicists. The Swiss jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli, 
professor at Heidelberg University, a revered figure in international law circles 
during his lifetime and one of the main driving forces of the Institut and the 
Revue58 (he was also consulted by Bismarck), argued that international law is 
the creation of the Christian civilized world of Europe, mainly a product of 
the ‘Germanic’ and ‘Romanic races’.59 The superiority of the ‘Aryan races’, he 
claimed, was evident in the development of higher science, higher culture, in their 
respect for women and human rights and in statecraft.60 The civilized nations of 
Europe and America were called upon to develop ‘a common legal conscience of 
mankind’. Yet international law was destined to be extended to the entire globe 
and not limited to Christian nations, as seen with the admission of the ‘Turkey’61 
to the 1856 Paris Congress.62
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Robert Phillimore was the first major British jurist to write on international 
law, in the nineteenth century, a naturalist rather than a positivist, attached to 
Christian principles. He was a Member of Parliament, a High Court judge, held 
other influential posts, and was a close friend of William Gladstone, whom he 
influenced on matters of international politics, especially with regard to interven-
tion on behalf of Christians in ‘Mohametan’ states like the Ottoman Empire.63 
Writing in 185464 he argued that ‘International Comity, like International 
Law, can only exist in the lowest degree among Independent States; in its next 
degree among Independent Civilized States, and in its highest degree among 
Independent Christian States’.65 Christianity, according to Phillimore, was the 
highest form of civilization and Christian nations deserved a privileged position 
in international law.66 However, non-Christian nations should not be refused 
recognition as members of the international community.67 
Similar views were held at the time by the Italian jurist Pasquale Fiore, of 
Cremona and Naples universities, whose work was highly acclaimed in Europe 
during his lifetime, and translated into French and English.68 Fiore, whose work 
anticipated the international law of human rights,69 was of the view that the 
ultimate source of international law was the juridical conscience of European 
peoples.70 Human society was ‘universal’ but only fully civilized states could be 
members of what he called the Magna civitas, the juridical community. He had 
doubts whether civilization could extend uniformly to all parts of the world.71 
Beyond Europe there was a clear distinction between the somewhat civilized 
cultures of Asia (such as ‘Turkey’ and the ‘great Oriental Empires’) and the less 
civilized peoples, perhaps barbarians, of Asia and Africa, who did not possess a 
stable political organization.72
F. F. Martens, of the University of St Petersburg (an ethnic Estonian), legal 
adviser to the Russian Foreign Ministry and the most acclaimed Russian inter-
national lawyer of his time, held similar views. International law was based on 
common values and reciprocity, hence could not apply to relations with ‘non-
civilized peoples’, as pointed out by John Stuart Mill (see chapter 5), despite 
commercial relations with such states or treaties. Relations with such entities 
were based only on natural law and morality. However, he reluctantly accepted 
that international law applied to non-Christian peoples if they are prepared to 
accept the rational aims of humanity as elaborated by the civilized European 
states.73
The eminent Swiss jurist Alphonse Rivier, of Brussels University, Secretary-
General of the Institut, argued (in the 1890s) that the sphere of international law 
extended to the family of nations that shared the Christian faith. He claimed that 
the law of nations could not function properly between Europeans and ‘inferior 
races’ for the gulf between them was similar to that between ancient Greeks and 
barbarians. However, the family was not closed but open, consisting of European 
nations as well as ‘Turkey’ (accepted in 1856). But other Asian states and Christian 
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Abyssinia were excluded from the so-called ‘family of nations’.74
A decade later, John Westlake, one of the founders of the Revue, President 
of the Institut and third Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge 
University, held similar views. He argued that the international society comprises 
those states equipped with ‘European civilization’,75 that is, all the European 
and American states as well as ‘Turkey’ and Japan. Some backward Christian 
countries, such as Abyssinia or Liberia, could not contribute to the development 
and enforcement of international law.76 A country ‘with an old and stable order 
of its own’ might be considered ‘civilized’, as in the case of China or Japan, 
whose ‘leading minds’ were ‘able to appreciate the necessities of an order different 
from theirs’.77 He regarded Japan an equal member of the family of nations and 
Morocco, ‘Turkey’ Muscat, Persia, Siam and China as enjoying only parts of 
international law.78
Moving onto the fourth category (eventual acceptance by all), worth 
mentioning is the British jurist Thomas Erskine Holland, a pure positivist,79 
who posited that international law need not be restricted to Christian nations, 
for this was a ‘question rather of Civilisation than Creed’.80 For him, ‘civilized 
states’ were those states that were well organized and effective,81 even if they 
were non-European.82 Participation in international conferences, such as the 
Hague Peace Conferences, did not automatically confer ‘civilized’ status but was 
a move forward, bringing China, Persia and Siam to the ‘outer courts of the 
charmed circle’.83 He accepted that Japan had become a full member of the family 
of nations.84
Lassa Oppenheim, Westlake’s successor at Cambridge University, one of the 
most authoritative international lawyers of his time and author of the most widely 
read international law treatise of the twentieth century (with nine editions up to 
2005), defined international law as ‘the body of customary and conventional rules 
which are considered legally binding by civilized States in their intercourse with 
each other’.85 For a new member to be admitted ‘into the circle of the Family of 
Nations’, three conditions had to be met: (1) to be civilized and ‘in constant inter-
course with members of the Family of Nations’, (2) expressly ‘or tacitly consent 
to be bound for its future international conduct by the rules of International 
Law’, and (3) states of ‘the Family of Nations must expressly or tacitly consent to 
the reception of the new member’.86 Following ‘the reception of Turkey’ in 1856, 
international law was no longer limited to Christian states, but the position of the 
Ottoman Empire remained ‘anomalous, because her civilization was deemed to 
fall short of that of the Western States’.87
Contemporary criticism
Very few publicists questioned the overall distinction between civilized and un-
civilized countries. The earliest dissenting voices did not question the distinction 
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but rather forceful intervention in the name of civilization. Terenzio Mamiani, 
the father of the Italian school of international law and actively involved in Italian 
unification, warned (in 1859) that ‘to introduce civilization amongst barbarians, 
and to take them out of their savagery … at the point of the spear, and by force of 
arms, as the Romans chose to do, was an uncivilized and tyrannical proceeding’.88 
His compatriot Giuseppe Carnazza Amari, of the University of Catania, pointed 
out that civilizing the barbarian peoples was an act of ‘high philanthropy’ but it 
should be accomplished by civilized means, as ‘imposing [civilization] by force 
is a barbarity greater than the one that we want to destroy’.89 Similarly, Bonfils 
was against intervening to educate barbarians and savages: ‘For if in the name 
of humanity we claim to have the right to mingle in the affairs of Negro kings of 
Africa how could we contest such occurrences in Europe, as in the case of those 
who intended to invade France in 1793?’90 
David Dudley Field, a US legal reformer and one of the founding members of 
the Institut, argued that a lack of neither Christianity nor ‘civilization’ supplied 
a justification for exclusion from international law. Referring to China he made 
the following pertinent point: ‘Can it be justly claimed that a nation which has 
maintained a regularly administered government, over hundreds of millions of 
human beings, for thousands of years … is uncivilized?’ 91 
The Swiss professor Joseph Hornung referred to acts of barbarity and 
inhumanity by various ‘civilized’ states (Russia, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, 
Holland) against so-called ‘barbarian’ and ‘savage races’, and concluded that ‘all 
the Christian States have committed more or less the same crimes. In general 
they have proceeded towards other races by conquest, brutality and egoistical 
exploitation’.92
 Another dissenting voice was that of Alexandre Mérignhac, of Toulouse 
University. As he put it: ‘on the basis of what sign can they recognize civilized 
States and distinguish them from those that are not? … seeing things from a 
higher level, if we do not limit civilization on the basis of this or the other criterion, 
which is more or less arbitrary we may arrive at the conclusion that perhaps these 
nations simply have a distinct civilization from our own, for in addition they, in 
turn, consider us barbarians’.93
It was only following the First World War, when the ‘civilized’ world clashed 
in the most uncivilized manner imaginable, that reference to ‘civilized states’ was 
largely abandoned. Now international lawyers and diplomats were ‘wary of the 
language of civilization’,94 although it did continue to crop up in various texts of 
the inter-war period.95 It found its echo in the trusteeship system of the League 
of Nations, with its notion of the ‘sacred trust of civilization’, and in the statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice of the inter-war period, and 
more embarrassingly in the statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 
which still refers to ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ 
(article 38, 1c).96
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The reactions of the outsiders: China and Japan 
But what was the reaction of those on the receiving end of the ‘standard of civiliz-
ation’? These states, initially not accepted into the family of nations, were not 
participants in international conferences, were party to unequal treaties against 
their interests and suffered military interventions to boot. Three cases are well 
documented: China, Japan and the Ottoman Empire (the last is treated under its 
own heading in the next section of this chapter).
China
China’s reaction and adaptation to the modern world were greatly delayed. In 
order to understand this inertia one must bear in mind that for thousands of years 
and well into the nineteenth century the Chinese held a Sinocentric concept of 
the world. They regarded their country as the centre of the world, the ‘Middle 
Kingdom’, the Celestial Empire under the ‘Son of Heaven’ (the Emperor) as a 
universal ruler, reigning over the entire world. The Middle Kingdom was the 
quintessential country of virtue, the embodiment of civilization, indeed the only 
civilized country, hence their sense of superiority, huge pride and utter contempt 
for foreigners, invariably regarded as ‘barbarians’ (akin to ‘dogs and sheep’). 
Barbarian entities, namely the various small states near China, were, at best, 
vassals in a tributary system, and then only provided they showed obedience 
and their representatives performed the famous kowtow ritual (three kneelings 
and nine prostrations) before the Son of Heaven. Some authors have called this a 
distinct ‘East Asian society’ or ‘family of nations’ with China as the centre, though 
it was hardly an international society in which some form of equality reigned, but 
was more like the Roman Empire and its relations with its neighbours. From the 
late eighteenth century onwards, with China’s first contacts (through trade) with 
Britain and other Western states, the ruling Chinese regarded Westerners as 
‘Western barbarians’ and this remained the case past the mid-nineteenth century. 
The Son of Heaven ruled with the mandarins, officials trained in the Confucian 
classical tradition (in the famous Hanlin Academy), who knew almost nothing 
else, for all other knowledge or practical expertise was seen as being beneath 
their dignity. Trade and foreign affairs (called ‘barbarian affairs’, which included 
knowledge of other countries and peoples) were regarded as a waste of time, and 
demeaning.97
This mentality and sense of superiority, together with China’s size, long history 
and self-sufficiency (intellectually and economically) and lack of knowledge or 
interest for the rest of the world, made China impervious to foreign influence 
and even to the much more intrusive Western influence until it was too late. The 
‘immobile empire’ moved at tortoise pace when confronted with the West, which 
initially was not regarded for what it was, the greatest challenge and existential 
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threat ever faced by China, which called for quick reactions and far-reaching 
reforms in education, government and foreign policy.98 
In this tragic meeting, or rather clash, of civilizations, one can discern three 
stages on the part of the Chinese ruling elite: 
(1) 1840–60. Following the Opium War of 1840–42, with Britain, China’s defeat 
and the ‘unequal’ Treaty of Nanking, China ceded Hong Kong and opened 
five ports to British residence and trade; it was also made to accept a ‘most 
favoured nation’ clause for Britain. The resultant trauma and humiliation 
led to a ‘closed-door foreign policy’ in what were two ‘lost decades’ for the 
Chinese Empire. The defeat by a much smaller army was seen as resulting 
merely from the superior fire-power of the ‘Western barbarians’ instead of 
being seen as pointing to the urgent need for radical change in the name of 
survival. Thus, acquiring Western weapons and manipulating the ‘Western 
barbarians’ through trade were regarded as the ways to manage the West, 
along with the age-old Confucian strategy towards ‘barbarians’, known as 
the ‘loose-rein policy’.99 
(2) 1860–80. After the 1857–60 War (with the invasion by Britain and France 
and huge shock of the burning of the Summer Palace in 1860), it dawned 
on the Chinese that the situation was unprecedented and ‘unalterable’.100 
Thus the ‘self-strengthening’ policy was adopted, stressing knowledge of 
the West (‘Western learning’, though it made limited inroads). This new 
phase saw the formation of the equivalent of a foreign ministry (the Tsungli 
Yamen) under enlightened officials Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang, the 
formation of the Interpreters College (for learning foreign languages, again 
with limited inroads made), the sending of the first permanent diplomatic 
mission to London in 1877, under Kuo Sung-too (a Confucian scholar like 
the rest but  forward-looking), followed by missions in Paris, Berlin, Madrid, 
St Petersburg, Washington and Tokyo, the translation of several international 
law treatises and the sending in the 1870s of the first student to study inter-
national law in Paris (Ma Chien-chung, who was to prove a valuable adviser 
on international affairs). China opened a new era in its relations with the 
West but continued to be torn between tradition and modernity.101 Western 
learning, the initiatives by Prince Kung and the positive appraisal of Britain 
by Kuo in his reports in London faced heavy criticism from traditionalists on 
Confucian grounds and on the grounds of Chinese superiority.102 
(3) 1880–1900. According to Sinologist Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, by ‘1880 China had 
belatedly taken her place in the family of nations’103 (this was not accepted 
by Western international lawyers, who placed the date later, at the turn of 
the century). What is more than clear is that Sinocentrism was now on the 
wane, the term ‘barbarians’ regarding the Westerners was dropped, ‘Western 
learning’ was now ‘new learning’, the Japanese Westernization example was 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   40 22/01/2015   10:53:41
Eurocentrism, ‘civilization’ and the ‘barbarians’ 41
seen in a positive light and by the 1890s ‘Western knowledge’ had entered the 
school curricula (previously it had been scanty to non-existent). The defeat 
in the war with Japan (1894–95), a lesser power, was a great shock and, with 
continued foreign expansion in the region (by Britain, France, Russia, as well 
as Germany), China felt threatened with dismemberment, with ‘being cut up 
like a melon’.104 Yet despite the urgency of the situation, there was backlash 
on the part of conservative officials, including the reactionary mother of the 
Emperor (the Empress Dowager), who ran the state given the weakness of 
her son. This period ended dramatically with a tug of war for China’s soul: 
on the one hand, there was the famous ‘hundred days’ when the Kuang-hsu 
Emperor asserted himself under the influence of the reformists, headed by 
scholar K’ang Yu-wa, who convinced him, for the good of the country and its 
survival, to take a series of major reforms, possibly including constitutional 
monarchy; and on the other, there was the Empress Dowager’s coup, which 
deposed her son and ushered in the reactionary Boxer Rising (with its call to 
‘expel the barbarians’).105 
As regards international law, on the eve of the Opium War, in 1839, com-
missioner Lin Tse-hsu, in charge of abolishing the opium trade, had extracts 
from Vattel’s treatise (see chapter 2), on a state’s right to control foreign trade, 
translated into Chinese. He also sent two eloquent letters to Queen Victoria 
(which she never read), in which he pointed out that she would no doubt ‘be 
bitterly aroused’ if people from another country ‘carried opium to England and 
seduced your people into buying and smoking it’.106
In the 1860s and 1870s, under the guidance of Kung, works of international 
law were translated into Chinese, starting with Wheaton’s treatise and followed 
by those of Woolsey, Martens, Bluntschli and Hall (all of them translated by 
W. A. P. Martin, who initially wanted to translate Vattel’s but found it too 
antiquated) as well as the Manuel de lois de la guerre of the Institut.107 Martin, 
an American missionary and member of the Institut who lived in China for 
sixty years, taught international law and tried to present it as compatible with 
Confucian tradition. But his translations and teachings had limited influence 
prior to the 1890s. No doubt China’s self-concept as the abode of civilization did 
not allow it to emulate Western-inspired international law, though it was obliged 
to do so in its relations with the Western powers. It was to incorporate inter-
national law and respect for the laws of war in its foreign behaviour mainly after 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.108 
Japan
Japan was isolated and autarkic for centuries, styling itself as an empire under 
the ‘Son of Heaven of the country where the sun rises’, implying that it was the 
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equal of China (under ‘the Son of Heaven of the country where the sun sets’), 
much to the Chinese Emperor’s anger, but, by and large, and despite Japan’s sense 
of superiority even in comparison with China, it fell under the Chinese ‘sphere 
of civilization’, together with Korea, Vietnam and other smaller countries of the 
region.109
From the early seventeenth century until Commodore Perry’s arrival in 
Japan in 1853, Japan, under the ruling Tokugawa warrior clan (with the Emperor 
powerless), had opted for a policy of complete seclusion (but for limited trade 
with Korea, China and the Dutch, and with no Japanese allowed to leave the 
country or foreigner to enter the country). When from Perry’s arrival onwards 
the Japanese were confronted with the West and obliged to sign unequal treaties 
(as in the case of other ‘uncivilized states’) their initial reaction to humiliation 
was to build Japan’s power and repel the ‘Western barbarians’.110 But with the 
advent of Emperor Meiji (and the ‘restoration’ of imperial power), seclusion was 
officially abandoned and Japan declared its willingness to become a member of 
international society. Indeed, it was deemed desirable to become Westernized, 
comply with Western rules and practices and to follow the Western ‘standard of 
civilization’. Major intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (the Enlightenment 
theorist) and Uchimura Kanzō (who introduced Christianity to Japan) were at 
the forefront of this process, together with the Meiji leaders. Students were sent to 
Europe and the US to study international law in a deliberate attempt to emulate 
the West. Various treatises on international law were translated into Japanese 
(far more than the number translated in China into Chinese), including those by 
Wheaton, Heffter, Bluntschli, Kent, Halleck and Hall, and were very influential 
(far more so than in China), making Japan better able to defend itself on the basis 
of Western international law.111
No doubt this overall pro-Western approach was stimulated by Japan’s appre-
hension that this was a one-way street: if it did not follow this course it was bound 
to lose its independence to the imperialist Western powers, which were spreading 
their colonies and influence across the world, including East Asia. The 1857–60 
defeat of China in particular was a turning point for the Japanese.112
For Japan, the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War provided the opportunity to join the 
‘family of nations’. After an initial bad start with its onslaught on Port Arthur (with 
3,000 dead civilians), the Japanese followed the laws of war, unlike the Chinese. 
Fukuzawa dubbed it ‘a war between civilization and barbarism’ and Uchimura 
claimed that the war was righteous, aimed at Korean independence.113 Two inter-
national law professors, Ariga Nagao and Takashaki Sakue, were appointed to the 
Japanese army and navy to make sure that no transgressions occurred and they 
wrote two international law books on the war, Ariga in French and Takashaki in 
English, the latter with an introduction by Holland and a preface by Westlake. 
These two British authorities claimed that, apart from the Port Arthur incident, 
Japan had followed the laws of war and merited being regarded as ‘civilized’ 
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and a member of the family of nations, a line taken by other European and US 
international lawyers.114 
The acclaimed jurist and diplomat Kaneko Kentaro (a Harvard graduate), 
an associate of the Institut de droit international, in an article in the Revue 
argued that the Japanese laws and institutions were of as a high standard as those 
in Europe and America. He distinguished between the European standard of 
civilization as a mere European juridical device and the wider, more substantial 
concept of civilization as such, which had a long history in Japan,115 concluding 
that the characteristic trait of the Japanese was that, when in contact with a 
worthy foreign civilization, they assimilated it, but this hardly amounted to 
simple imitation.116 
In Japan, criticism of the standard was rare. One of the very few dissenting 
voices was international lawyer Tsurutaro Senga, who criticized the standard as 
unscientific, beyond jurisprudence and ideologically charged and untenable.117
The downside to Japan joining the ‘family of nations’ was that it started to act 
as an expansionist imperialist power, trying to emulate the Western imperial-
ists, regarding itself as the only ‘civilized country’ in the region and its Asian 
neighbours fit to be under its hegemony.118
The Ottomans 
The European ‘Other’: the ‘Turks’
The Ottoman Empire was officially accepted as a member of the European family 
of nations, of international law (‘the public law of Europe’) as well as of the 
European Concert itself at the 1856 Congress of Paris, following the Crimean 
War, but was rarely treated as an equal.119 This was the case above all because 
the Ottomans were for centuries the quintessential ‘Other’ in the history of the 
European state system.120 
From the Renaissance onwards, the ‘Turks’ superseded the ‘Saracens’ as the 
European ‘Other’. They were depicted initially as ‘unbelievers’ (infidels) and 
later as ‘barbarians’.121 When Constantinople fell in 1453 to the Ottomans, King 
Christian I of Denmark spoke of the ‘grand Turk’ as ‘the beast rising out of the sea 
described in the Apocalypse’.122 The ‘Turks’ were seen ‘as a pernicious force sent by 
God to scourge Christendom from its sins’.123 Yet in the next century an exception 
was made: the first alliance between a European state and the Ottoman Empire, 
upon French initiative, during the struggle between the Habsburg Charles V 
and Francis I of France, the latter concluding several treaties with Suleyman the 
Magnificent.124 Moreover, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
the image of the ‘Turk’ was more nuanced, with many European travellers praising 
the Ottomans for their administration, for promoting people on the basis of merit 
and not birth, as well as for their cleanliness and good manners.125
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From the eighteenth century onwards, the negative image dominated the 
scene. For Edmund Burke, they were ‘wholly Asiatic’, ‘worse than savages’, people 
who ‘despised’ all Christians as infidels and wished to subdue and exterminate 
them.126
In the nineteenth century, Lorimer, expressing a widely held sentiment of his 
time, opined that ‘the rights of civilization’ should not have been extended to the 
‘Turks’ in Paris in 1856, for ‘bitter experience’ had shown that they are incapable 
of performing their duties and ‘possibly do not even belong to the progressive 
races of mankind’,127 adding that ‘there is probably no other instance of a people 
that has been so long in contact with civilization without producing one single 
individual who has been distinguished in any intellectual pursuit. The art of war 
is the only art that they seem capable of acquiring’.128 
Following the Congress of Vienna (1815), no less than five options were 
enter tained by public figures regarding the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the 
so-called ‘Eastern Question’:129 (1) upholding its territorial integrity; (2) dis-
memberment and division of the spoils by the great powers; (3) expulsion from 
Europe; (4) Russian conquest of part of the Empire, including the Straits and 
Constantinople; and (5) major reforms that would make the Ottoman state like 
the other modern ‘civilized’ European states. 
The first option was advocated by, among others, Austrian Chancellor Clemens 
von Metternich and British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh in the 1820s, and in the 
1870s by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli and his Foreign Secretary Lord Derby, 
though they hardly regarded the Ottoman Empire as an equal state. 
The second option, dismemberment, suggested to be the ultimate aim or wish 
(or wishful thinking) by several personalities in Europe, and not least in Russia, 
was impractical, for it meant a general war, with unpredictable consequences. One 
of the few explicit presentations of this option by a public figure was in 1829, by the 
ultra-royalist Jules de Polignac, the last premier of King Charles X of France.130 
The third possibility (expulsion from Europe) was supported across the 
political spectrum: in France by the writer and politician Chateaubriand, 
the French historian and statesman François Guizot (the dominant figure of 
the July Monarchy) and the writer and politician Alphonse de Lamartine, one 
of the founders of the French Second Republic; in Britain by Stratford Canning 
in the 1820s and many Liberals; in Prussia in the 1820s by the historian Friedrich 
Ancillon as Director of the Prussian Foreign Ministry; and in Russia in the 
1820s by Ioannis Capodistrias, as co-Foreign Minister of Russia, and in the 
1870s by Russian ambassador Nikolay Ignatiev, both advocates of the creation 
of independent Christian states in all the Balkans. This was also the approach of 
Giuseppe Mazzini.
The fourth option (Russian conquest) was entertained not only by Russian 
nationalists and pan-Slavists, such as Ivan Aksakov or Fiodor Dostoevsky in the 
1870s, but also by Richard Cobden (see below). By and large, however, this option 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   44 22/01/2015   10:53:41
Eurocentrism, ‘civilization’ and the ‘barbarians’ 45
was seen as unrealistic, even by the pan-Slavists who fantasized about capturing 
Constantinople. 
For a time from 1839 until 1875, the Tanzimat reforms made the fifth option – 
reforming the Ottomans, based on the conviction that the Ottoman Empire could 
indeed be reformed and follow the European model – a distinct possibility.131 This 
minority view was held by several Orientalists, including British diplomat and 
politician David Urquhart in the 1840s and 1850s and two pro-Ottoman British 
ambassadors to the Porte in the 1870s, Henry Elliot and Austen Henry Layard. 
However, the 1875–78 Balkan crisis and the Bulgarian atrocities were decisive 
in convincing most of the elite in Europe that the Ottoman Empire was perhaps 
‘unreformable’.132 
Stratford Canning, the long-serving British ambassador to the Porte, is the 
first to have used the expression about driving the Sultan ‘bags and baggage into 
the heart of Asia’.133 Guizot maintained that the ‘Turks will go out of Europe’ and 
that that day ‘would be a triumph for humanity’.134 
The French diplomat and jurist Édouard Engelhardt, a frequent contributor 
to the Revue and acclaimed Ottomanist, argued that ‘the Ottoman Porte finds 
itself in a situation of subordination vis-à-vis the continental powers’, in a state 
of ‘tutelage’ and ‘surveillance’.135 As for the Tanzimat reforms, he concluded, in 
his two-volume study, that they had not transformed the Empire into a secular 
state. It remained under Islam’s doctrine, ‘primitive’, ‘fanatic’, ‘Asiatic’, ‘corrupt’, 
‘inferior’, ‘despotic’ and ‘virtually at war’ with the Christians and Europeans, 
whom they hated for their ‘superiority’.136
Such views were not limited to conservatives but resonated among liberals, 
socialists and other progressive thinkers and public figures of the long nineteenth 
century. 
A striking case is Cobden, the important Radical and Liberal politician and 
scathing critic of British imperial rule, who, in damning the ‘Turks’, went as far 
as supporting a Russian conquest of Constantinople. According to Cobden, the 
‘backwardness’ of the ‘Turks’ was due: (1) to Islam, for it teaches its followers ‘to 
despise all other fields of learning than the Koran’; 137 (2) to ‘a fierce, unmitigated, 
military despotism’ under the Sultan, which ‘enables him to sway the lives and 
destinies of the people, with an absoluteness greater than was ever enjoyed by any 
tyrant of ancient times’;138 (3) to their disdain for commerce and industry, and 
the forbidding of communication with the ‘infidels’;139 and (4) to a distinctive 
characteristic of the ‘Turkish’ and ‘Mongolian races’, compared with the Russian 
and ‘Sclavonic’ (sic), ‘the former unchanging and stationary, the latter progressing 
and imitative’.140
Gladstone, in his famous pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East (1876), written as an impassioned reaction to the 1876 Bulgarian atrocities 
(see chapter 8), claimed that this instance of barbarity was not a question of 
‘Mahometanism simply’:141
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but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of race. They [the 
‘Turks’] are not like the mild Mahometans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins 
of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain. They were, upon the whole, from the 
black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of 
humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind 
them, and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization disappeared from view. 
They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by 
law.
This frame of mind continued until the eve of the First World War. Georges 
Scelle, for instance, one of the most innovative French international lawyers of 
the inter-war period (he discarded sovereignty and regarded individuals as the 
subjects of international law),142 claimed (in 1911) that ‘the Turks’ were a ‘living 
anachronism’, that their ‘particularly energetic methods of repression’ were not 
used in modern times by European states, and that ‘the Turk’, well known for his 
massacres and plunders, had ‘never more than camped in Europe’.143
David Lloyd George, the last Liberal Prime Minister of Britain, confided before 
the outbreak of the First World War that he was all for the expulsion of ‘the Turk’ 
from Europe, bag and baggage, adding that ‘personally, I don’t want him even to 
keep Constantinople’.144
The admission of the Ottoman Empire 
The admission of the Ottoman Empire to the 1856 Congress of Paris had been 
mainly political: keeping the Ottoman Empire formally outside was seen 
as counter productive. There were obvious advantages to making it a titular 
member of the European legal structure and thus partaking in the stability of the 
continent.145
There was also the tricky question as to whether the Ottoman Empire was 
now an equal member of the Concert of Europe, actually the sixth European 
great power (with Italy later as the seventh).146 The wording is more than clear 
(‘et du concert Européens’) and Turkish Ottomanist scholars claim that in 1856 
the Ottoman Empire had indeed become ‘a member of the European concert’.147 
Yet for the next decades there was considerable disagreement about the 
Ottoman Empire’s legal status.148 Lorimer regarded the admission a major mistake, 
‘Turkey’ a ‘phantom state’, its recognition a ‘farce’, and he urged the Europeans to 
conquer Constantinople and civilize the country.149 Few jurists were so extreme 
but even moderates such as Twiss,150 Martens, Westlake and Rivier regarded the 
admission premature and incomplete, given the capitulation system.151 
For the great majority of European and US publicists and diplomats the 
Ottoman admission was provisional. It was to remain inside Europe condition-
ally, the condition being improving the living conditions of the Christians in 
the Ottoman Empire.152 The 1856 Treaty of Paris also referred to respect for the 
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independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by the signatory 
states. Yet after 1856, interventions in the Ottoman Empire increased rather than 
diminished, on humanitarian or other grounds. Indeed, the ‘maltreatment of 
Christian minorities’ provided ‘an excuse for foreign intervention in Ottoman 
affairs’ and such deficiencies in ‘civilization’ limited the Ottoman Empire’s ability 
to participate in the European international system as a full legal personality.153
The Ottoman response
To begin with, the universalist Islam-centred approach during the Ottoman 
golden age (from 1453 until the end of the seventeenth century) left little ground 
for international legal relations among equals. But with the Empire’s decline the 
Ottoman rulers had grudgingly to accept their inferior position, at least techno-
logically and militarily, and the need for reforms, starting in the reigns of sultans 
Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II (1808–39).
The Ottoman reaction to the nineteenth-century humanitarian interventions 
and other intrusions in the Empire’s internal affairs warrants a separate study. 
One can approach this theme, which has wider ramifications, by delving into the 
Ottoman archives and by examining what has been written by present Turkish 
and other specialists on the Ottoman Empire’s troubled relations with Europe. 
On both counts, the overall thrust is that the European powers were biased, 
anti-Ottoman and, according to modern scholars, Orientalist. Moreover, the 
massacres committed by the Ottomans were grossly exaggerated, while those 
committed by the Christians were downplayed or even justified, and there was 
no concern whatsoever for the plight of the Muslims at the hands of the Christian 
insurgents.154 
Here we will limit ourselves to a few cursory remarks on the official Ottoman 
response and on the stance of the Ottoman opposition. 
When intervention was afoot, the attitude of the Porte was, at times, one of 
rejection and outrage, as we will see in the Greek case of great power involvement 
in 1821–32 (chapter 6) and with the Balkan uprisings of 1876–78 (chapter 9), 
or, at other times, one of bending with the wind, as we will see in the case of 
the Lebanon/Syria crisis of 1860–61 (chapter 7). These two contrasting postures 
correspond to the reigns of Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II, with their haughty 
reaction, which was counterproductive for the Ottoman Empire, and Abdulmecid, 
who was the most reformist Sultan of the nineteenth century and who followed a 
careful approach vis-à-vis the European great powers.
Special reference is due to the Tanzimat reforms, which commenced in 1839, 
the very year that Abdulmecid succeeded his father, Mahmud II, as sultan. These 
reforms started with the 1839 Rose Chamber Edict and the process lasted nearly 
four decades; they were headed by committed reformist statesmen, in particular 
by Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha, Mehmed Fuad Pasha and 
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Ahmed Shefik Midhat Pasha, as Foreign Ministers and Grand Viziers, until 
1877. The aim was to render the Ottoman state modern, more effective and more 
legitimate to its subjects, not least to its non-Muslim minorities, but above all the 
aimed was to save the Empire from collapse, by not permitting further external 
meddling in its domestic affairs.155 Presumably, in an Ottoman Empire where 
equality and the rule of law reigned – where previously all were either reaya 
(flock) or kul (servants-slaves of the Sultan) – there would be fewer pretexts for 
foreign admixture. If European interference was threatened it could be dealt with 
more convincingly by the Porte as unwarranted. One of the aims of the reforms 
from the start was also Ottoman accession to the Concert of Europe.156
Under Abdulmecid, several Ottoman officials, some of whom, like Mehmed 
Fuad Pasha (Foreign Minister and Grand Vizier), had studied in Europe and 
were proficient in international law, were aware of the humanitarian intervention 
discourse in Europe and tried to adjust the policy of the Empire accordingly. 
European diplomacy was entrusted to Ottoman diplomats, many of them 
Ottoman Greeks, trained as lawyers in Western Europe, such as John Aristarchis 
and Constantine Mousouros (who served as Ottoman ambassador in London 
for thirty-five years) and Alexander Karatheodori Pasha (under-secretary at the 
Foreign Ministry and briefly Foreign Minister in 1878).157
The other side of the coin is the stance of the Ottoman opposition, namely 
the ‘Young Turks’ (as they were known in Europe), headed by the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP) in exile (mainly in Paris, Geneva, Cairo and in 
various British cities), whose avowed aim was the overthrow of absolutism and the 
formation of a democratic and modern Ottoman Empire. The CUP in exile was 
not limited to educated radical young men who could not stand Abdulhamid’s 
Islamist turn and onslaught against all forms of opposition, but came to include 
some major high-ranking Ottoman officials, such as Murad Bey (briefly the main 
figure of the CUP in exile), Ismail Kemal Bey, Basil Mousouros Gkikis (the leader 
of the Ottoman Greek Young Turks) and none other than the Sultan’s brother-
in-law, Damad Mahmud Pasha, and his two sons, Princes Sabahaddin Bey and 
Lutfullah Bey.158 
With the advent of the twentieth century the liberal wing of the Young Turks 
was headed by Sabahaddin, who was close to Greek and Armenian Young 
Turks. He advocated foreign armed intervention, mainly on the part of Britain 
and France, the ‘liberal great powers’ as he called them, in order to overturn 
Abdulhamid’s authoritarian rule. This foreign intervention would allow the 
liberal Ottomans to address the Armenian plight and bring about a modern, 
liberal, multi-ethnic, quasi-federal Ottoman state. This was known as the majority 
view of the Young Turks, though it was in the ascendency for only a brief period. 
And there was the minority view (soon to become the dominant view), headed 
by the conservatives and would-be nationalists under Ahmed Rıza, who opposed 
any notion of European armed intervention.159 
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At the First Congress of Ottoman Opposition, held in Paris in February 1902, 
Sabahaddin urged the acceptance of ‘the benevolent mediation of the Great 
Powers’ in order ‘to execute the terms of the treaties, and to bring force to bear 
against the present absolutist regime that rules against the general will in our 
fatherland’.160 He called for intervention on behalf of all ‘Ottoman nations’ 
(including the Ottoman Greeks, the Ottoman Armenians and the Ottoman 
Jews).161 When the question was put to him whether the intervention was to be 
military, Sabahaddin’s response was ‘How many times have [the great powers] 
intervened in our domestic affairs, how many times even have parts of our country 
been taken away? Why do we not want to transform these interventions, which 
most of the time took place without even a military action, into one favoring our 
own interests?’162 Rıza retorted that ‘every nation is free to conduct its domestic 
affairs in conformance to its own will’; foreign interventions in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire had always taken place in order to advance the interests of those 
intervening; seeking European intervention amounted to accepting ‘our inability 
and impotence’; and if Europe intervened it would be to advance its own ‘material 
interest’ and any gains for ‘us’ would be far less than the losses; moreover, calls for 
intervention would bring about malign Russian intervention.163 
The end result of the debate was a compromise formula calling the great powers 
for concours morale, taken from a wording used by the reformist Grand Vizier 
Midhat in the 1870s. At the Second Congress of Ottoman Opposition, in Paris in 
1907, with the conservatives under Rıza now the majority, the use of armed force 
to topple the Addulhamid regime was approved but it was to be achieved without 
foreign assistance.164
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International law and humanitarian intervention
Advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention
From the 1860s onwards, international law became an academic discipline in its 
own right in Europe and the Americas, taught separately from philosophy, natural 
law or civil law, and came to be written by professional academics or theoretically 
inclined diplomats.1 Until then what existed was the droit public de l’Europe or 
‘external public law’. Britain in particular had to face the ‘spectre of Austin’,2 who 
dominated British jurisprudence in the first part of the nineteenth century. For 
John Austin, ‘laws properly so called’ were ‘established directly by command’3 
and those lacking command were ‘positive moral rules which are laws improperly 
so called … laws set or imposed by general opinion’4 and this was the case with the 
‘so called law of nations [which] consists of opinions or sentiments current among 
nations generally’.5
Two landmarks for international law are the founding of its first scholarly 
journal and of an institute/association of international lawyers (see chapter 3). 
The journal, the Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, was launched 
in Belgium in 1868, by the Belgian Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Dutch Tobias 
Asser and the British John Westlake, with the support of the Italian Professor 
Pasquale Mancini.6 Rolin-Jaequemyns was also at the forefront of the creation of 
the Institut de droit international in 1873, with the help of Bluntschli, Holtzendorff, 
Calvo, Mancini and a few others.7 
At its inception, the ultimate aim of the Institut was ‘[d]e favoriser le progrès 
du droit international, en s’efforçant de devenir l’organe de la conscience juridique 
du monde civilisé’.8 The wording in question had come from Bluntschli, who had 
used such language before in his publications.9 As Martti Koskenniemi points 
out, the reference to ‘legal conscience’, or ‘consciousness’, seems to us today ‘old-
fashioned and difficult to take in full seriousness’.10 But in those days this aim 
was taken in all seriousness and voiced by worldly publicists, many of them with 
hands-on experience as politicians, diplomats, lawyers or judges.
Interestingly, humanitarian intervention entered the scene as international 
law was developing into a scientific discipline, as in the case of another science in 
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its modern form, history, which matured hand in hand with the rise of national-
ism (hence the emergence of national historiography in the nineteenth century).11 
From the 1830s until the 1930s most publicists addressed the question of inter-
vening or not for humanitarian purposes to stop ‘the effusion of blood’, with a clear 
majority favouring the use of armed force for humanitarian purposes in certain 
exceptional cases, thereby bypassing the cardinal norm of non-intervention (see 
table 4.1). According to Wilhelm Grewe’s assessment, in the nineteenth century 
‘the principle of humanitarian intervention increasingly absorbed all other 
grounds of intervention (with the exception of contractual permission and self-
help)’.12 This tendency in law and practice is striking, for, prior to the UN Charter 
and the international law of human rights, there was no international legal ban 
on acts of inhumanity by states, and sovereignty and independence, including 
the norm of non-intervention, were the cornerstones of international law. On the 
other hand, aggressive war was permitted and was a manifestation of sovereignty.13 
The ‘paradoxical outcome’ was that ‘the greater threat to the integrity of states 
(waging war) was widely regarded as legitimate, but the lesser (intervention) was 
not’;14 thus, ‘in the absence of a clear distinction between intervention and war any 
regulation of the former could be circumvented by resort to the latter’.15 
There was also the parallel development of the laws of war aimed at humanizing 
warfare initiated by Henry Dunant in the wake of the suffering in the Crimean War 
and the 1859 Battle of Solferino during the Second Italian War of Independence.16 
The laws of warfare were the first branch of international law to be codified17 and 
these mention the concept of ‘humanity’. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
on land warfare adopted, in ‘the interests of humanity’, what came to be known 
as the ‘Martens clause’, proposed by F. F. Martens, ‘that in cases not included in 
the Regulations adopted … the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and 
the dictates of the public conscience’. Thus, at the turn of century, the humani-
tarian idea had entered general international law.18
The advocates of humanitarian intervention, within a period of about a century, 
from the 1830s to the 1930s, regarded it as legitimate, but only if it fulfilled the 
following criteria: (1) intervention was needed to counter gross mistreatment and 
massacres ‘shocking the moral consciousness of mankind’, (2) the intervention 
was collective or quasi-collective, so as to acquire international legitimacy and 
limit the abuse factor; and (3) disinterestedness or that humanitarian concern 
was one of the main motives and justifications for intervening.19 
Those opposed to such interventions based their case on the principles of 
sover eignty and independence, with non-intervention as their corollary, as well as 
on practical grounds, especially abuse by powerful states, with total disinterested-
ness regarded as unrealistic and by definition bogus. Some also alluded to the 
double standard of singling out only ‘barbarous’ states for intervention.
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We have identified no less than 100 publicists who had addressed the question 
from the 1830s up to the 1930s, mainly with the historical examples of the 
nineteenth century in mind.20 Sixty-two were supportive of humanitarian inter-
vention (that is, 62 per cent of the total). Of the publicists supportive of armed 
humanitarian intervention, forty-eight claimed a right to intervene in exceptional 
circumstances only and fourteen invoked moral or political reasons. There is also 
a substantial minority against any such legal or moral right: thirty-eight publicists 
(that is, 38 per cent of the total) (see table 4.1).21
To make our presentation as lucid as possible, we will divide our material into 
five periods, from the 1830s until the 1930s, and present it, to the degree possible, 
in the form of a debate.
1830–50: from Wheaton to Heffter
In the 1830s and 1840s, eleven publicists addressed the question, more or less 
equally divided into advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention (see 
table 4.1).
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Egide Arntz, of the University 
of Brussels, was credited as the first to formulate the theory of humanitarian 
intervention, this in the mid-1870s.22 Arntz’s thesis was presented in a letter he 
sent to Rolin-Jaequemyns, which the latter published in the Revue.23 But most 
commentators in the second part of the nineteenth and today regard Wheaton as 
the initiator of the concept, on the basis of the following statement, made a few 
years after the end of the Greek independence struggle, in his 1836 treatise:24 
The interference of the Christian powers of Europe, in favor of the Greeks, who, 
after enduring ages of cruel oppression, had shaken off the Ottoman yoke, affords a 
further illustration of the principles of international law authorizing such an inter-
ference, not only where the interests and safety of other powers are immediately 
affected by the internal transactions of a particular state, but where the general 
interests of humanity are infringed by the excesses of a barbarous and despotic 
government.
Wheaton’s view on intervention was put to task by the Italian–French 
jurist, economist and politician Pellegrino Rossi and by the British lawyer and 
economist Nassau William Senior. Rossi advocated neutrality in civil wars, save 
when a neighbouring state was menaced by the conflict.25 Senior, a frequent writer 
on political affairs and governmental adviser, commented that ‘interference for 
the mere purpose of preventing the oppression of Subjects by their Prince’ was 
unlawful26 and dangerous, and made the lasting point that it was ‘the privilege … 
of the strong against the weak’.27
In the 1840s, three advocates of non-intervention allowed for a slight opening 
for exceptional intervention in instances of humanitarian plight. The Norwegian 
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authority Johan Heiberg (in 1842) regarded intervention for humanity ‘inevitable’, 
when ‘assured rights and reciprocally recognized principles’ were ‘endangered’.28 
His German contemporary, Heffter, opined that nations ‘have incontestably the 
right to put an end, after common consent, to a civil war which devours one or 
more countries’ and this could also be done by ‘armed interference’;29 he added 
that ‘foreign powers can assist the party whose position seems to them to be 
founded on justice, if it invokes their help’.30 Herman Rodecker von Rotteck 
asserted that ‘[h]umanitarian intervention should be considered as a violation of 
law, but sometimes excused, or even applauded, as we excuse a crime’.31 
1851–70: from Phillimore, Woolsey and Mamiani to Fiore and Bluntschli 
In the 1850s and 1860s at least eleven publicists addressed the question for the first 
time, with the supporters more than double the opponents, eight against three, 
and if to them we add those from the previous period who had not passed away 
(and presumably had not retracted their views), the numbers are ten as opposed 
to six jurists (see table 4.1).
In the mid-1850s, Phillimore argued that a limitation of the principle of non-
intervention ‘may possibly arise from the necessity of Intervention by Foreign 
Powers in order to stay the shedding of blood caused by a protracted and desolating 
civil war in the bosom of another State’.32 He regarded it as ‘an accessory’ to other 
factors and on its own not in the code of international law, ‘since it is manifestly 
open to abuses’.33 Despite his misgivings he concluded that intervention by a 
Christian state ‘on behalf of the subjects of another upon the ground of Religion’ 
is not ‘a violation of International Law … as an armed Intervention to prevent the 
shedding of blood and protracted internal hostilities’.34
In the US, the Yale Professor Theodore Dwight Woolsey maintained, in his 
1860 treatise, that interference can be justified if ‘brought about by the crime 
of a government against its subjects’,35 adding that in the case ‘of extraordinary 
crimes committed by a government against its subjects … the danger of erring is 
less than in the other instances, because interference here is more disinterested; 
and the evil results of a mistake are less, because such cases are comparatively 
rare’.36 In the same year, Professor Albert Friedrich Berner of the University of 
Berlin asserted that there were reasonable exceptions to non-intervention, such 
as continued acts of inhumanity, for ‘[m]an is the highest right before which all 
other right must incline’.37
The end of the 1850s saw one of the most elaborate rebuttals of humanitarian 
intervention, by Terenzio Mamiani. After a detailed presentation of the various 
reasons for intervention he concluded that ‘all forcible intervention in the internal 
affairs of a people is to be deemed unjust and oppressive’.38 As he put it, ‘[t]he doings 
or misdoings of a people … within the bounds of its own territory, and without 
detriment to others’ rights, never afford any ground for legitimate intervention’.39 
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However, Mamiani allowed for two exceptions to non-intervention, which he did 
not associate with intervention in humanitarian plights: (1) intervention when a 
war was waged by a subject people;40 and (2) ‘opposing the wrongful intervention 
of others, and undoing the certain and immediate effects which it has induced’,41 
that is, counter-intervention. 
Mountague Bernard, the first Professor of International Law in Britain, 
occupant of the newly created Chichele Chair of International Law and 
Diplomacy at Oxford University, is hard to pinpoint. In a lecture at All Souls 
College at Oxford University on the principle of non-intervention, he argued 
against intervention, referring extensively to Mamiani’s arguments.42 But then 
he made an about-face by distinguishing between ‘rebellion’ and ‘revolt’, defining 
the former as successful change of government or dynasty and the latter as the 
splitting of a state into two parts. He claimed that in the latter case ‘interference 
ceases to be intervention when this is done’, as in the case of the Battle of Navarino 
during the Greek War of Independence (see chapter 6), which could not be seen 
as ‘simply an intervention in the internal affairs of the Turkish empire’.43 Another 
remark by Bernard makes his overall position even more baffling: that ‘for the 
protection of the weak … there may be the most powerful inducements to shake 
off the restraints of the rule [of non-intervention]. Nay, there may even be cases in 
which it becomes a positive duty to transgress it’.44
Henry Wager Halleck, an American Civil War general better known as a 
jurist, maintained that interference on humanitarian grounds was lawful only 
if it amounted to ‘pacific mediation’, that is, ‘one State merely proposing its good 
offices for the settlement of the intestine [sic] dissensions of another State’. 45 
The important Liberal politician Sir William Vernon Harcourt, repeatedly 
cabinet minister under Gladstone and one-time Professor of International Law at 
Cambridge (the first occupant of the Whewell Chair in International Law), made 
the following oft-quoted remark: ‘Intervention is a question rather of policy than 
of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably 
handled by those who have the power to give effect to it, may be the highest policy 
of justice and humanity’.46 But he cautioned: ‘I am not insensitive to the respect-
able sentiments of humanity … but I also know that, of all things, the most cruel 
is a mistaken and useless interference’.47
Pasquale Fiore, the leading Italian authority, criticized the publicists who 
remained indifferent spectators of the affairs of other countries if their interests 
were not directly threatened48 and added graphically (in 1865):49 
Let us suppose … that a prince, in order to quell a revolution, violates all the 
most recognized laws of war, kills the prisoners, authorizes plundering, rapine, 
arson, and encourages his supporters to commit those odious acts and others of 
the same kind.… The laissez-faire and indifference of other States constitutes an 
egoistic policy contrary to the rights of all; for whoever violates international law 
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…violates it not only to the detriment of the person directly affected, but against 
all civilized States.
His conclusion is that under these circumstances collective intervention is 
‘obligatory’.50 
Bluntschli of Heidelberg University asserted that ‘[t]he civilized nations 
in particular are called upon to develop the sentiment of the common laws of 
humanity’51 and that ‘[o]ne is authorized to intervene to ensure respect for the 
individual rights recognized as necessary … an oppressed minority could … 
provoke foreign intervention, not in the name of the state, but in the name of 
international law’.52
1871–90: from Arntz and Martens to Carnazza Amari and Renault 
In the 1870s and 1880s many authorities advocated a legal right of humanitarian 
intervention, with a majority in favour, thirteen against ten, and if we add those 
from the previous period who were still active, the numbers are twenty-two to 
thirteen publicists (see table 4.1). 
In the 1870s Arntz set the pace with the following oft-quoted passage:53
When a government, although acting within the limits of its sovereign rights, 
violates the rights of humanity … by an excess of injustice and cruelty, which 
deeply wounds our mores and civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate. 
For however worthy of respect may be the rights of sovereignty and the indepen-
dence of States, there is something even more worthy of respect, and this is the law 
of humanity, or of human society, which must not be outraged. 
Arntz specified that intervention in the name of humanity should be sanctioned 
by the greater number of civilized states, which should arrive at a collective 
decision, for only in this manner could intervention be reconciled with state 
independence.54 
Rolin-Jaequemyns concurred with Arntz, and asked ‘what would happen if 
in the place of a despotic monarch who is an outrage to the law of humanity, a 
victorious faction acts, in the name of a republic or a democracy, with analogous 
excess … [embarks on] a civil war of extermination, massacring the prisoners and 
hostages and threatening to plunge again into barbary all the parts of the country 
that have not already become a desert’?55 Elsewhere he made the following 
pertinent point: for ‘a State to lay claim to the principle of non-intervention it 
should be a State worthy of its name and a viable one’.56
F. F. Martens, the major Russian jurist, referred in 1877, apropos of the Russian 
intervention in the Balkans (see chapter 9), to the ‘interests of humanity’ as 
a reason for intervention, ‘in order to safeguard the interests recognized as 
worthy of sympathy by all the civilized nations’, namely ‘the life and honour of 
Christians’.57 A few years later he elaborated the point thus:58 
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In the relations of civilized peoples with the non-civilized … the intervention 
by civilized states is in principle legitimate, in the case of a Christian population 
of those countries being exposed to barbaric persecutions or massacres. In this 
particular case intervention is justified by common religious interests and con-
siderations of philanthropy.
This view regarding non-civilized states had first appeared in 1874 in a study 
in Russian by Leonid Komarovskiy, Martens’s colleague at the University of 
Moscow, who was a student of Bluntschli and a frequent writer in the Revue.59
Those supportive of humanitarian intervention during this decade included 
Sheldon Amos,60 Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London, and 
the British judge Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy.61 Those decidedly against included 
the Catania professor and Italian politician Giuseppe Carnazza Amari, the French 
international lawyers Henri Bonfils62 and Louis Renault and the Luxembourgian 
French sociologist Théophile Funck-Brentano, together with the French historian 
Albert Sorel,63 Professor of Diplomatic History and co-founder of the École libre 
des sciences politiques.
As forcefully put by Giuseppe Carnazza Amari, Fiore’s main rival in the Italian 
school on this question, a champion of non­intervention absolue:64 
No case exists where a foreign sovereignty has the right to substitute national 
sovereignty; consequently intervention is never possible, neither as a rule nor as an 
exception.… All coercive influence from abroad constitutes a violent intrusion of 
one’s domain, a supreme tyranny of the powerful against the weak, the usurpation 
and the rapine of the sovereign powers on which we have no right, an exercise of 
illegitimate power, a servitude imposed by the oppressor on the oppressed. 
As for civil wars, he maintained that ‘whatever the good intention may be 
of the one who wants to intervene, he lacks the right, for he has no sovereign 
authority over other nations … the man with the best of intentions in the world 
cannot reconcile by force another family which leads a life of hate and troubles’.65 
Yet he allowed for three exceptions, which he did not regard as interventions and 
contraventions of non-intervention: assistance to a people who cannot on their 
own get rid of foreign domination; aid to a people who want to separate from a 
people with whom they have been forcefully united; and aid to a people to deliver 
themselves from foreign intervention and its results.66
Louis Renault of the University of Paris, the doyen of French international 
lawyers in the last two decades of nineteenth century, was equally averse to the 
idea of humanitarian intervention. As he tersely put it (in 1879): ‘Very often the 
nations called civilized have abused their power with regard to the so-called 
barbarian peoples, having declared unjustified wars and having violated the 
most elementary rules of international law’.67 Referring to Bluntschli’s view on 
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humani tarian intervention he notes that ‘this may happen, but I think that it is not 
desirable, for the slope will be slippery’.68
In the period 1880–90, those supporting humanitarian intervention include the 
British William Edward Hall and James Lorimer,69 the French diplomat Édouard 
Engelhardt,70 the Swiss Joseph Hornung71 and the Greek Michel Kebedgy, of the 
University of Berne.72
Hall at the start of the 1880s was circumspect in his widely read treatise of 1880 
(with eight editions up to 1924),73 putting commentators at a loss where to place 
him in the debate.74 According to Hall, ‘[t]yrannical conduct of a government 
towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecu-
tion, are acts which have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such [inter-state] 
relations’.75 But he concluded that intervention ‘for the reason or upon the pretexts 
of cruelty, or oppression, or the horrors of civil war … could only be excused 
in rare and extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary 
character of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and 
conduct of the intervening state’.76 
The 1880s also saw one of the clearest presentations of the arguments against 
humanitarian intervention, by the French jurist Paul Louis Pradier-Fodéré, 
one-time Professor of International Law at the University of Lima and author of 
a multivolume treatise on international law, who referred to the views of Arntz, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns, Woolsey and Fiore in support of intervening for humanitarian 
reasons, but concluded that ‘it is impossible to accept such a doctrine’,77 for:78 
A nation could still be in such a backward stage as to accommodate absolutism, 
to voluntarily suffer despotism; on the basis of what right can foreign Powers 
claim that they can impose liberty? A nation, even a backward one, is the only one 
competent to regulate its political, civil and religious organization; it is free to 
adopt its form on the basis of its customs and ideas; foreign peoples are not entitled 
to impose them. 
For Pradier-Fodéré, humanitarian intervention ‘is illegitimate for it constitutes 
an infringement upon the independence of States.… The acts of inhumanity, 
however condemnable they may be, as long as they do not affect or threaten the 
rights of other States, do not provide the latter with a basis for lawful intervention, 
as no State can stand up in judgment of the conduct of others’.79 
1891–1918: from Lawrence and Rivier to Westlake, Oppenheim and Nys
In the 1890s and until the end of the First World War, the advocates total eighteen 
and the opponents thirteen, and if we add those from the previous period who 
were still active, the numbers are nearly equal, twenty-six advocates and twenty-
four opposed (see table 4.1).
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During the 1890s the jurists supportive of humanitarian intervention include 
the British Thomas Joseph Lawrence, the Swiss Alphonse Rivier, the French 
Antoine Pillet,80 Louis Le Fur81 and Albert de Lapradelle,82 and the Americans 
Amos S. Hershey 83 and Theodore S. Woolsey.84 Those against in the 1890s include 
the French Frantz Despagnet, the Germans Franz von Liszt85 and Adolphe de 
Floeckher 86 and the British Thomas Alfred Walker.87 
In 1895 Lawrence of Oxford University put it thus:88 
Should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting that the best instincts of 
human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it 
to an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of the contest, 
there is nothing in the law of nations which will condemn as a wrong-doer the 
state which steps forward and undertakes the necessary intervention. Each case 
must be judged on its own merits … I have no right to enter my neighbor’s garden 
without his consent; but if I saw a child of his robbed and ill-treated in it by a tramp, 
I should throw ceremony to the wind and rush to the rescue without waiting to ask 
for permission.
Rivier, a year later, referred approvingly to the views of Arntz and Rolin-
Jaequemyns and asserted that ‘[t]he law of human society … represented by 
the Society of nations is superior to the law of a nation on its own. When a State 
violates the law of humanity, it is not for one state to intervene, on its own, and 
without a mandate. But States as a whole, representing human society, which is 
injured … have the right to intervene as in the case of one State on its own which 
intervenes when its proper right of preservation is injured’.89 
Among opponents, Despagnet of the University of Bordeaux argued that inter-
vention against a government ‘which in its exercise of internal sovereignty violates 
the laws of humanity … cannot be accepted, as it gives rise to abuse and, under 
the pretext of safeguarding the interests of populations, it completely ruins the 
respect of State sovereignty; a government could, for example, not permit slavery 
or halt the traffic of slaves in all the domains that fall under its own authority, but 
it cannot impose the suppression [of slavery] to other States in their territory’.90
In the early twentieth century and until the end of the ‘Great War’, supporters of 
humanitarian intervention include John Westlake, Lassa Oppenheim, the French 
Alexandre Mérignhac91 and Antoine Rougier, the Italian Arrigo Cavaglieri,92 
and the Americans William Ezra Lingelbach,93 Edwin Borchard94 and Henry 
Green Hodges.95 Those against include the British Thomas Erskine Holland96 and 
Frederick Edwin Smith,97 the Belgian Ernest Nys, the German Karl von Gareis,98 
and the Americans George Grafton Wilson and Charles Cheney Hyde.99
Westlake referred to anarchy and misrule as grounds for intervention100 and 
stated ‘[i]t is idle to argue in such a case that the duty of neighbouring peoples is to 
look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not for creatures of the imagination, 
and they must not create or tolerate for them situations which are beyond the 
endurance’.101 
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Oppenheim was more circumspect in his monumental 1905 treatise, contending 
that ‘[m]any jurists maintain that intervention is … admissible, or even has a basis 
of right, when exercised in the interest of humanity for the purpose of stopping 
religious persecution and endless cruelties in time of peace and war’ and he 
referred to intervention in the Greek case.102 And added ‘[b]ut whether there 
is really a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such intervention may well 
be doubted … and it may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations will 
recognise the rule that interventions in the interest of humanity are admissible, 
provided they are exercised in the form of collective intervention of the Powers’.103 
Rougier argued that collective humanitarian intervention was preferable to 
individual intervention for it is more able to establish ‘disinterestedness and 
greater authority’.104 He was the first jurist to present a list of criteria for humani-
tarian intervention, including ‘a violation of the law of humanity and not merely 
a violation of positive national law’105 and ‘exceptionally grave cases, as when the 
life of an entire population is menaced, when the barbaric acts are often repeated, 
when their character is particularly horrible that it violently shocks the universal 
consciousness’.106 He also refers to considerations of opportunity, appeals by the 
victims and favourable conditions for intervening.107 
On the side of the opponents, worth referring to are the points raised by 
Nys and Wilson. Nys argued that ‘independence for States is like liberty for 
the individual’108 and referred approvingly to the views of Renault and Pradier-
Fodéré against intervention.109 As for the admixture of the European powers 
in the Eastern Question, he maintained that ‘it cannot be invoked to justify 
the doctrine of intervention’, for it was something else: ‘the establishment of a 
protectorate regarding the Christian nations under the sultan’.110 
Wilson, Professor of International Law at Harvard University and at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, pointed out that ‘[f]or a state to set itself 
up as a judge of the actions of another state and to assume that it has the right 
to extend its powers to settling and regulating affairs of morals, religion, and 
the relations of public authority to the subjects in another state, on the ground 
of maintaining the rights of mankind as a whole, is to take a ground which the 
conduct of any modern state, even the most civilized, would hardly warrant’.111
1919–39: from Stowell and Higgins to Lauterpacht and Politis
Surprisingly, during the inter-war period, at a time when no humanitarian inter-
vention took place, the overwhelming majority of advocates who addressed 
the question for the first time is in support, at eighteen, as opposed to only six 
opponents, and if we add those from the previous period who were still active, the 
advocates total thirty-three as opposed to fourteen against (see table 4.1).
Supporters include the Polish-British Hersch Lauterpacht, the French 
Paul Fauchille112 and Georges Scelle,113 the Americans Ellery Stowell, Charles 
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Fenwick114 and Pitman Potter,115 the Greeks Nicolas Politis116 and Stélio 
Séfériadès117 (father of Nobel Laureate poet George Seferis), and the Russians 
André Mandelstam118 and Michel Taube.119 Those against include the British 
Alexander Pearce Higgins, Percy Winfield120 and James Leslie Brierly,121 the 
French Robert Redslob122 and the German Karl Strupp.
We will start with the opponents this time round. Strupp, of Frankfurt 
University and later Istanbul University, discussed the views of Cavaglieri in 
support of collective humanitarian intervention123 and concluded that it is un-
acceptable and dangerous, and given the fact that ‘no one can say how many States 
suffice to constitute a collectivity, we are led to practically authorize the great 
Powers to interfere in the affairs of smaller States’.124
According to Higgins, Whewell Professor in Cambridge, interventions in 
instances of social upheavals and civil wars ‘constitute a grave danger to inter-
national harmony because they offer an opportunity to an unprincipled state 
to take undue advantage of the internal weakness or maladministration of such 
a state to increase its own power’.125 Thus it may acquire ‘a de facto protectorate 
while protesting that its intervention is in the interests of humanity’.126 
Moving on to the advocates, Stowell, of Columbia University, advocated 
humani tarian intervention, for no state ‘may persist in conduct which is considered 
to violate the universally recognized principles of decency and humanity’.127 He 
accepted that ‘recourse to intervention on the ground of humanity may at times 
offer a cloak for interference and aggression’,128 but maintained that ‘a deliberate 
violation of that minimum of security and justice to which every individual in 
a civilized community is entitled’ made it ‘the right and duty of other states to 
intervene’.129 
Lauterpacht, one of the greatest international lawyers of the twentieth century, 
then in his thirties, who succeeded Higgins as Whewell Professor, had the 
following to say on the matter: 130 
The sovereign and independent State receives from international law absolute 
autonomy as regards the treatment of its inhabitants…. But this exclusive right 
could be abused, in which case it ceases to be a right and the competence of 
international law to protect the individual reasserts all its force … humanitarian 
intervention is both a juridical as well a political principle of international society.
Politis, one of the most innovative international jurists of the inter-war period 
and a key figure in the League of Nations,131 Professor at the University of Paris 
and later Greek Foreign Minister, made the following important point in his 
book on international morality, written just before the Second World War and 
published posthumously:132
Every people has the right to organise itself as it wants … without other countries 
being in the position to oppose or to intervene in what are internal affairs.… But 
… such a right will merit due respect on the principle that it makes reasonable use 
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of it. If, on the contrary, it gives ground to abuses of power … and, in general, if the 
prescriptions of international morality and of international law are downtrodden, 
other countries are entitled to intervene; they could put into play the rules of 
international responsibility.
Overall assessment
As we have seen, most of the issues for and against humanitarian intervention 
raised today were developed in the period 1830–1939:133 the moral drive to do 
something for the oppressed in instances where the moral consciousness of 
humankind is shocked, the abuse factor, a level of disinterestedness, the need 
to maintain the principle of sovereignty and independence, the assuredness of a 
successful outcome stopping the bloodshed and so on. 
It has been suggested that the Anglo-Americans were more supportive than 
the continental schools.134 In fact there is an even split within the British and 
French schools of thought. Most US jurists supported intervention on legal or 
moral grounds, though a substantial minority were against. Russian publicists 
(apparently with the Ottoman Empire in mind) as well as those from the small 
states of Europe, such as Switzerland, Belgium and Greece, were all, with no 
exception, advocates of humanitarian intervention. The Italian school tilts more 
towards non-intervention, though with the proviso of support for liberation 
movements and counter-intervention. The only group that was for the most part 
against is the German school, which may perhaps be attributed to the fact that 
Prussia, Germany and Austria–Hungary refrained from intervening militarily in 
humanitarian plights or in internal wars. 
Until 1914 all publicists, with very few exceptions, adhered to the civilized–
barbarian distinction (see chapter 3), but most advocates avoided any distinction 
as to its application, which implies that they considered, as a matter of principle, 
that intervention for reasons of humanity is applicable to all, irrespective of 
degree of civilization. 
Some of the supporters of humanitarian intervention were explicit in this 
regard. Hornung posited that such intervention had to be raised ‘above con-
siderations of religion or race’ and become ‘truly humanitarian in character’.135 
It should apply if need be ‘against the Christian, in favour of the Muslim, the 
Buddhist or the pagan’.136
According to Fauchille, humanitarian intervention is practised ‘vis-à-vis 
civilized States as well: after all is not the violation of the right of humanity more 
grave when it emanates from a civilised State?’137
Kebedgy referred to the difficulty of distinguishing between civilized and 
non-civilized states, pointing out that atrocities could be committed by a state 
called civilized; if its actions indeed made it barbarous, it would lose ‘all title to 
respect for its independence’.138
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   71 22/01/2015   10:53:43
72 Part I: Theory
But some publicists supportive of humanitarian intervention claim, as we have 
seen, that it is applicable only to ‘civilized states’ against ‘non-civilized states’. 
They include Martens, Komarovskiy, Lorimer, partly Bluntschli139 and, in the 
early twentieth century, Edwin DeWitt Dickinson,140 Phillimore regarding the 
Muslim states, and Engelhardt and Rolin-Jaequemyns regarding the Ottoman 
Empire per se.141 According to Phillimore, ‘the right of Christian Intervention 
on religious grounds in a Mohammedan State rests upon an obviously stronger 
foundation’.142 But he adds, to his credit, that ‘[t]he converse of this, viz., 
Mohammedan Intervention with Christian States, has, it is believed, never yet 
arisen in practice, but it would be subject on principle to the same law’.143 
Ironically, the double standards of humanitarian intervention and the singling 
out of non-Christian states for intervention were criticized by opponents of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, who presented their supportive peers 
as unprincipled. They include Pradier-Fodéré,144 Funck-Brentano and Sorel,145 
Bonfils,146 Renault,147 Despagnet, Floeckher148 and Winfield.149
Despagnet, for instance, referred to ‘an alleged right of civilization that permits 
European peoples in particular to act against barbarian governments so as to 
impose upon them more ethical and humane institutions’,150 adding that it was 
open to abuse ‘under the cover, often hypocritical, of a disinterested civilizing 
mission’.151 
Now we come to the fundamental question whether armed humanitarian 
intervention had become part of customary international law at the time, the 
majority view of legal authors from 1920 until today.152 This overall trend is 
accepted even in some of today’s polemics on the concept.153 Clearly, a majority 
(more than three-quarters) were in favour of humanitarian intervention, be it 
on legal or moral grounds. However, in order to claim that a legal right did exist, 
one has to wrongly lump those advocating a legal right with those invoking 
moral or political grounds,154 even though the latter explicitly deny such a legal 
right. It would be more accurate to say that from 1830 until 1939 the views were 
‘divided’;155 it was ‘debatable’156 or ‘doubtful’157 whether such a right existed in 
positive international law. 
But when it comes to humanitarian intervention as conceived in the pre-UN 
Charter period, which also included peremptory demands and forms of dictatorial 
interference short of the actual use of armed force,158 it appears that humanitarian 
intervention lato sensu was part of customary international law from the 1860s 
or 1870s onwards. In itself this is a striking finding, for the international law 
of human rights was yet to come, with the exception of the minority treaties 
regime in the peace treaties signed in Paris (1919–20) and Lausanne (1923), which 
hardly gave ground for intervention (their whole philosophy was minority rights 
in exchange for loyalty on the part of the minorities159).
We will conclude by reverting to the double-standard aspect. From an inter-
national law perspective, one view is that of Komarovskiy, Martens and others, 
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that such a right exists only with regard to civilized states towards barbarous states 
if Christians are harshly treated. Another line is to regard it as a lex specialis in the 
relations of European states with the Ottoman Empire or China, as advocated 
by Bluntschli,160 Rolin-Jaequemyns,161 Westlake,162 Nys163 and Rougier.164 A third 
option is to regard the possibility of humanitarian intervention as a ‘special 
custom’ applicable only in the relations of Europe with the Ottoman Empire.165 
By today’s criteria this approach is problematic, for special (or regional) customs 
have to be applied reciprocally and not for the benefit of one party at the expense 
of the other. Clearly, none of these options would carry the day in current inter-
national law, but international law as conceived in the long nineteenth century 
was, for better or worse, the law of the European states (and those of European 
extraction), those with the ‘standard of civilization’ to boot, hence the double 
standards that come out naturally from this perspective, however antiquated. If 
we draw such a conclusion we also avoid the danger of retrospective thinking.
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Intervention and non-intervention in international 
political theory
Contrary to international law, international political theory and political 
philosophy paid scant attention to the ethics of intervention in the long 
nineteenth century.1 As for humanitarian intervention per se, there is nothing, 
apart from cursory remarks by John Stuart Mill and Giuseppe Mazzini. On the 
wider question of intervention and non-intervention we will refer to their views 
and to those of Kant, Hegel and Cobden. 
Based on today’s distinction between cosmopolitanism and communitarian-
ism one would expect that cosmopolitans would be inclined towards intervention 
for humanitarian and other principled reasons, while communitarians would 
adhere to non-intervention.2 Yet Kant, regarded as the father of modern cosmo-
politanism,3 is, prima facie, against intervention. Cobden, a cosmopolitan, is 
rigidly against any notion of intervention. Mazzini, a communitarian (though with 
a cosmopolitan bent) is a cautious supporter of intervention. J. S. Mill, arguably 
a communitarian,4 places himself gingerly between non-intervention and inter-
vention. Only Hegel, perhaps the father of the communitarian approach,5 does 
not defy expectations, advocating non-intervention but inadvertently bringing 
military intervention in by pointing to war’s positive aspects.
Kant, non-intervention and republicanism
Kant, the advocate of a cosmopolitan existence, of a cosmopolitan confederation 
of republican states and of universal human rights,6 has very little to say about 
intervention and does not refer at all to intervention for humanitarian reasons.7 
In Preliminary Article 5 of his celebrated essay Toward Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch (1795),8 it is stipulated that ‘No State Shall by Force Interfere 
with the Constitution or Government of Another State’. And he makes two points: 
(1) there is a problem over who is to authorize interference, since there is no higher 
authority; and (2) if a state has fallen into ‘evil’, ‘its lawlessness should serve as a 
warning’.9 And he comes up with only one exception to non-intervention:10
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if a state, through internal discord, should split into two parts, each … laying claim 
to the whole; in that case a foreign state could not be charged with interfering in the 
constitution of another state if it gave assistance to one of them (for this is anarchy). 
He cautions that prior to this critical phase, such interference would amount to ‘a 
violation of the right of a people’, making ‘the autonomy of all states insecure’.11 
Only when a state has collapsed into anarchy, with rival groups claiming 
sovereign authority, can other states intervene to assist in bringing about an end 
to the anarchy.12 Surprisingly, Kant (like Grotius) was opposed to revolution 
against oppression,13 despite his great enthusiasm for the French Revolution, the 
American Revolution and the Irish struggle, a contradictory position that has 
baffled scholars ever since.14 
Kant does not address intervention in any other work and it is clear that he 
does not suggest any right or duty of humanitarian intervention15 or intervention 
to promote ‘republicanism’.16 His position on intervention is not unrelated to his 
position on war. For the German philosopher, war is ‘the scourge of mankind’, 
‘the destroyer of everything good’17 and ‘creates more evil than it destroys’.18 Yet 
strictly speaking he was no pacifist.19 He was critical of ‘a long peace’ in some 
cases20 and regarded the historical emergence of civil society as the result of 
violent means and war, which unified people under a general will.21 On the whole, 
a justified war was defensive: to defend one’s country and repulse aggression, 
which could also include ‘anticipatory attack’.22 But as regards military interven-
tion, he was more than clear: intervention even for ethical reasons introduces a 
right to war, with a disastrous effect on the attempt to ban war.23
Despite the prohibition set out in Preliminary Article 5, several scholars have 
tried to prove that he did not reject intervention or humanitarian intervention. 
There are three main positions: (1) the view that Kant upholds a rigid principle 
of non-intervention;24 (2) guarded assertion that had he been faced with or con-
templated massive atrocities, he would have been more open to intervention qua 
humani tarian intervention;25 and (3) claims that he was in fact supportive of 
humanitarian intervention.26 
One line of reasoning is to link Preliminary Article 5 with Kant’s First Definite 
Article, which reads as follows: ‘The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be 
Republican’. Republican states are peaceful internationally and base their internal 
policy on justice, the rule of law and respect for individual autonomy.27 From this 
ambit it has been argued that, assuming that the Definitive Articles are ‘more 
basic’ (in fact this is not the case, as Kantian scholars point out), non-intervention 
‘does not apply to forms of intervention that might promote or defend the develop-
ment or survival of republican forms of government’.28 
John Vincent was of the view that ‘Kant appeared to imply an exception to 
the rule of nonintervention if by intervention a republic could be established or a 
despotic regime crushed’.29 Along similar lines, Fernando Tesón maintains that 
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Kant’s ‘nonintervention principle is dependent upon compliance with the First 
Definitive Article. Internal legitimacy based on respect for human rights and 
democracy is what gives states the shield of sovereignty against foreign interven-
tion’.30 Consequently, ‘nonintervention holds only among liberal states’.31 Harry 
van der Linden refers to Kant’s concept of states as ‘moral persons with autonomy’ 
founded on ‘the social contract’ and ‘united will’. On this basis he surmises that 
‘political intervention is only wrong with respect to republican states, or approxi-
mations thereof, and may be justified with regard to unjust states if it accords with 
the will of their people struggling for democracy’.32 
Other Kantian scholars venture onto more controversial grounds. Thomas 
Hill for instance maintains that, according to Kant’s logic, people in anarchy 
or ‘a state of nature’ can be forcefully made to join the legal order ‘so long as it is 
reasonably certain that intervention is necessary and will be effective without further 
implications and effects that are morally unacceptable’33 and concludes that in Kant’s 
ethics ‘there is no absolute prohibition of humanitarian intervention in all cases’.34 
Antonio Franceschet admits that Kant has nothing explicit on humanitarian 
intervention,35 but claims that one can extrapolate from his work, if it is seen 
from its ‘ethico-political reasoning within his broad roadmap for international 
reform’ and ‘legal evolution’.36 Accordingly, five themes provide a more com-
prehensive account of Kant regarding humanitarian intervention: (1) juridical 
pacifism; (2) institutionalization and constitutionalization; (3) the restructuring 
of the rights of war and peace; (4) the development of authorized coercion; and 
(5) cosmopolitan citizenship rights.37
It is hard to pass judgement on whether these authors interpret what Kant was 
all about or whether they present a different Kantian perspective and not Kant as 
such. As for Preliminary Article 5 being applicable only to republican states, in fact 
only the Definitive Articles refer exclusively to republican states; the Preliminary 
Articles refer to all states, republican or otherwise;38 and Kant ‘nowhere makes 
any explicit claim regarding the priority of republicanism over nonintervention’.39 
More generally, Kant wanted to deter states becoming paternalistic guardians of 
the well-being of other states.40
One is probably on safer grounds if one sticks to the letter of Kant. At least 
four points are worth making. First of all, Kant was guarded on intervention, not 
wanting to open a Pandora’s box, given his views on war and peace, autonomy and 
morality. Secondly, he wrote Perpetual Peace in the wake of the French Revolution 
and apparently one of his main preoccupations was not to give grounds for foreign 
interventions against Republican France41 (as advocated, say, by Burke). Thirdly, 
Kant, as a cosmopolitan, was not an advocate of conquest and colonialism, and 
so did not want to bring the less fortunate non-Europeans into the European 
fold.42 Fourthly, even scholars critical of the extrapolations of others are prepared 
to offer a small opening for Kant’s advocacy of intervention in extreme humani-
tarian instances. Pierre Laberge for instance has argued that ‘[s]ince genocide 
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is an idea that can scarcely have occurred to him, to hold that he would prohibit 
intervention even in such extreme circumstances is surely to be guilty of an 
anachronism’.43 Georg Cavallar is prepared to entertain that ‘Kant might have 
favoured intervention to stop dramatic violations of human rights (for example 
genocide)’.44 Franceschet is predictably more forthright: ‘The idea that a state 
that would commit or allow genocide or would otherwise deny its population 
their basic moral rights or humanity is not only inconceivable but conceptually 
impossible for Kant’.45 Howard Williams acknowledges the opening that may arise 
from Kant’s support for universal human rights and ‘a moral responsibility to be 
concerned about how citizens in other states are treated by their governments’,46 
but asserts that this does not lead to the ‘active involvement of our government in 
attempting to redress or punish wrongs in other states’.47 His conclusion is that 
only ‘the breakdown of order’ tantamount to civil war, with no sovereign power in 
control, permits intervention, provided that intervention has been requested by 
one of the warring sides, notably ‘the party that would bring the disputed territory 
into the peaceful federation’.48
Hegel, non-intervention and war
For Hegel, states, like persons, are autonomous in the moral sense and ‘realize 
their nature in the choice and pursuit of ends’.49 The state is ‘ethical’, ‘the actuality 
of the ethical idea’.50 According to Hegel: ‘The nation as state is mind in its substan-
tive rationality and immediate actuality and is thus the absolute power on earth. 
It follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors’.51 
Tesón has called this reification of the state the ‘Hegelian myth’: that the state 
is ‘a moral being, capable of making moral choices’ and, as in the case of persons, 
whose moral choices deserve respect from others, ‘state choices deserve respect 
from foreigners’, hence ‘[f]oreign intervention is a violation of that autonomy, even 
when it is undertaken for benign purposes’.52 Moreover, according to Tesón and 
others before him, such as Karl Popper, Hegel glorified war and even aggressive 
war in the name of ‘vitality’.53 He regarded war as one of the means ‘by which the 
ethical character of the state is preserved’.54 According to Steven Smith, Hegel 
arrives at this conclusion on the basis of the following syllogism: ‘The state is 
an ethical unity. 2) States frequently engage in war to preserve their unity. 3) 
Therefore war is a “moment” in the ethical life of the state’.55 
For Hegel, war is outside the domain of ethics and not ‘a matter of right meeting 
wrong, but rather a clash between two subjectively perceived rights’.56 As he put it: 
‘Each party claims to have right on its side; and both parties are right. It is just the 
rights themselves which have come into contradiction with one another’.57 Hegel, 
anticipating the thinking of present-day conflict research, claims that disputes 
arise not as a result of ‘real grievances as on subjective perception of an alleged 
threat posed’.58 
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These are valid points and hardly a glorification of war or militarism. But 
several other passages by Hegel are more extreme, such as the following: ‘War is 
the moral health of peoples in their struggle against petrification.… Just as the 
breeze saves the sea from foulness, which is the result of continued complacency, 
so does war for people’.59 He also refers to the heroic and sacrifice aspects of war, 
to courage, honour and internal cooperation and regards perpetual peace à la 
Kant as an illusion.60
Hegel’s glorification of war and presumed militarism have been challenged, 
starting with John Plamenatz and Schlomo Avineri, who present him as more 
nuanced and not an advocate of aggressive war.61 As is often the case with 
scholarly controversies, a fairer depiction is somewhere in the middle or is reached 
via another vantage point that makes the polar opposites less convincing.62 
Apparently, several of Hegel’s extreme statements were motivated by the German 
predicament of his time, characterized by fragmentation and lack of unity.63 And 
it is worth noting that wars were then quite different, with fewer casualties than 
the battles and wars that were to follow Hegel’s death.64 
Cobden, peace, free trade and non-intervention 
Moving from the two great philosophers, Kant and Hegel, to Cobden may appear 
odd, but it is worth stressing that Cobden, though not a political philosopher, 
is regarded an important liberal thinker in his own right and one of the earliest 
exponents of the liberal internationalism in international relations. He is also 
regarded as a precursor of the theories of functionalism and interdependence.65 
Cobden, the ‘international man’,66 as he was called during his lifetime, was 
as absolute as Hegel in his stance against intervention, though not for the same 
reasons, and he was more consistent, not bringing intervention in through the 
back door by presenting the positive functions of war.
For Cobden, freedom of commerce was essential for peace, a view shared by his 
close associate, John Bright. He was convinced that ‘unfettered commerce would 
create such a powerful incentive for peace that men would prevent their govern-
ments from using war as the chosen instrument for serving their interests’.67 
However, he was not an advocate of peace for the sake of free trade.68 If free 
trade conflicted with peace, as in the case of trade in armaments or loans for 
armament, he was against it (‘No free trade in cutting throats’, as he put it).69 As a 
committed exponent of progress brought about by industrialization and trade, he 
was strongly opposed to militarism, arms expenditures, colonial expansion and 
imperialism.70 
It is within this context that Cobden was an advocate of ‘an absolute policy of 
nonintervention’.71 As he put it: ‘I am against any interference by the government 
of any country in the affairs of another nation, even if it is confined to moral 
suasion’.72 Non-intervention was ‘a necessary, if not sufficient condition for 
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international peace’,73 and could be more readily associated with interests than 
with a vague vision of future peace. He scathingly criticized great power interven-
tion, even for noble goals.74 The regeneration of a people could come about only 
by the ‘force and virtue of native elements, and without assistance of any kind’.75 
Anticipating J. S. Mill (see below) he maintained that a ‘people which wants a 
saviour’ and ‘which does not possess an earnest and pledge of freedom in its own 
heart, is not yet ready to be free’.76 
According to Vincent’s reading of Cobden, ‘intervention was doubly in-
appropriate as a means of promoting liberalism abroad; outside assistance could 
not promote a necessarily mature growth, and if such assistance were requested 
by a people, that very request was evidence of its immaturity and inability to 
benefit from intervention’.77 Cobden could accept counter-intervention only as 
a means of upholding the principle of non-intervention, and the only sanctions 
he could accept were ‘the power of opinion and moral force’.78 His condemna-
tion of intervention had as its primary target British foreign policy under the 
sway of Palmerston, whose interventionism, according to Cobden, was against 
the interests of the British people.79 The fact that the ‘international man’ was 
also a pacifist activist80 made his absolute principle of non-intervention more 
convincing.81 Moreover, Cobden was consistent in his anti-interventionism cum 
anti-imperialism, contrary to other British liberals who were ‘more selective’,82 as 
in the case of James Mill and John Stuart Mill.83
Mazzini, nationality and non-intervention/intervention 
Mazzini, like Cobden, was not a political philosopher, but a politician and activist. 
He is known today as the ‘Beating Heart of Italy’, the foremost inspirer of Italian 
unification. But in his lifetime he was one of the most respected theorists of 
democracy and of the principle of nationality (national self-determination), with 
considerable international influence. 
Mazzini’s views on nationalism were moderate and liberal, and though famous 
as a prophet of nationalism, ‘humanity’ is his keyword rather than ‘nationality’.84 
For Mazzini, the starting point is the individual. Individuals fulfil themselves in 
the nation and the nation fulfils itself in humanity, while the idea of cosmopolitan-
ism left out this essential middle link (i.e. the nation).85 As in the case of Herder, 
he regarded all European nations as equal, each with its own mission in the 
world. He was basically a democratic patriot and not a nationalist, and sincerely 
believed that independent democratic nations (states corresponding to a nation) 
would be peaceful in their relations. Thus Mazzini can be seen as an advocate of 
‘democratic peace’ on a par with Kant (democracies are peaceful at the inter-state 
level) and, as with Cobden, as one of the pioneers of liberal internationalism.86 
As did both Cobden and J. S. Mill, Mazzini maintained that foreign interven-
tion was not warranted in domestic political struggles for democratic rule and 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   86 22/01/2015   10:53:45
Intervention and non-intervention in international political theory 87
national liberation. But certain factors made him temper his views and part ways 
with Cobden, bringing him much closer to Mill (see below), with whom he was 
personally acquainted (and they respected each other’s views). 
Mazzini’s views on intervention appear mainly in a succinct essay entitled 
‘On Nonintervention’, written in 1851, mostly for a British audience (Mazzini 
lived in London for more than thirty years).87 He argued that adherence to non- 
intervention had to apply if two preconditions were met. Firstly, it was applicable 
if it was adhered to absolutely by all states. But this was hardly ever the case, 
as despotic states intervened to help other despotic states threatened by revo-
lutions or national liberation movements, contradicting the original purpose of 
non- intervention, which was avoiding war and conquest.88 As he put it, this was 
‘Intervention on the wrong side; Intervention by all who chose, and are strong 
enough, to put down free movements of peoples against corrupt governments. It 
means cooperation of despots against peoples’.89 Secondly, non-intervention was 
applicable only if all states were distinct nations, in which case ‘the government 
must deal directly and alone with its people’, with no foreign interference.90 But 
most states were not nations, and empires trampled on nations aspiring to freedom.
These two factors did not lead Mazzini to advocate military intervention. 
He allowed only for two exceptions to non-intervention: (1) to offset a previous 
intervention in support of despots, that is, counter-intervention;91 and (2) to 
intervene to stop massacres (‘massacres of Christians’).92 In the first case he 
advocated mainly ‘moral support’ and a credible threat of counter-intervention by 
a powerful liberal nation in the hope that it would be sufficient to deter a despot 
from intervening.93 
On intervention, including humanitarian intervention, he followed a middle 
path among Italians in the course of the long nineteenth century, between strict 
non-intervention, as advocated by jurists Mamiani, Pierantoni, Carnazza Amari 
and Cimbali,94 and collective intervention in humanitarian plights, as argued 
by Fiore and Cavaglieri (see chapter 4). He also followed another well known 
tendency of the Italian school of international law: advocacy of intervention to 
free an oppressed nation. 
J. S. Mill, non-intervention and intervention
John Stuart Mill is classified today as a communitarian, especially given his 
stance on nationalism.95 But if one takes into consideration other aspects of 
Mill’s approach to international relations, such as his emphasis on ‘the general 
prosperity of mankind’ or international law as the protector of the weak,96 he 
appears more of a cosmopolitan or simply defies classification.97
Mill in discussing intervention made no reference to contemporary jurists, 
probably given his aloofness towards international law based on Austin’s views 
(see chapter 4).98 The international lawyers for their part returned the compliment 
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by not mentioning Mill at all on intervention or non-intervention, with very rare 
exceptions, such as Bernard as regards intervention99 and a few others with regard 
to intervening in ‘barbarous’ regions.
Mill’s main work on intervention is his 1859 essay ‘A Few Words on Non-
Intervention’,100 in which he makes a very strong case for non-intervention but an 
equally convincing case for intervention in several circumstances. This has led to 
confusion as to where he really stands and he has been criticized as ‘ambivalent’,101 
and ‘not at his most convincing’102 regarding the principle (non-intervention) he 
presumably, judging from the title, set out to defend. 
References to non-intervention and intervention were also made by Mill in an 
earlier essay, ‘The French Revolution of 1848 and Its Assailants’ (1849), and in a 
forgotten article, ‘The Spanish Question’, published in 1837, which he had written 
together with a former army officer.103
The main rule of thumb to grasp Mill’s overall position on non-intervention/ 
intervention is whether a movement striving for freedom is seeking independence 
from ‘a foreign yoke’ or is seeking to overthrow a ‘native tyrant’ and establish 
liberal democratic rule. In the first instance he advocates external intervention 
(starkly or hesitantly), while in the second he advocates strict non-intervention.104 
Let us start with non-intervention. Mill was opposed to intervention in 
support of liberty, for a people will be better served if they ‘are left to work out 
their own salvation’.105 At least five arguments can be identified in buttressing 
non-intervention.106 
The first argument is uncertainty as to the outcome of intervention: ‘there 
can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even 
if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves’.107 The second 
argument is the readiness to wage a struggle despite the grave dangers involved. 
As he puts it: ‘The only test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become 
fit for popular institutions, is that they … are willing to brave labour and danger 
for their liberation’.108 This is related to the argument of authenticity.109 He 
asserts ‘if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely 
domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands 
than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent’.110 In ‘The Spanish 
Question’ he puts it thus: ‘The attempt to establish freedom by foreign bayonets is 
a solecism in terms. A government which requires the support of foreign armies 
cannot be a free government’.111 This leads us to a fourth argument: the danger 
of reversion to tyranny again, linked to one’s own fighting. He argues that ‘[i]f 
a people … does not value it [freedom] sufficiently to fight for it, and maintain 
it against any force which can be mustered … it is only a question in how few 
years or months that people will be enslaved’.112 A related fifth point is that the 
virtues and feelings needed ‘for maintaining freedom’ spring up only ‘during an 
arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts’.113 In this context he makes 
a telling point: ‘Men become attached to that which they have long fought for and 
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made sacrifices for; they learn to appreciate that on which their thoughts have 
been much engaged’.114 This considerable insight on the part of the utilitarian 
philosopher (which Cobden, as we have seen, had also touched upon) tallies with 
the findings of today’s cognitive psychology. As Leon Festinger has put it: ‘Rats 
and people come to love the things for which they have suffered’.115 According 
to Morton Deutsch, presumably they do so ‘in order to reduce the dissonance 
induced by the suffering, and their method of dissonance reduction is to enhance 
the attractiveness of the choice which led to their suffering: only if what one chose 
was really worthwhile would all of the associated suffering be tolerable’.116
The emphasis of Mill on a people’s ability to use force successfully for liberation 
has been criticized as a social Darwinian (actually crude Spencerian117) ‘survival 
of the fittest’,118 although Mill was not a social Darwinist. Walzer claims that this 
accusation, though not wide of the mark, is unfair to Mill, ‘for it was precisely 
Mill’s point that force could not prevail, unless it was reinforced from the outside 
over a people ready “to brave labor and danger”’.119 Anthony Ellis attributes Mill’s 
stance to his belief ‘that a people will be hard to oppress for long, once they have 
set their minds on freedom’.120 
Now let us present the other side of the coin, intervention. Commentators have 
identified various exceptions, ranging from only two (Walzer) to as many as seven 
(Doyle). From Mill’s at times convoluted presentation, we have identified five 
instances where Mill’s non-intervention principle can be overcome in favour of 
its opposite, intervention: (1) in relations with ‘barbarians’, (2) in order to offset a 
previous counter-revolution by an external party against a people fighting against 
foreign rule, (3) in a struggle against a foreign yoke, (4) in protracted civil wars 
and (5), subsumed under civil war, stopping ‘severities repugnant to humanity’.
Regarding the first instance, Mill subscribed to the nineteenth-century dis-
tinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ peoples (see chapter 3) and claimed 
that ‘[d]espotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, 
provided the end be their improvement’.121 According to Mill, ‘barbarians will 
not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules’122 and ‘it is 
likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection 
by foreigners’.123 
Mill, like the great majority of his European contemporaries, was an apologist 
for conquest and colonialism, an example of ‘imperial liberalism’,124 and indeed 
perhaps presenting ‘the most well-known liberal justification of empire’.125 But 
terms such as ‘benign colonialism’126 or ‘tolerant imperialism’127 are probably 
more appropriate for Mill and in this way one also avoids retrospective thinking. 
Mill criticized harsh colonial measures in India (and, nearer home, in Ireland) and 
advocated the participation of Indians at the highest levels of administration.128 
Moreover, for him cultural differences were not innate but a result of upbringing 
and circumstances, which could be remedied by education, and he was criticized 
by racists for not adhering to their views.129 
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The second exception is counter-intervention against a struggle for freedom 
from foreign rule. As Mill puts it:130 
Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not 
always prudent.… It might not have been right for England (even apart from 
the question of prudence) to have taken part with Hungary in its noble struggle 
against Austria; although the Austrian Government in Hungary was in some sense 
a foreign yoke. But when … the Russian despot interposed, and … delivered back 
the Hungarians, bound hand and foot, to their exasperated oppressors, it would 
have been an honourable and virtuous act on the part of England to have declared 
that this should not be, and that if Russia gave assistance to the wrong side, England 
would aid the right.
With this we arrive at another exception, assistance to a national liberation 
movement if it is ‘unable to contend successfully … against the military strength 
of another nation much more powerful’.131 But, as we have seen, he hesitated when 
faced with the Hungarian uprising.132 
Here one is faced with a dilemma. If ‘A Few Words’ is to be regarded as his last 
and definite word on this question, then one is left with his hesitation and could 
agree with Walzer’s first reading of Mill: that the two go together, assistance 
to the secessionist movement cum counter-intervention133 and that interven-
tion is warranted only when counter-revolution by an external party has taken 
place.134 Another option is not to prioritize ‘A Few Words’ but to take it together 
with ‘Vindication’, where he calls for intervention in support of those fighting, to 
prevent them ‘from being crushed and trampled’ by foreign conquerors.135
In 1865, when campaigning for elections, he gave the clear impression that he 
supported intervention even without counter-intervention.136 Mill’s overall thrust 
regarding nationality and national self-determination137 can also be brought in to 
buttress intervention in support of independence movements. Mill (like Mazzini) 
believed that democracy can function properly only in national states. This was 
the very opposite of the position taken by Lord Acton, who was of the view that 
national states lead to absolutism and discrimination against minorities within.138 
It is also worth referring to what was understood at the time by the readers 
of and commentators on ‘A Few Words’. As Georgios Varouxakis points out, 
all understood Mill to mean that intervention should be used only in excep-
tional circumstances and that one assists a liberation moment if another state has 
intervened to suppress its efforts; and Mill was content with this interpretation of 
his views.139
The fourth exception, protracted civil war, includes within it a fifth, our subject 
matter: humanitarian intervention. According to Mill in ‘A Few Words’:140 
A case requiring consideration is that of a protracted civil war, in which the 
contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy 
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issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished 
but by severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the 
country. In this exceptional case it seems now to be an admitted doctrine, that the 
neighbouring nations, or one powerful neighbour with the acquiescence of the 
rest, are warranted in demanding that the contest shall cease, and a reconciliation 
take place on equitable terms of compromise.
In ‘A Few Words’ it is not clear whether he means military intervention or 
mediation. But the examples he provides are suggestive, such as the Battle of 
Navarino by the three powers during the Greek War of Independence. Mill is 
clearer in ‘Vindication’: if attempts at accommodation by third parties are not 
accepted, then they may intervene by force.141
Humanitarian reasons, even though subsumed under civil war, can be seen as 
one of the reasons for intervening.142 As for the non-intervention/intervention 
nexus, it would seem that Mill, in his two earlier works, was more in support of 
intervention. But by 1859, as an older and more prudent man, he had his doubts; 
thus his views come out as they do, perplexing and tentative. But perhaps it is 
better this way and shows the agonizing dilemma involved until this very day: 
a very convincing case against intervening can be made, as well as an equally 
convincing case for intervening in humanitarian plights or internal wars.
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Introduction
Our criteria for selecting the armed humanitarian interventions of the nineteenth 
century are the following (which conform with the understanding in the long 
nineteenth century, as elucidated in chapters 4 and 5): (1) governmental onslaught 
against unarmed people or atrocities by both sides in a protracted internal war; 
(2) humanitarian concern, that is, stopping the ‘effusion of blood’, as one of the 
main reasons and official justifications for intervening; (3) military intervention, 
ranging from ‘peacekeeping’ (in today’s parlance) to hostilities or a full-scale war; 
and (4) intervention opposed or reluctantly condoned by the incumbent. 
A clarification is in order as regards the second criterion, motivation, which 
harks back to the ‘right intention’ of the ‘just war’ doctrine (see chapter 2). One 
view is that pure humanitarian motives are of the essence, ‘altruism writ large’.1
A more pragmatic line is that there is always a mix, for, as Rougier had put it, 
with the nineteenth-century experience in mind, ‘it is practically impossible to 
separate the humanitarian motives of intervention from the political motives and 
assure that the intervening parties are absolutely disinterested’.2 Thus several 
authors yesterday and today are prepared to regard a case as humanitarian if there 
is a combination of motives and the humanitarian motives are no sham.3
A third line is that since even the best of motives or intentions4 may turn out 
disastrously in the field, the crux is a positive humanitarian outcome irrespective 
of the real motives,5 but this is probably going too far. 
On this basis of the above four criteria we will examine four cases. The case 
of Crete, which appears in some discussions on humanitarian interventions in 
the nineteenth century, will not be included. In fact Crete presents two cases, in 
1866–68 and again in 1896–98. The former witnessed reports of massacres while 
in fact the Ottoman authorities tried to be restrained in subduing the Cretan 
uprising so as not to allow foreign intervention on humanitarian grounds. Apart 
from diplomatic support for the Greeks from Russia, great power involvement 
was limited to the sending of warships to gather fleeing Greek Cretans. As for 
1896–98, the six European powers were requested by the Porte to curb Greek 
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aid to yet another Cretan uprising and the powers actually intervened as peace-
keepers in Crete (with warships and troops) on behalf of the Ottomans. Other 
cases that happen to be included in some lists of humanitarian interventions, such 
as the Armenians or the situation in Macedonia in the Ottoman Empire at the 
turn of the century, did not involve military operations but diplomatic pressure. 
Humanitarian reasons have also been referred to by some commentators with 
regard to the outbreak of the First Balkan War. In fact the official humanitarian 
justification at the time was bogus. The aim of the coordinated acts of aggression 
by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro was to oust the Ottomans and annex 
as much of Macedonia as they could, a process which had begun in the 1890s 
with guerrilla warfare by rival Greek and Bulgarian volunteers supported by 
their respective governments.6 Ottoman rule had its flaws, in particular under 
Abdulhamid, and especially in the case of the Armenians, but the Ottoman 
Empire, following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution (which was heralded by the 
minorities and by neighbouring states), had become an imperial republic, with a 
parliament representing most of the minorities. Ironically (and tragically), when 
the four states launched their attack in October 1912, the Ottoman government 
was under the firm grip of liberal elder statesmen bent on curbing the influence 
of the nationalist Young Turks.7 Moreover, in the course of the 1912 war, Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia acted in a manner that was hardly within the confines of 
humanitarian law, committing a series of atrocities against unarmed Muslims.8 
 At this juncture an additional point is worth making with a bearing on the 
presen tation of the case studies. The field of international relations as conceived 
by the traditional realist paradigm (which dominated the scene from 1945 until 
the mid-1970s and is hardly a spent force today) is statist: it regards states as the 
key units of analysis, seen as unitary actors, akin to billiard balls9 whose outer 
shells (diplomats, foreign ministers, prime ministers and heads of state) are in 
contact. Further, a clear distinction is made between domestic politics and inter-
national politics, with the former being seen as having little impact on the latter 
save as regards aspects of power (power inputs).10 
Such views may seem today passé and social constructions by recalcitrant 
realist scholars, but they are a fairly accurate depiction of the state of play in the 
nineteenth century, the golden age of traditional diplomacy, with the making of 
foreign policy in the hands of a small elite circle of foreign ministers, ambassadors 
(and other professional diplomats), monarchs, presidents (in the US case) and 
prime ministers, and a limited number of figures inside and outside government. 
This small circle shaped foreign policy and kept it away from the ‘prying eyes’ of 
an increasingly vocal public. As Richard Pipes points out, foreign policy relations 
‘proved to be that area of politics which was resisted most successfully the en-
croachments of democratic control’.11 There was also the implicit assumption 
that responsible governments and diplomats knew how best to promote national 
interest and raisons d’état, away from the passions, sentimentalism or jingoism of 
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the public. These few individuals played a key role in foreign policy and, despite the 
‘unspoken assumptions’12 of a state’s foreign policy, they at times held divergent 
views within the same decision-making milieu, views that are well worth referring 
to, and show that foreign policy was then hardly as uniform and coordinated as 
is often assumed.13 This divergence of opinion within the same decision-making 
body was also symptomatic of the acute dilemmas posed by humanitarian plights. 
On the basis of all of the above, the presentation of the four case studies will for 
the most part be traditional, with emphasis on diplomatic history and the views 
of key individuals.
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Intervention in the Greek War of Independence, 
1821–32
On intervention
The intervention of Britain, Russia and France in the Greek War of Independence 
is regarded as the first armed intervention on humanitarian grounds in world 
history (as depicted by publicists from Wheaton onwards) and it took place prior 
to the appearance of the new concept of humanitarian intervention. As such it was 
pace-setting.
From the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) until the outbreak of the Greek War 
of Independence, there were three views on intervention at the diplomatic level.
Metternich and his close adviser Friedrich Gentz held that the great powers 
could take counter-revolutionary measures and intervene to suppress uprisings 
against legitimate rule.1 This doctrine was shared by Tsar Alexander I, and his 
brainchild, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria and Prussia), and was endorsed by 
the great power Congress system at the Congresses of Aix La Chapelle (November 
1818) and Troppau (November 1820).2 
The second view came from Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, who 
stated in a famous circular (dated 19 January 1821) that states retained the right to 
interfere ‘where their own immediate security or essential interest are seriously 
endangered by the internal transactions of another State’ and not as ‘a general and 
indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements’.3 
The third approach was peaceful involvement, mainly mediation attempts. 
This can be discerned in the foreign policy initiatives of the two main rivals of 
Metternich on the European scene, Ioannis Capodistrias4 (co-Foreign Minister 
of Russia, with Nesselrode) and George Canning as British Foreign Secretary.5
A major concern (then and now) was finding the most propitious international 
reaction in instances of protracted internal wars. One approach was the cordon 
sanitaire, the sealing off of a country experiencing civil war and thus avoiding 
getting into a messy situation, with unpredictable results.6 But absolute non-
involvement or an arms embargo could inadvertently amount to supporting the 
militarily more powerful party in an internal conflict (as seen in the 1990s with the 
Bosnian tragedy). To remember the famous Talleyrand adage: ‘non-intervention 
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est un mot diplomatique et énigmatique, qui signifie à peu près la même chose 
qu’intervention’.7 
In the nineteenth century, the concept of ‘belligerency’ was applicable in 
internal wars: another state could recognize insurgents as ‘belligerents’ provided 
the armed conflict met certain criteria, the so-called ‘factual test’ (protracted 
armed conflict, insurgents administering a large portion of a state’s territory, 
insurgents headed by a responsible authority and so on).8 Recognition of belliger-
ency did not imply diplomatic support for the insurgents9 but such recognition 
was more often than not seen as an unfriendly act by the incumbent government, 
as seen in the Greek–Ottoman case.
The uprising and international reaction
The uprising in the making
The spark that ignited the fuse leading to the ‘Greek Revolution’ (as it is called 
in Greece) was the French Revolution and its Enlightenment principles.10 It was 
then that the ‘Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment’ was spawned, which came to see 
Ottoman rule as unacceptable and the Greeks as being ‘in chains’, even though 
the educated Romioi (Orthodox Greek-speakers or Hellenized inhabitants of the 
Balkans) were prospering in the Ottoman Empire, with the Phanariots (their 
quasi-aristocracy in Constantinople) holding high state positions, despite being a 
subject people, the Rum millet (the Orthodox Christian community).11 
The uprising was put on course with the founding in Odessa of a clan-
destine organization named Philiki Hetairia (Friendly Society) in September 
1814, whose aim was Greek independence with Russian support.12 The Hetairia 
approached Capodistrias, who was influential throughout Europe (as the main 
opponent of Metternich’s ultra-conservative European system13) and offered 
him the leadership. Capodistrias was seen as the only figure capable of steering 
the Greeks ‘safe through the hurricane’,14 given his position and friendship with 
Tsar Alexander I. But he declined the offer and advised against the uprising, 
which he regarded a folly (and duly reported the incident to the Tsar).15 The 
leadership of the Hetairia was then bestowed on Alexander Ypsilantis (a young 
Phanariot major general in the Russian army and aide-de-camp of the Tsar) in 
April 1820.16 
At the time, the international landscape ‘could hardly have been more un-
favourable’17 for the Greek uprising, with the Congress system and the Holy 
Alliance poised to subdue revolts.18 As regards a national uprising by a numerical 
minority, on the basis of the principle of nationalities it was ‘almost unheard-of ’19 
and equally condemnable by the great powers.20
Given this state of affairs, Capodistrias and the most revered figure of the Neo-
Hellenic Enlightenment, scholar Adamantios Korais (who lived in Paris), advised 
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against taking up arms, and called instead for the regeneration of the Greeks 
through education.21 Moreover, the urge for Greek freedom was not sweeping, 
with the Orthodox Patriarchate, most Phanariots and many primates in the 
southern Balkans against it, given their privileges and affluence.22 
The uprising and the Ottoman and international reaction 
Despite the bad omens, Ypsilantis launched the Greek independence struggle on 
21 February 1821 from Russian soil and crossed the River Prut, in the prospect 
of Russian assistance. In Russian army uniform, he arrived in Jassy (Moldavia) 
delivering a proclamation with Enlightenment rhetoric and romantic overtones, 
calling for a fight for the faith and the fatherland, stressing the ‘natural right to 
freedom’ and calling the Greeks to imitate the example of European peoples 
who had risen up in arms to foster ‘freedom and happiness’. Ypsilantis referred 
to ‘a Mighty Empire’ ready to ‘defend our rights’, and in a letter to the Tsar wrote: 
‘Will you, Sire, abandon the Greeks to their fate, when a single word from you can 
deliver them from the most monstrous tyranny and save them of the horrors of a 
long and terrible struggle?’23
The Tsar ordered Ypsilantis to lay down his arms and dismissed him from the 
Russian army. The Orthodox Patriarch, Gregorios V, excommunicated him and 
issued an anathema against the Hetairia. Ypsilantis’s behaviour in the principali-
ties was a disaster, marked by ‘a mixture of vanity, brutality, and incompetence’.24 
By June, the Ottoman army quelled the ill-prepared Greek rebellion in Moldavia.25 
The uprising that was to succeed was in Peloponnese from March 1821 onwards, 
a rugged area suited to hit-and-run warfare, with an overwhelming Christian 
majority, and Greek dominance in the sea due to the many ships of the nearby 
islands of Hydra and Spetses. Moreover, the war between the Ottomans and Ali 
Pasha, the powerful governor of Yannina, stranded the elite Ottoman forces, 
providing a unique opportunity for the Greeks to take up arms.26 
The Laibach Congress was taken by surprise upon hearing of the Greek uprising. 
The Tsar was convinced that it had been masterminded by a sinister ‘central 
governing committee’ based in Paris.27 Metternich regarded the Ottomans and 
Greeks ‘beyond the pale of civilization’ and hoped that the rebellion would ‘burn 
itself out’.28 Castlereagh, like France and Prussia,29 opted for strict neutrality. The 
Congress made sure to denounce the uprising.30
For the Ottomans, the revolt was unexpected. They were unaware that an 
upheaval was in the making or perhaps were ‘too proud to be easily alarmed’.31 
Sultan Mahmud II jumped to the conclusion that it was led by the Russians 
and clung to this view until the end (a self-fulfilling prophecy, as it turned out), 
regarding himself vindicated when Russia intervened in 1827–29. With news of 
massacres of Muslims, the view prevailed that the Rum were out to kill all the 
Muslims. Thus they were longer treated as dhimmi (protected minorities) but 
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harbi (anti-Islamic warring groups) and the zimmet pact (loyalty in return for 
protection) ceased to apply.32
In the first months of the uprising 15,000 to 20,000 Muslims in the Peloponnese 
‘were murdered without mercy or remorse’,33 a tragedy barely noticed in Europe.34 
Mahmud, unable to punish the perpetrators, vented his fury on the Rum nearer 
at hand, ordering the execution of more than fifty prominent Phanariots and 
allowing Muslim mobs to slaughter several thousand innocent people in the 
capital and other cities, and to burn hundreds of churches, acts which left Europe 
aghast.35 
Another act of the Sultan stunned Europe even more: the hanging on the 
dawn of Easter Day (22 April 1821) of the octogenarian Patriarch Gregorios (and 
several senior bishops), held responsible for the behaviour of his flock though he 
was obviously innocent. The Austrian Emperor was as shocked as if the Pope had 
been executed. The Russian population, including the Tsar, were so incensed that 
a Russo-Ottoman war seemed likely.36 
The Russian ambassador to the Porte, Stroganov, delivered two strongly 
worded protestations (drafted by Capodistrias) stating that Christians had been 
extermin ated and demanding an end to the horrors. The Reis Effendi (foreign 
minister) told Stroganov that they had recriminating evidence against the 
Patriarch, who had been aware of the plot of the Hetairia, and that the Ottoman 
reaction was not meant as an all-out war against the Christians.37 Stroganov, not 
satisfied with the answer, left Constantinople. The British ambassador, Strangford 
(who was pro-Ottoman), was instructed by Castlereagh to ‘bring the Porte back 
to reason’ and to demand that the Ottoman authorities distinguish between 
innocent and guilty so as to restore Christian trust to the state.38
Russia, nearer to the scene and attached to its co-religionists, was in a quandary. 
For Alexander and the Russians, Orthodoxy and historical tradition justified 
coming to the support of the Greeks, as fellow Orthodox Christians. On the 
other hand, the Congress system and the Holy Alliance stood for the support 
of legitimate authority against rebels and the Tsar, for all his sympathy for the 
Greeks, was against their independence.39 In Russia a war party took shape and 
clamoured for intervention.40 It comprised many high-ranking Russian officials, 
including ambassadors Stroganov, Lieven (in London) and Pozzo di Borgo (in 
Paris), and famous commanders from the Napoleonic wars, such as generals 
Kiselev, Ermolov and Diebitsch. Capodistrias was the natural leader of the war 
party and tried to convince the Tsar to take military steps against the Ottomans. 
There was also a small anti-war party, headed by Nesselrode, which feared that 
Greek emancipation would lead to similar calls on the part of Poles, Ukrainians 
and other subject peoples in Russia.41
Metternich and Castlereagh put pressure on the Tsar by addressing his worst 
fears. Castlereagh wrote him a personal letter, in which he acknowledged that the 
atrocities committed by ‘the Turks’ ‘made humanity shudder’, but that the Greeks 
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were in effect Carbonari representing the spirit of insurrection and threatening the 
whole of Europe.42 The Tsar, finding no support for war outside Russia, concluded, 
in the interests of European stability, not to go to war for the Greek cause. As he 
put it to Capodistrias in August 1821: ‘If we reply to the Turks with war … the Paris 
directing committee will triumph and no government will be left standing.… At 
all costs we must find means to avoid war with Turkey’.43 Capodistrias did his 
best to make him change his mind and went as far as suggesting the expulsion 
of the Ottomans from the Danubian principalities.44 Realizing that Alexander 
was unflinching, he left the Russian service a year later (August 1822), though his 
resignation was not accepted (he went on indefinite leave and settled in Geneva).45 
In the latter part of 1821 and first part of 1822, two appalling events took place 
within seven months. The first was the conquest of Tripolis (5–6 October 1821) 
by the Greeks, amidst carnage that defies description, with the indiscriminate 
massacring of 8,000 to 15,000 unarmed people of all ages. It was then that many 
philhellenes left the region in disgust, including Colonel Thomas Gordon (the 
later historian of the Greek uprising). News of this horrifying deed trickled abroad 
but there was no condemnation. The standard line was that the exaggerated Greek 
reaction was due to the centuries-old ‘Turkish yoke’.46 
The European response was very different in April 1822 when the Ottomans 
laid waste the affluent island of Chios. Gordon likened it to the carnage of 
Tripolis, with ‘the victors butchering indiscriminately all who came in their 
way’.47 According to Strangford, Ottoman ferocity had been carried ‘to a pitch 
which makes humanity shudder’.48 Some 25,000 were killed and 45,000 enslaved. 
The European uproar was even greater than in 1821. Delacroix painted Scenes of the 
Massacre of Chios, causing a sensation when it was unveiled in Paris.49
Castlereagh instructed Strangford to tell the Porte that ‘a repetition of such 
deeds of blood’ and ‘ferocious and hateful barbarism’ would not be tolerated and 
would lead to the withdrawal of diplomatic missions.50 The British ambassador 
lectured Sadiq-Effendi (the Reis Effendi) about ‘the duties of humanity which 
existed in all civilized countries’, which ‘obliged the Powers not to remain in-
different observers of the atrocities of this war, of the only war in the entire 
world’.51 Sadiq-Effendi stated that events in Chios had ‘deeply pained the Sultan’ 
but that the Chiots had started it all by massacring Muslims, adding pointedly 
that reference had never been made to the massacres of Muslims in Tripolis, 
Navarino, Corinth and Athens.52 
The philhellenes
Contrary to the aloofness of the powers, bar Russia, European and American 
public opinion had been on the Greek side almost from the beginning. What made 
the difference with the uprising of the Serbs in previous decades and the more 
recent rebellions for political rights in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Piedmont 
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and Sardinia (1820–21) was that the Greek uprising had become a cause célèbre, 
giving rise to an impressive wave of what came to be known as ‘philhellenism’. 
Greek committees sprung up in various parts of Europe and the US, starting with 
Spain and Switzerland, concluding with the London Greek Committee (1823) 
and the Paris Greek Committee (1825), all of which were engaged in fund-raising, 
writing pamphlets, securing funds, foodstuffs, medicine, arms and ammunition, 
as well as paying ransom to free enslaved Greeks (a Russian prerogative). Over a 
thousand ‘philhellenes’, Italians, French, English, Scots, Irish, Germans, Swiss, 
Poles, Scandinavians, Americans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Hungarians and 
others (but not Russians, much to Capodistrias’s chagrin53) came to assist the 
Greeks in their struggle, including a unique celebrity, Lord Byron, with some of 
his greatest romantic poems referring to the Greek cause (Childe Harold, Don 
Juan and others).54 
The philhellenes were convinced of the righteousness of the Greek cause 
and of the barbarity of the ‘Turks’. Thus the atrocities and other barbarous acts 
committed by the Greeks – the few that were reported – were wished away and 
had little impact in stemming the enthusiasm. There was strong public pressure 
from elite circles in Britain (apart from Byron, Shelley, Bentham, Ricardo, Lord 
Erskine, Lord Russell and others), Russia (a string of poets, including Pushkin), 
France (Chateaubriand, Hugo, Constant, Delacroix, Berlioz, Villemain, Firmin 
Didot), Switzerland (banker-philanthropist Eynard) and the US (Hellenist 
Professor Everett, three ex-Presidents, Jefferson, Adams and Madison, and future 
President Harrison) to assist the beleaguered Greeks. Ludwig I of Bavaria and US 
President Monroe contemplated recognition of statehood (Madison suggested 
reference to the Greek cause in the Monroe Doctrine of December 1823) but 
Secretary of State (and future President) John Quincy Adams, a pragmatist, put 
an end to any such ventures.55 
European and American identification with the Greeks was also due to the fact 
that they were regarded as the descendants of the ancient Greeks (with ancient 
Greece regarded as ‘the cradle of European civilization’). Shelley’s words in the 
preface of his poem Hellas captured the overall mood: ‘We are all Greeks. Our 
laws, our literature, our religion [sic], our art have their roots in Greece. But for 
Greece … we might still have been savages and idolators.… The Modern Greek 
is the descendant of those glorious beings’.56 It was a great advantage to the Greek 
cause that Europe and America were then under the spell of classicism, which 
venerated the ancient Greeks, as well as romanticism, making the uprising appear 
a most romantic episode.57 
For the Russians, the Greeks striving for freedom were the descendants of the 
venerated Byzantines (to whom they owed Christianity, the alphabet and icon-
ography) as well as the ancient Greeks. Co-religionism brought the support of the 
Russian Church and wide public support, even in rural areas, among the illiterate 
strata and peasants, something unique in Europe in those days. Furthermore, 
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Greeks were very much present in Russia as prosperous merchants, educators 
and high-ranking civil servants, diplomats, military personnel and members of 
the aristocracy, several of them close to the Tsar and court, a case in point being 
Capodistrias, senior officials Sturdza and Destounis and the Ypsilantis family.58 
There is also an intriguing dimension to the Russian–Greek link, little known 
outside a small circle of Soviet and Russian researchers: the impact it had and 
the interplay it created between the Greek would-be insurgents in Moldavia (in 
February–March 1821) and the Russian would-be Decembrists (in December 
1825).59 This characteristic example of ‘entangled histories’ can be seen in: (1) the 
contacts between Ypsilantis and other aristocratic officers of the Russian army 
(most of them liberals and future Decembrists) in various salons and Masonic 
lodges, where they discussed and planned their respective uprisings (the liberation 
of the Greeks and the liberation of Russia from absolutism); (2) the assistance 
given by individual officers (most of them future Decembrists) to Ypsilantis in his 
Danubian endeavour, without the approval of the central government or army; and 
(3) the impact Ypsilantis’s uprising had in Russia, among the future Decembrists, 
officers and lay people, including more than a dozen philhellene poets. Ironically 
for them, as in the case of Alexander’s conspiracy theory (the ‘Paris committee’), 
the Greek uprising would provide the spark, together with the uprisings in the 
Italian and Iberian peninsulas, for a wider European conflagration, which would 
overthrow absolutist rule, including absolutism in Russia.60
1823–25: Canning, Russia, Byron, Ibrahim and barbarization 
Canning, Russia, Byron
When Canning succeeded Castlereagh (following his suicide) in September 1822 
he followed his predecessor’s neutral policy. Canning had ‘no regard for the Turks 
as such, but he did not mean to excite the millions of Mohammedans in India by 
a display of partiality’ 61 and ‘did not share the illusions of the Philhellenes about 
the modern Greeks’,62 regarding them ‘a most rascally set’.63 He stood for the 
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and ‘he held that, if war occurred, Russia 
would gobble Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next’.64 Yet, having in 
the meantime become renowned as the defender of oppressed peoples in Latin 
America and Europe, he came to regard the Greek cause more favourably, vindi-
cating those Greeks who from the start regarded him as a philhellene.65 
The goals of Canning’s Greek policy from 1824 can be summarized as follows: 
(1) to further British interests in the region; (2) not to allow Russia to take undue 
advantage of the Greek case; (3) to limit French influence and not to permit a 
Franco-Russian alliance;66 (4) not to permit the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; 
and (5) to bring about an autonomous or independent Greece leaning to wards 
Britain.67 
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Canning recognized the Greeks as belligerents in March 1823. The act as such 
was not pro-Greek but aimed to protect British commerce from piracy and to hold 
the Greeks accountable for such actions.68 Sadiq-Effendi did not miss the oppor-
tunity to ask Strangford whether Canning was now prepared to ‘allow the right of 
America to recognise Irish rebels as belligerents’.69 When Metternich complained, 
Canning’s reaction was that the Greeks had acquired ‘a certain degree of force and 
consistency’ and ‘monstrous consequences’ would follow from treating them as 
pirates, adding ‘[c]an it be necessary to suggest the advantage to humanity of 
bringing within the regulated limits of civilised war, a contest which was marked 
on its outset on both sides, with disgusting barbarities?’70
The Greeks, in spite of their poor organization and vicious infighting, were 
able to hold their own even after the Ottomans had quelled Ali Pasha in Yannina 
and had sent abundant forces to the south. Thus, in January 1824 the Sultan took 
‘a bold but desperate step’71 and summoned the semi-independent Muhammad 
Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, to subdue the Greeks. He agreed to send his 
son, Ibrahim Pasha, as head of an army and navy. The move, though successful 
militarily, was to prove a grave mistake. 
In the same month (January 1824), Russia took the initiative with a mémoire 
proposing the establishment of three autonomous Greek principalities. The 
proposal was discussed in two conferences at St Petersburg (June 1824–March 
1825). Britain chose not to participate, hoping that the Russian proposal would 
not fly. The Russian scheme fell short of the Greek demand for independence but 
provided more territory than the Greeks would have been able to secure though 
their own efforts.72
The Porte did not accept the Russian proposal and Mavrokordatos (the Anglo-
phile acting as Greek Foreign Minister) sent a letter to Canning rejecting it and 
appealing for British support. Canning replied (in December 1824) reiterating 
British neutrality but hinted that Britain might mediate in the future and would 
not be party to an agreement unacceptable to the Greeks.73
Meanwhile, a unique event was to create a sensation, reviving the waning 
international public interest in the Greek cause. Byron, the idol of literary Europe 
and America, had arrived in Messolonghi in January 1824, inspiring romantic 
Byronists across Europe to join him. The Porte had asked Canning to shelve 
Byron’s arrival but he had turned a deaf ear.74 After a perilous journey by ship from 
the Ionian Islands, Byron, in scarlet military uniform, set foot in Messolonghi to 
a hero’s welcome by an enthusiastic crowd and was made head of the Greek and 
philhellene army in western Greece, known as the Byron Brigade. His motley 
brigade saw no military action but his mere presence ‘electrified’ the Greeks75 
and acted as a ‘talisman’76 internationally. Byron, while in Messolonghi, displayed 
practical spirit and assisted the Greek cause both financially and organizationally. 
The Byron magic was to reach its apogee a hundred days later when he ‘died 
immortally’77 from illness (19 April 1824). His death assured the Greek cause 
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thereafter of constant European concern, which was much needed in view of the 
arrival of Ibrahim and his forces early the next year.78
Ibrahim and the barbarization rumour
Ibrahim landed in the Peloponnese on 24 February 1825 and embarked upon a 
campaign of conquest and devastation (though initially he refrained from indis-
criminate killings79) with the Greeks no match for his military acumen and small 
but well disciplined army.80 By the end of the year there were only some pockets 
of resistance left. Only great power intervention could save the Greeks. Indeed, 
they ‘were to be rescued, though in an unplanned and even reluctant way, by the 
great powers’.81 
The Greeks, in desperation, placed themselves in 1825, by an ‘Act of Submission’, 
under the protection in turn of Britain, France and Russia, none of which accepted 
it. A Greek delegation met Canning (29 September 1825), who dismissed the 
protectorate idea but said that ‘there might be a point in the contest when Great 
Britain would promote a fair and safe compromise’.82 The Greek deputies’ reaction 
was ‘independence or death’.83 
The idea of British mediation matured in the mind of Canning, preferably 
Britain on its own but if that proved impossible then together with Russia. He sent 
his cousin, Stratford Canning, to be the new ambassador to Constantinople,84 
with instructions to convince the Porte of the need for British mediation.85 
At this juncture an ugly hearsay gave rise to a sense of urgency: that Ibrahim 
intended to depopulate the Peloponnese and re-people it with Muslims.86 The 
Russian ambassador in London, Christopher Lieven, and his formidable wife, 
Dorothea Lieven, told Canning at a meeting in Seaford (25 October 1825) that the 
‘Court of Russia, had positive information that … an agreement was entered into 
by the Porte with the Pasha of Egypt … to remove the whole Greek population, 
carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere, and to re-people the country 
with Egyptians and others of the Mohammedan religion’.87
The ‘barbarization project’ was almost certainly smoke without a fire but it was 
crucial in spurring eventual military intervention. Canning could hardly treat 
such a monstrosity lightly. As he put it, ‘supposing the fact to be true’ it would not 
be possible ‘to justify to the country a continued abstinence from interposition’.88 
According to Granville Stapleton, Canning’s secretary and confidant, it was then 
that he opted for the use of force ‘if necessary to prevent the consummation of this 
atrocious design’.89
Canning asked Stratford to see whether there was truth in the rumour and 
‘to declare in the most distinct terms to the Porte that Great Britain would not 
permit the execution of a system of depopulation’.90 The British admiral in the 
Mediterranean was instructed to meet Ibrahim and to demand ‘an explicit 
disavowal … or a formal renunciation of it, if ever entertained’.91 Otherwise 
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‘effectual means will be taken’ by the British navy to prevent ‘the accomplishment 
of so unwarrantable a project’.92 Ibrahim denied any such design93 and so did the 
Reis-Effendi, who referred to it to Stratford as ‘imbecility’.94 But the pro-Greek 
Stratford wrote to the Foreign Office to say that Ibrahim ‘acted on a system little 
short of extermination … and there was room to apprehend that many of his 
prisoners had been sent into Egypt as slaves, the children, it was asserted, being 
made to embrace the Mahommedan Faith’.95 
International agreements in St Petersburg and London 
The St Petersburg Protocol and its aftermath
In the last months of 1825 Alexander contemplated war to save the Greeks.96 But 
he died unexpectedly (in December 1825) and was succeeded by his younger 
brother, Nicholas I, who took over in the midst of the Decembrist revolt. 
The new Tsar tried to use the Greek question to Russia’s advantage and, if need 
be, he intended to act alone, even though he despised the Greeks as rebels against 
legitimate authority.97 Under the circumstances, Canning decided to act quickly, 
jointly with Russia.98 He persuaded the Duke of Wellington to undertake a 
delicate mission to St Petersburg with two objectives: to avert a war by smoothing 
Russo-Ottoman differences; and to arrive at a common line of action on the 
Greek question. Ibrahim’s atrocities and the barbarization project were to be the 
justification for their common action.99
Wellington succeeded in his second task (the Greek question) but not in the 
first. Nicholas appeared to be on a war footing in relation to the Ottoman Empire 
and unconcerned with the Greek question. But agreement began to take shape 
when Lieven arrived and acted as the main protagonist on the Russian side. 
The final text was ready and signed on 4 April 1826 by Wellington and by both 
Nesselrode and Lieven.100 
The St Petersburg Protocol offered mediation to the Porte, which, if accepted, 
would to lead to an autonomous Greece tributary to the Sultan. If the Porte did 
not agree, mediation and autonomy were to remain on the table. A self-denying 
clause was included, renouncing any ‘augmentation of territory, any exclusive 
influence’ or commercial advantage. There was also mention of ‘intervention 
whether jointly or separately between the Porte and the Greeks’, a Russian clause, 
if mediation failed.101
In the meantime, Messolonghi fell to the Egyptians and Ottomans. The 
conquest of a town famous due to Byron created a stir across Europe, with an 
array of poems, musical plays, essays and sermons. Victor Hugo wrote a macabre 
poem, ‘The Seraglio Heads’, in which Ibrahim is presented as sending to the 
Sultan 6,000 severed heads. Delacroix painted his famous Grèce sur les ruines de 
Missolonghi, and the next year the Paris Salon exhibited twenty-one paintings 
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with Greek themes. Ibrahim may have conquered the town, but Messolonghi had 
become a symbol for European public opinion, and more pressure was put on 
governments to rescue the Greeks.102 
Messolonghi’s impact was great in France, which until then had followed an 
equivocal policy. Despite sympathy among the educated public for the Greeks, 
the French government had followed a policy of neutrality but in fact provided 
assistance to Egypt, with which links had existed for decades (French officers and 
advisers had modernized Egypt’s army and navy). France, through Egypt, was 
influential in the Levant at the expense of Britain and Russia. 
In 1825 the French philhellenic spirit became intense, bringing together the 
various bitter divisions of Restoration France: Liberals, Bonapartists as well as 
ultra-Royalists and Royalists, such as Chateaubriand, the ex-Foreign Minister. 
The conservatives were mainly motivated by the suffering of Christians, the 
liberals by the call for national liberation. Chateaubriand, in his influential Note 
en Grèce (1825), urged the French King and other monarchs: ‘Will our century 
watch hordes of savages extinguish civilization at its rebirth on the tomb of a 
people who civil ized the world? Will Christendom calmly allow Turks to strangle 
Christians?’103 In the Comité grec de Paris, set up in 1825, one sees major figures 
apart from Chateaubriand and men of arts and letters: Lafayette, the dukes 
de Broglie, de Dalberg, de Laborde and other members of the higher French 
aristoc racy, generals Sébastiani (Foreign Minister 1830–32), Gérard, Mathieu 
and Dumas, and bankers and in dustrial ists Laffitte, Ternaux and Casimir-Périer. 
Eventually France withdrew its assistance to the Egyptians and remained neutral 
until the end of 1827. More generally the Greek case, as previously with the 
Spanish crisis of 1823, provided the opportunity for France to re-enter the scene 
as a great power.104
Ibrahim had almost total control of the Peloponnese and of the north of 
the Gulf of Corinth, having captured Athens after a long siege. But the Greeks 
remained dominant in the sea now with the assistance of the legendary Lord 
Cochrane, the ex-British officer Captain Hastings with the Karteria (one of the 
first steamships to engage in combat), Captain Hamilton with the British warship 
the Cambrian and the French Rear Admiral de Rigny, who supported the Greeks 
to the extent permitted by France’s neutrality. Soon the British Vice Admiral 
Codrington was to arrive on the scene, whose role was to prove decisive.105
Ambassadors Stratford and Ribeaupierre (Russia) put pressure on the new 
Ottoman Foreign Minister, Pertev-Effendi (a hard-liner who had replaced 
moderate Saida-Effendi in March 1826106), to accept the mediation offered by the 
Protocol. Pertev-Effendi rejected it, adding that it was unacceptable on Muslim 
religious grounds as well.107 
Canning proposed to the Tsar common action: ‘to seize the first occasion of 
recog nizing as an independent State such portion of her [Greece’s] territory as 
should have freed itself from Turkish dominion’,108 but that was too radical for 
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Nicholas to accept.109 The pressure on the Porte produced the Convention of 
 Akkermann (October 1826), with the Porte giving in to various Russian demands 
unrelated to the Greek question.110 
The Treaty of London
Meanwhile, efforts were being made to convince the other three powers to 
accede to the Protocol but only France (King Charles X, Premier de Villèle) 
agreed to join, and then only provided the Protocol was turned into a treaty.111 
Canning (who had been privately in Paris for weeks to lobby the French) readily 
accepted and so did Lieven. Wellington was decidedly against this course of 
action, however.112 Canning wrote to Lieven to say ‘a contest so ferocious … so 
intolerable to civilized Europe, justifies extraordinary intervention, and renders 
lawful any expedients short of positive hostility’.113 
The negotiations started with France tabling the first draft of the Treaty, which 
did not include means of enforcement (January 1827). A Russian draft (March) 
envisaged a naval blockade if the Porte was unyielding and it implied the use of 
armed force. British Prime Minister Liverpool was taken ill with paralysis; after a 
brief tussle between Wellington and Canning, the latter become Prime Minister. 
On 6 July 1827 the Treaty of London was signed, after six months of acrimonious 
deliberations between Dudley, the new British Foreign Secretary, Lieven and 
Polignac (the French ambassador in London). The Treaty followed the lines of 
the Protocol.114
The official justification of the Treaty was stated in the preamble: ‘putting an 
end to the sanguinary struggle’ which has led to ‘the disorders of anarchy’; ‘fresh 
impediments to the commerce of the States of Europe and gives opportunity 
for acts of Piracy’; ‘putting a stop to the effusion of blood’; ‘re-establish peace 
between the contending parties by means of an arrangement called for, no less 
by sentiments of humanity, than by interests for the tranquillity of Europe’.115 
Although stopping the effusion of blood was not the only justification, it is 
probably the first time in history that such concern was invoked expressis verbis as 
‘a justification for intervention’.116
The Treaty offered three-power mediation, called for an immediate armistice 
and provided for the creation of Greece as ‘a dependency of Turkey’. If one of the 
contending parties or both declined, the powers ‘will, nevertheless, continue to 
pursue the work of pacification’.117 
The Treaty included a secret clause (leaked to The Times) to the effect that the 
three powers ‘will jointly exert all their efforts to accomplish the object of such 
armist ice, without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the two 
contending parties’.118 In the text, the various instructions to the three admirals 
boiled down to the following: if the Ottomans refused an armistice, they were to 
‘observe extreme care to prevent the measures which you shall adopt against the 
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Ottoman marine from degenerating into hostilities’ and ‘not to make use of that 
force unless the Turks persist in forcing the passages which they [the admirals] 
have intercepted’.119 
How could the admirals accomplish their task without hostilities? According 
to Marriott, ‘[e]ither the matter had not been clearly thought out, or there was 
a deliberate intention to leave the Gordian knot to be cut by the Executive 
Officers of the Powers’, that is, the three admirals in the Levant.120 As wryly put 
by Woodhouse: ‘This directive [to the admirals], covering all contingencies and 
none, bears the stigmata of official drafting by men who had shut their eyes to facts 
and hoped for the best. It shifted all ill-defined responsibility to the Admirals, and 
left to them the glory and the blame’.121 The lack of clarity is probably due to the 
fact that the Treaty was ‘a compromise between a strictly impartial mediation and 
an open intervention on behalf of the Greeks’.122
The Realpolitik reasons for the Treaty were for France to keep Britain and Russia 
in check; Britain to restrain Russia from going to war and gaining advantage from 
the situation; and Russia to avail itself of the opportunity to gain advantages. 
As Crawley has put it, ‘the mutual suspicion of the Powers was the Greeks’ best 
security: no one of them was concerned to make Greece an independent State 
(Canning himself gave no clear indication of it) but each was driven in that 
direction by the fear of allowing the other an excuse for further interference’.123
By July 1827, when the Treaty was signed, ‘the war was as good as won’ by the 
Ottomans and Egyptians, but, as Turkish scholars have argued, the victory ‘was 
snatched out’ of their hands.124
The Greeks wisely accepted the armistice and mediation, though in practice 
they did not adhere to the armistice, with the justification that Ibrahim continued 
to ravage the country.125 The provisional Greek government nominated two 
Britons to head the Greek forces: Cochrane the navy, and ex-general Church 
the army. Cochrane and Church, together with Blanquière and Hamilton, 
were instrumental in convincing the rival Greeks factions (and even the pro-
British Mavrokordatos) that the wisest option was to nominate Capodistrias as 
President.126
The ambassadors of the three powers, Stratford, Ribeaupierre and Guilleminot 
(France), tried to convince Foreign Minister Pertev-Effendi to accept a cease-fire 
and mediation, and on 12 August 1827 gave only fourteen days to the Porte to come 
up with an answer. On the fourteenth day the reaction of the Porte was negative. 
The ambassadors sent a verbal note to Pertev-Effendi making it clear that their 
governments intended to implement the armistice even without the approval of 
the Porte, but nothing came of this.127
Metternich, realizing that the Ottomans were in a quandary, offered mediation 
to save them, which was enthusiastically accepted by the Divan (Ottoman cabinet) 
and the Sultan, on 23 October 1827. But unfortunately for the Ottomans, the Battle 
of Navarino had taken place a few days earlier.128
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Navarino and the years 1828–32
Navarino and its aftermath
Let us see what had transpired. Following the Porte’s rejection, the admirals 
were instructed by the Constantinople ambassadors to enforce the armistice.129 
The immediate concern of the admirals was to use their ships effectively to 
prevent the arrival of fresh Egyptian troops and supplies, and to do so without 
provoking hostili ties.130 Codrington asked Stratford for clarification, whose reply 
(1 September) was that ‘the prevention of supplies is ultimately to be enforced, if 
necessary, and when all other means are exhausted, by cannon shot’.131
Codrington and de Rigny met Ibrahim at Navarino (on 25 September 1827) and 
he seemed forthcoming regarding an armistice132 but he continued his devastat-
ing campaign against the Greeks by land, which was now even more destructive 
than before.133 Following the arrival of the Russian squadron under Rear Admiral 
Heiden, the three admirals agreed to enter the bay ‘without effusion of blood 
and without hostilities, but simply by the imposing presence of the squadrons’, 
as the only way to fulfil their mandate, enforce an armistice and halt Ibrahim’s 
onslaught.134
The three squadrons (first the British, followed by the French and Russian) 
entered Navarino on 20 October 1827, outnumbered by 1,298 to 2,000 Ottoman 
guns and with half the number of ships of the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets. 
The first shot was fired by their opponents, apparently without instructions. The 
outcome is well known: the annihilation of the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets.135 
Navarino, the last major naval battle fought under sail, in eighteenth-century 
battle conditions, has passed into legend, not least in the lore of humanitarian 
intervention. Navarino is retrospectively regarded as the first instance of use of 
force for humanitarian purposes as we understand it today,136 but a sound case 
could be made that its humanitarian rationale is unconvincing.137 Retrospective 
or not, convincing or not, as early as the end of the 1820s the intervention of 
Navarino was labelled ‘d’humanité ’ in several official documents.138
Undoubtedly the battle had come about ‘by accident rather than design’139 
but it ‘strengthened enormously the position of the Greeks’.140 In fact the battle 
itself brought no immediate relief to the Greeks: Ibrahim remained entrenched 
in the Peloponnese for more than a year. The real effect of Navarino in delivering 
the Greeks took time to materialize, but one thing is certain: it made it almost 
impossible for the three powers to change track, even if they wanted to, as did 
Britain under Wellington.141 
The news of the battle was received with amazement in Europe. The French 
public were delighted, though not the government, the Russians were jubilant, 
the Austrians appalled and the British uneasy. The Ottomans called it a ‘revolting 
outrage’ and denounced the Convention of Akkermann.142 For Metternich it 
was a ‘frightful catastrophe’.143 Foreign Secretary Dudley addressed ten queries 
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to Codrington regarding the battle and whether he had followed instructions, 
to which the admiral answered point by point.144 When Wellington formed his 
government in January 1828, the speech from the throne (which he had drafted) 
used the famous words ‘untoward event’.145 The speech was greeted with uproar 
in both Houses, with most speakers praising Codrington. Wellington tried to 
explain away the phrase by claiming he meant ‘unexpected’ or ‘unfortunate’.146 
The Ottoman government demanded condemnation of the ‘tragic episode’ as 
unintended, compensation and the three powers to allow the Porte to treat the 
matter for what it was, an internal affair. The three ambassadors replied that the 
battle had indeed been unintended but the Ottomans had first opened fire; their 
states desired friendly relations with the Porte, provided there was an armistice 
and mediation; and the London Treaty was aimed at European peace and was to 
the benefit of the Ottoman Empire.147
Pertev-Effendi’s reaction was that only the submission of the Rum would 
resolve the question; upon their submission they would be pardoned, despite 
their crimes of treason and rebellion. ‘Greece’, he asserted, does not exist, the 
Rum are simply a millet headed by their patriarch. When Guilleminot questioned 
whether one can speak of submission after such a long struggle, Pertev-Effendi 
retorted that ‘it is well known what has kept the rebellion alive’, implying foreign 
encouragement.148 
Mahmud for his part made the following concessions (as he saw them): he 
would drop his demand for the rebels to pay compensation for the costs of the 
war, and, after their submission, he would relieve them of paying capital taxes 
for a year. The ambassadors made a last-ditch attempt at compromise, calling for 
abandonment of warfare and the acceptance of the autonomy status of the Greeks 
as provided by the London Treaty, but the Divan remained adamant and the three 
ambassadors left the Ottoman capital (December 1827).149
Events of 1828–32
By the end of 1827 the fate of Greece was sealed, or so it seems with the benefit of 
hindsight, in view of the intrusive London Treaty, Navarino, Ottoman intransi-
gence, Russia’s willingness to go to war, unremitting pressure from France on its 
two allies to allow France to send an expeditionary force to expel Ibrahim, and 
Capodistrias in charge, with his great diplomatic skills and international links. 
Only two things remained unresolved: whether Greece was to be autonomous or 
independent, and its geographical limits. Yet it took three more gruelling years to 
make the Greek dream and the Ottoman nightmare a reality. If one absence was 
deeply felt in the Greek camp it was that of Canning, especially from the moment 
Wellington took over.
Indeed, the Iron Duke did his best to undo the consequences of the London 
Treaty and Navarino. His hostility was based on his conviction that Greece was 
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destined to become a maritime state and from this he mistakenly surmised that 
the new state was bound to be antagonistic towards Britain and to become ‘a 
Russian dependency’.150 His fear of Russia made Britain openly pro-Ottoman and 
this encouraged the Sultan to remain defiant.151 Thus all the dividends of years 
of incremental diplomacy by Canning were thrown overboard and thereafter 
Britain played second fiddle to Russia and France in the Greek affair.152
With Russia and France standing firm, the Sultan opted for war with Russia 
instead of accepting the inevitable, namely Greek autonomy. Had Mahmud acted 
with restraint and bent with the wind after Navarino – even though Navarino 
was admittedly ‘rather provoking’153 – the Ottomans would have avoided 
an unwinnable war with Russia. Actually, moderation had been advised in 
a memorandum to the Sultan from a group of senior officials, headed by the 
eminent poet Izzet Mollâ and Hamid Bey (a former Reis-Effendi). The reasoning 
of the peace lobby was countered by the war lobby under Pertev-Effendi, which 
advocated intransigence in a memorandum that was endorsed by the Sultan.154 
Metternich, in a last attempt to avoid a war that was bound to go Russia’s 
way, proposed (15 March 1828) to ‘invite the Porte to recognise the autonomy 
of Peloponnese and Islands only’ and on refusal ‘to recognise their entire in-
dependence’.155 The Tsar was indignant with this Austrian proposal. As he put it, ‘I 
detest, I abhor the Greeks, I consider them as revolted subjects and I do not desire 
their independence; Austria has abandoned her principles’.156
Meanwhile, France was able to obtain Wellington’s reluctant consent for the 
sending of a French expeditionary force in the name of the three allies. The force 
of some 14,000 under General Nicolas Maison arrived in the Peloponnese in 
September 1828. Maison’s mission, to expel Ibrahim’s forces, was achieved almost 
without firing a shot, with only some mock sieges and momentary resistance in 
only two cases.157
The reconvened London Conference instructed the three former ambassadors 
to the Porte to suggest frontiers for Greece and an ambassadors’ conference was 
convened on the island of Poros (September–December 1828), urged along by 
President Capodistrias. The ambassadors’ report (12 December 1828) recom-
mended the frontier run from the Gulf of Volos (in the east) to the Gulf of Arta (in 
the west), incorporating the large island of Euboea. The faraway islands of Samos 
and Crete were also suggested for inclusion. The report was not accepted as such 
but instead as a basis for negotiations (22 March 1829), with Samos and Crete not 
included. Stratford resigned his embassy in disgust.158
The Russo-Ottoman war which had started in April 1828 raged on much 
longer than had been anticipated, due to stiff resistance by the Ottomans. When 
the victorious Russian army entered Adrianople in August 1829 a committee 
under the head of the Russian Council of Ministers reached the conclusion that 
‘the advantages of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire outweigh its dis-
advantages’, but if the Empire collapsed in the future Russia must take ‘the most 
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energetic measures to ensure that the exit from the Black Sea is not seized by any 
other power whatsoever’.159 The committee also considered but did not adopt a 
previous plan by Capodistrias for the creation of a Balkan confederation of five 
independent states (Dacia, Serbia, Macedonia, Epirus and Greece).160
The Treaty of Adrianople (14 September 1829) made the Porte accept an 
autonomous Greece. This time it was the turn of Capodistrias to reject the 
tributary status. Now Metternich and Wellington opted for an independent 
Greece, for they feared that Russian influence would be greater with Greek 
autonomy. The new British government of Lord Grey, with Lord Palmerston as 
Foreign Secretary, was more favourable to the Greeks.161 
On 3 February 1930, at the London Conference, a protocol was signed making 
Greece independent. Another London protocol (8 April 1830) referred to the 
‘frightful calamities to humanity’, which made the internationalization of the 
problem inevitable.162 Following the assassination of Capodistrias in 1831, Greece 
became a kingdom under Otto, the son of Ludwig of Bavaria. In 7 May 1832 
a treaty was signed by the three powers and Bavaria which fixed the frontier 
as proposed – between the Gulf of Volos and the Gulf of Arta. Finally, Greek 
independence and its frontiers were accepted by the Porte in a convention signed 
in Constantinople (21 July 1832).163
Motives for intervention and views of publicists
As we have seen, one of the official justifications for the three-power intervention 
concerned humanitarian factors. And had it not been for the humanitarian plight 
and identification with the Greeks among the educated publics in Britain, Russia 
and France, none of the three states would have contemplated intervening. As the 
war dragged on and the Greeks held their own, strategic, balance-of-power and 
economic concerns came to the fore, above all not to allow any of three powers 
to gain advantage from the Greek case. The crisis, the gravest until then of the 
so-called Eastern Question, namely the fate of the Ottoman Empire in decline, 
could not but be a key concern of the great powers. For Russia it was also a 
question of preserving its prestige and influence among the Balkan Christians.164 
Among publicists the pace was set by Wheaton as early as 1836, who asserted 
that this intervention was ‘more justifiable’ than other cases for it rescued ‘a 
whole nation, not merely from religious persecution, but from the cruel alter-
native of being transported from their native land, or exterminated by their 
merciless oppressors’.165 His conclusion is worth stressing: ‘The interference of 
the Christian powers, to put an end to this bloody contest might, therefore, have 
been safely rested upon this ground alone [i.e. the ground of what he calls “the 
right of human nature”] without appealing to the interests of commerce and of 
the repose of Europe, which, as well as the interests of humanity, are alluded to in 
the treaty’.166 Similarly Rougier pointed out that ‘[i]t is reasons of humanity in the 
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widest sense of the word … and of moral dignity which dictated this intervention 
of the powers … in the general interest of Europe and civilisation. But the reasons 
of humanity were not yet regarded in that epoch as a just cause for intervention, 
thus the Treaty of London mentions it timidly’.167 
On the whole, from the 1830s until the 1930s publicists who were advocates 
of humanitarian intervention referred approvingly to this intervention (we have 
identified twenty such publicists) as motivated solely or mainly by humanitarian 
reasons (this is the majority view) or at least partly by humanitarian reasons (the 
minority view).168 John Stuart Mill also referred approvingly to intervention on 
behalf of the Greeks on humanitarian grounds (see chapter 5). 
Surprisingly, in the nineteenth century even some of the jurists opposed to 
humanitarian intervention condone this one case on humanitarian or moral 
grounds (at least eight of them).169 For instance, Calvo stated (in 1870) that ‘the 
inter vention in favour of Greece was dictated by moral and political consider-
ations of the highest and most respectable order’.170 Even more surprising is the 
view expressed by Senior, one of the earliest opponents of humanitarian interven-
tion, put forward eleven years after the independence of Greece:171 
The treaty of 1827 … was … the most disinterested interference of sovereigns in 
behalf [sic] of a people that has occurred in modern times.… The long duration of 
the contest – the ferocity with which it was carried on by the Turks – the apparent 
success of Greece against her gigantic enemy until she was crushed by the invasion 
from Egypt – the fear of having to witness the utter extirpation of a Christian 
population by Mohametans, that Christian population being the descendants of 
those to whom the world owes its civilization; – all these were motives which it 
would have been hard to withstand, even if the interference had been a matter of 
difficulty or danger.
In Senior’s assertion one sees almost all the grounds of the publicists (from 
the 1830s until the 1930s) justifying the humanitarian intervention (HI). They 
are as follows: (1) protracted barbarous war, the culprits being the ‘Turks’ and 
Egyptians (claimed by eleven pro-HI publicists and four anti-HI); (2) relative 
disinterestedness on the part of the three intervening states, the predominant 
aim being to stop the ‘effusion of blood’ (claimed by fourteen pro-HI and five 
anti-HI); (3) the barbariz ation project and danger of annihilation of the Greeks 
(claimed by two pro-HI and two anti-HI); (4) ‘Turkish’ despotism, oppression 
and religious persecution (claimed by six pro-HI and one anti-HI); and (5) debt of 
Europe and humankind to the ancestors of the Greeks (claimed by three pro-HI 
and one anti-HI).
The views of two well known supporters of humanitarian intervention are 
worth referring to. According to Harcourt:172
The Battle of Navarino may have been an ‘untoward event,’ but it was the natural 
and almost inevitable consequence of a forcible intervention to prevent the Turkish 
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Government from reducing its subjects to submission. The emancipation of Greece, 
effected by Europe, was a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law. As 
an act of policy, it may have been, and probably was, justifiable.
According to Lawrence:173
The contest between them [the Greeks] and their Turkish oppressors had gone on 
for many years, and had been marked throughout by the most horrible barbarities. 
It seemed as if it would end in the extermination of the whole Greek race. The 
intervention of the three powers preserved a people to whom civilization owned 
so much and laid the foundations of a new order in Southeastern Europe, which, 
with all its defects, is infinitely preferable to the chaos of weltering barbarism that 
immediately preceded it.
The view of a prominent opponent of humanitarian intervention is also worth 
mentioning. Thomas Alfred Walker, writing in the 1890s, criticized intervening 
on the ‘dictates of humanity’ as opening ‘a wide door to outrage’174 but added:175 
On the other hand, the cause of humanity was undoubtedly really served by that 
intervention of the Powers which led to the establishment of the modern kingdom 
of Greece. It was not until after several years of singularly bloody struggle and the 
enactment of a long series of frightful scenes of horror, when it became evident that 
the alternative offered to Europe was the independence or the annihilation of the 
Greeks, that Great Britain, France and Russia agreed to combine their efforts.
After 1945 the jurists supportive of humanitarian intervention also tend to 
refer to the Greek case as the first such instance.176 But those opposed, contrary 
to before, do not regard it as humanitarian. Ian Brownlie, for instance, argues 
that the collective intervention in Greece is an example of ‘ex post factoism’, for 
‘[t]he governments of the time did not use a legal justification’ for intervening, 
as no such right existed then.177 For others, their reading of the official stance on 
intervention leads them to the conclusion that humanitarian reasons were non-
existent or secondary.178
Concluding remarks
The Greek case, apart from being regarded as the first case of humanitarian inter-
vention, providing the springboard for the emergence of the new concept, has a 
bearing on the evolution of international norms and rules of conduct in instances 
of humanitarian plights in a number of ways.
First is the exceptional overruling of the grundnorms of sovereignty and non-
intervention in instances of ‘effusion of blood’ that shake the moral consciousness 
of humankind.
Second is the multilateral character of the intervention, in this case an ‘alliance 
of the willing’, of three of the five powers. 
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Third, in this first case one sees most of the repertoire of international involve-
ment on humanitarian grounds: consultation of the powers, peremptory demands 
made of the guilty state (to halt barbarities and distinguish between guilty 
and innocent), formal great power agreements, calls for a cease-fire, mediation 
attempts, a peace conference, an important battle, a peacekeeping force and, at the 
end, an all-out war by one of the powers condoned by the rest.
Fourth is the reticence or hostility of the powers on instrumental Realpolitik 
grounds, and when the need for intervention becomes more evident, a mixture of 
humanitarian and instrumental motives. Moreover, there is a deliberate attempt 
to check abuse by including self-denying clauses in the relevant texts.
Fifth, it is a clear manifestation of the civilized–barbarians binary that was to 
dominate the scene until 1914: the ‘civilized Christians’ as opposed to the Muslim 
‘barbarian Other’, with the latter prone to committing slaughters and atrocities. 
The massacres of Muslims were swept under the carpet, as if the Muslim victims 
of the Christians were less human.179
Last but not least is the role played by civil society across Europe and in North 
America in spurring intervention on humanitarian and other ethical grounds, in 
this case of members of the elite, politicians, thinkers, writers, poets and artists 
(including celebrities), which was unprecedented and a sign of things to come.
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Intervention in Lebanon and Syria, 1860–61
On intervention
The second intervention in the nineteenth century on humanitarian grounds is 
regarded the great power intervention in Lebanon and Syria, headed by France.1 
Both were at the time provinces of Greater Syria, within the Ottoman Empire, 
which included today’s Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. 
When the intervention in Lebanon and Syria took place in 1860–61, the debate 
among publicists on humanitarian intervention that had started in the 1830s was 
almost thirty years old, with a slight majority favourable to such interventions, 
which included major jurists of the time (see chapter 4), and there were also the 
recent contributions of Cobden, against intervening, and Mazzini and Mill in 
support of counter-intervention and intervention in humanitarian plights (see 
chapter 5). 
France, the main initiator of the intervention, did not yet have thinkers par-
ticipating in the debate for or against intervention d’humanité.2 As for intervention 
in general, the leaders of the French Revolution had come out in favour of both 
non-intervention and intervention. Condorcet, for instance, asserted in 1792 that 
it is an inalienable right of a people for their state to have a Constitution and no 
outside power could intervene in this domain3 and non-intervention was adopted 
by the French National Assembly in 1790 and in the 1793 French Constitution.4 
The French Revolution can also be credited with the right to intervene in order 
to lend diplomatic and even military support ‘to all peoples who shall wish to 
recover their liberty’ (Declaration of 19 November 1792).5
In 1823, Chateaubriand, as French Foreign Minister, stated that ‘no Government 
has a right to interfere in the affairs of another Government, except in the case 
where the security and immediate interests of the first Government are com-
promised’.6 Two decades later, during the July Monarchy (1830–48), the historian 
François Guizot, as French Foreign Minister, maintained that ‘[n]o State has the 
right to intervene in the affairs and government of another State so long as its 
interest and proper security do not render this intervention indispensable’.7 
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The opposite, intervention to assist liberation movements, resurfaced in the 
early days of the July Monarchy with Lafayette and Armand Carrel,8 and in the 
wake of the February 1848 French Revolution by writer Alphonse de Lamartine, as 
French Foreign Minister (whose stance was then defended in Britain by J. S. Mill).
Consequently, if one can speak of a French approach to intervention from 1789 
until 1860, it could be summarized it as: (1) non-intervention in a state’s political 
system; (2) intervention if French interests are at stake; and (3) assistance to 
liberation movements under foreign domination. A new dimension to be seen in 
1860–61 was intervention for the sake of humanity, as evoked by French officials 
and mostly by Foreign Minister Édouard Antoine de Thouvenel. Napoleon III, 
then in power, had a contradictory record of having militarily intervened in 1849 
against the Roman Republic, much to the disappointment of Mazzini (the head of 
the governing triumvirate of the Republic), upon the Pope’s invitation to restore 
the Papal States, and ten years later having sent the French army to support the 
Italians fighting against Austria–Hungary for Italian unification.
Britain was then under Palmerston as Prime Minister, who, contrary to 
Castlereagh’s non-intervention stance (see chapter 6) and as an admirer of 
Canning, ‘drew the outer limits of permissible conduct for Britain as the 
champion of liberalism as well as an opponent of the European despots’.9 But he 
was careful not to upset the European balance of power or British interests for 
ideological reasons, by being too supportive of national self-determination and 
constitutional government. He thus earned the criticism of non-interventionists, 
such as Cobden, as well as interventionists in support of liberty, such as J. S. Mill. 
Palmerston was also well aware of the downside of intervention in civil wars, 
noting that ‘they who in quarrels interpose, will often get a bloody nose’10 and 
used non-intervention as a ‘ring-holding device’.11
In the years 1830–60, British jurists had been at the forefront of the ongoing 
debate together with their German, Italian and American colleagues, and were 
evenly split among opponents and supporters of humanitarian intervention, 
though by far the most authoritative and recent contributions were by two in-
fluential publicists within the British establishment, Phillimore (in 1854) and 
Bernard (in 1860), both guarded supporters of moral grounds for intervention 
(see chapter 4).
The landscape 
Among the Arab-speaking communities, the Maronites (Eastern Catholics 
linked to the Roman Catholic Church), the largest community in Lebanon, 
and the Druzes (an offshoot of the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam), one of the 
smaller communities, lived in Lebanon in two self-governing districts headed 
by an Ottoman governor.12 From 1840 until the events of 1860, there was tension 
between them that was accentuated by European influence and commercial, 
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religious and other interests in the region. More generally, European intrusion in 
the region and the traditional Ottoman policy of keeping religious communities 
apart (the millet system) hardly provided the ground for integration between the 
Arab com munities of Lebanon (Arab nationalism as pan-Arabism was to arrive at 
the start of the twentieth century, with Christian Arabs at the forefront13).14
The Maronites sought the support of France and Paris was keen to oblige, a 
support deeply resented by the Druzes. French involvement had its origins in 
the first capitulations of 1536 and 1569, under the reigns of Sultans Suleiman the 
Magnificent and Selim II.15 The end result was that the French regarded themselves 
as the defenders of the Maronites of Lebanon, their agents and protégés in the 
Levant. The British played almost the same role with the Druzes and for a while 
Palmerston toyed with the idea of a ‘special relationship’ with the Druzes (the 
missionaries went even further in the belief that they could convert the Druzes 
to Protestantism).16 The French and British consuls as well as the consuls of other 
powers, especially Russia (as regards the Lebanese Greek Orthodox community), 
became routinely involved in various aspects of Lebanese life.17
European interest in the region had also another dimension worth referring 
to. As Davide Rodogno points out, Syria and especially Lebanon were presented 
by romantic writers, such as Lamartine, and Orientalist painters, such as David 
Roberts and Edward Lear, as an ‘Eden on earth’, ‘a timeless biblical land’ in need 
of ‘cultural redemption and religious salvation’ so as to be reconnected with the 
evolutionary ‘stream of Time’ from which it had been severed due to the Ottoman 
conquest and tyranny.18
The Muslims in the region (Sunni, Shia and Druzes) strongly objected to the 
emancipation of the Christian subjects of the Empire initiated with the Tanzimat 
reforms, from 1839 onwards, which made the Christians, in law, equal to the 
Muslims. Equality before the law, despite far from strict adherence to it by the 
Ottomans in Greater Syria (or elsewhere in the Empire), benefited the Christians, 
who were generally better educated and made the most of new opportunities for 
economic and social ascendency: entry into the civil service, representation in 
provincial councils and prosperity, taking advantage of the European economic 
presence and protection in the region. The Maronites made their new-found 
freedoms as conspicuous as possible, building churches, establishing community 
schools and so on, at times with a show of superiority, or so it seemed to the 
Muslims, who became increasingly resentful. Another aspect of the Tanzimat 
was the adoption of a code which permitted Europeans and their protégés to buy 
agricultural land and real estate, the outcome being that property was bought 
from impoverished Muslim notables in Damascus and elsewhere.19 The Muslims 
became increasingly frustrated with this turn of events, dreading that their 
dominant role was slipping away for good. In this, the Christian powers had a 
hand, with their aid to the Christians and calls for the full implementation of the 
sweeping 1856 Reform Edict.20
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On the Maronite side there was a rise in expectations. They learned French 
and were inspired by the principles of the French Revolution; they increasingly 
felt themselves to be an alien island in a Muslim ocean and began to dream of the 
creation of an independent Maronite Lebanon, or at least a French protectorate.21
The massacres and the Ottoman authorities
The ‘massacres of ’60’ (madhabih al­sittin), as they are known in Lebanon and 
Syria, which started in April and continued until July, were premeditated22 in 
the sense that the Maronites were planning an all-out attack against the Druzes, 
the aim being the creation of a Maronite protectorate under France.23 The 
Maronites had been mobilized by their notables and clerics, headed by ‘Awn, the 
Maronite bishop of Beirut, and prepared themselves with arms in units under a 
commanding officer, poised to assail the Druzes. The Druzes took wind of it and 
organized themselves for the worst.24 
Sporadic violent clashes began in April 1860, with Maronites raiding a Druze 
village. The well prepared Druzes retaliated ferociously, burning villages (within 
a few weeks more than sixty villages were in ashes), sacking churches and mon-
asteries and massacring 10,000 to 15,000 Christians (not even sparing the Greek 
Orthodox Arabs, with whom they were on good terms), in what was the bloodiest 
ethno-religious confrontation in the history of sectarian strife in Lebanon (the 
number of Druzes killed is unknown).25 
The acts of arson and atrocities continued, culminating in an appalling 
massacre in Damascus (9–11 July 1860) of 5,000 to 10,000 Christians. The Russian, 
French, Austrian and US consulates were sacked and part of the famous city was 
ablaze, with the governor doing nothing to stop the carnage.26 Apparently the 
underlying cause of the onslaught was the aforementioned Muslim resentment 
at the rising Western influence and the economic prosperity of the Christians.27
The role of the Ottomans in the region from April to July 1860 has been a 
subject of controversy: were they inefficient, callously indifferent, or had they 
colluded with the Druzes? The key Ottoman officials in charge were the two 
governors, Khurshid Pasha in Lebanon and müşir (field-marshal) Ahmed Pasha 
in Damascus, an able soldier who had distinguished himself in the Crimean War.
The view of prominent French international lawyers until the First World War, 
such Despagnet and Rougier, was that there was ‘complicity’ on the part of the 
Ottoman authorities in having allowed the massacre of ‘six thousand’ people to 
take place.28 The American Stowell was of the view that the Druzes ‘had massacred 
six thousand Christian Maronites without any efforts on the part of the Porte to 
fulfill its obligations to protect the victims’.29 But let us see what the specialists of 
the region have to say. 
Ottomanists tend to absolve the local Ottoman authorities of any responsibility. 
The Shaws also claim that the British had sent arms to the Druzes so as to counter 
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French influence with the Maronites.30 Most Arab and other Middle East special-
ists attribute responsibility of one kind or another to the Ottomans, ranging from 
ineffectiveness and indifference to actual participation in the onslaught. According 
to Hitti, the Ottoman regulars did nothing to stop the fighting and the irregulars 
(bashibazouk) ‘maltreated and pillaged refugees fleeing to Damascus or Beirut’.31 
Salibi points out that when the European consuls in Beirut urged Khurshid to act, 
he was in no position to do so or ‘stood by and watched’.32 According to Akarli, 
the Ottoman authorities were ineffective in protecting the Maronites and other 
Christians due to a shortage of armed personnel, mismanagement and unwilling-
ness to fight fellow Muslims to protect Christians.33 Ma‘oz puts most of the blame 
on Ahmed Pasha34 and suggests there was ‘a concealed alliance’ between him and 
local leaders ‘to punish the Christians for their disobedience’ by ‘secretly instigat-
ing or at least tacitly directing the fatal course of events’.35
Among Middle East scholars Tibawi is almost alone in absolving the Ottoman 
authorities of responsibility. He maintains that the accusations of conspiracy 
with the Druzes ‘have never been judiciously investigated by any historian’36 and 
that Khurshid could do little, due to lack of adequate forces.37 Abraham takes the 
opposite line, pointing to Ottoman collusion on the part of both governors, while 
blaming the onslaught and even the instigation on the Druzes.38
In the most detailed study of the Maronite–Druze clash, by Farah, the picture 
that emerges is that the data do not confirm the Maronite view and French press 
reports of Druzes chiefs spoiling for a fight in 1860. In fact, Sa‘îd Janblât, the senior 
Druze leader, had urged both communities to show restraint, but to no avail. The 
decision to initiate an all-out ethnic war was taken by the Maronite leadership in 
Beirut with the approval of Bishop ‘Awn.39
As to the possibility of the Porte being somehow involved, no documentary 
evidence has surfaced to prove such a scenario.40 Plausibly, the anti-Tanzimat 
circles may have encouraged ethnic strife so as to bring about a crisis that would 
overthrow reformist Sultan Abdulmecid in favour of his conservative brother, 
Abdulaziz, but this hypothesis has also not found documentary evidence.41
European and Ottoman reaction
The news of the gruesome events reached the Ottoman capital only after a delay of 
some two months (on 7 June 1860), via the Izmir telegraph station. The European 
consuls in Beirut gave a slanted pro-Maronite account of the events, especially 
the French consul-general, Bentivoglio, who referred mainly to the massacres of 
Christians, portraying them as innocent victims, the Druzes as barbarians and 
alluding to the complicity of the local Ottoman authorities.42 Lavalette, the French 
ambassador at the Porte, cabled his Foreign Minister, Thouvenel, referring to ‘the 
interest of humanity’ and suggesting a military operation against the Druzes and 
local Ottoman authorities, whom he regarded as accomplices.43 
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Thouvenel, who was familiar with the region (he had served as ambassador 
to the Porte in 1855–59), sent the chilling dispatch to his British counterpart, 
Lord Russell. He appealed to the other four great powers for a unanimous 
response, because, he said, this was ‘a question of humanity, and does not 
comprise any difference of opinion between cabinets’.44 Thouvenel told the 
Prussian ambassador that France wanted to maintain the Ottoman Empire, ‘but 
to maintain it in conditions which can be reconciled with the rights of humanity 
and of civilization’.45
On the Russian side, Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
suggested joint Franco-Russian action. France called for the convening of a 
conference of the powers, but British Prime Minister Palmerston was uneasy with 
France’s motives and was reluctant to give his approval.46
The Porte condemned the atrocities at the highest level – that of Sultan 
Abdulmecid. The anger of the Sultan and of his two senior officials (both enlight-
ened reformists), Grand Vizier Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, the Foreign Minister, 
with the behaviour of the regional authorities was genuine; it was seen as a disgrace 
to the Ottoman army. The Sultan took the unusual step of sending Fuad with 
15,000 soldiers and extraordinary emergency powers to oversee the operation (he 
named him Commissioner Extraordinary of the Porte and personally handed 
him the seal of authority, by Ottoman ritual a sign of considerable commitment) 
and thus gave few pretexts for European meddling in the Empire’s internal affairs. 
Abdulmecid sent letters to Napoleon III and Queen Victoria expressing his grief 
at the massacres, promising the re-establishment of order, punishment of the 
guilty and assuring justice for all.47
The Damascus massacre was a turning point. European and in particular 
French public opinion was horrified. The Ottomans were accused, especially by 
the French press, of deliberately staging the massacres and there were calls for 
military intervention. Thouvenel stated that ‘[i]n the face of these massacres, re-
producing from city to city and everywhere where Christians live, it is impossible 
not to recognize that humanity commands the Powers to interpose their action’.48 
The British press and public were in favour of intervention for humanitarian 
reasons and supported the French initiatives. Russell conceded, fearing a Russo-
French alliance that would isolate Britain, and endorsed the sending of European 
troops in the name of humanity if it was sealed by an official agreement between 
the five powers and the Porte.49
Upon Thouvenel’s invitation, the five powers and the Ottoman Empire 
convened an ambassadors’ conference in Paris (26 July–3 August 1860). The 
Porte was represented by its Paris ambassador, the worldly Vefik Effendi, whose 
instructions were to stall and try to divide the other powers, but to give in if 
the five were united.50 Two Paris protocols were adopted (3 August 1860). The 
first justified ‘active cooperation’ by referring to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 
(article IX), which guaranteed the rights of Ottoman Christians.51 The second 
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provided for 12,000 soldiers to be sent, 6,000 of them French, together with 
sufficient naval forces from various European countries and commissioners from 
the great powers. A disinterestedness proviso was inserted: not to seek ‘any ter-
ritorial advantage, any exclusive influence, or any commercial concession’.52 The 
period of foreign troop presence was to be limited to six months (at British 
insistence). A declaration by Abdulmecid was included in the second protocol, 
stating that his aim was ‘to stop by prompt and efficacious measures, the effusion 
of blood in Syria’.53 
Clearly, the operation was intended to be a ‘rescue mission’ and not a punitive 
one.54 Napoleon’s message to the French force as it left Toulon (6 August 1860) 
was ‘to aid the Sultan recall to their allegiance subjects blinded by an antiquated 
fanaticism’.55 The French contingent was headed by General de Beaufort 
d’Hautpoul, with instructions that the expedition was not to be ‘an occupation of 
some duration’; the mission was ‘essentially restorative, temporary … assuming 
the character of an act of justice and humanity’.56
Fuad was informed of the Damascus massacres while his ships were refuelling 
in Cyprus. Exasperated, he arrived in Beirut on 17 July and hastened to Damascus 
to re-establish order and give little excuse for French presence in the city.57 
His ‘justice was swift and harsh’.58 He was able to re-established order prior 
to the arrival of the French troops, who landed on 16 August 1860; he assisted 
the Christians and arrested offenders, hundreds of whom were put to death 
or imprisoned following summary trials. Ahmed Pasha (a friend of Fuad) and 
some sixty Ottoman officials were hanged, while Khurshid and his officers were 
imprisoned. Fuad wanted to demonstrate that the Ottoman government was 
in no way responsible for the massacres, which were, as he put it, against ‘the 
principles of civilization current in the world’.59 In order not to provide grounds 
for the French to render their presence a real occupation, the Pasha did not punish 
the Maronite instigators.60 
In record time no less than twenty-eight warships from the powers and also from 
small states (such as Greece and Sardinia) arrived on the coastline of Lebanon to 
monitor the situation. Fuad’s troops, together with the French contingent under 
Beaufort and the five commissioners of the great powers, were able to keep the 
peace. The French troops were no menace to the Ottoman  authorities and did 
not engage in any major military activity. The French acted as peacekeepers and 
not as peacemakers (to use present parlance), since Fuad had already pacified 
the region. The French soldiers were engaged mainly in humanitarian activities. 
Indeed, they ‘beat their swords into plough-shares and their spears into pruning-
hooks’,61 burying the dead, cleaning streets, and rebuilding houses, villages and 
farms.62 
The six-month limit was extended upon French request (with Russian support) 
to three more months, after which the French forces duly left, having gained 
acclaim inside and outside Lebanon for their conduct.63 
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Final agreement
Fuad was able to dominate the scene and control the other commissioners, 
with the support of Lord Dufferin, the British commissioner.64 The mandate of 
the commission was to punish the guilty, secure reparations for the Christian 
losses and suggest reforms that would ensure order and security.65 Deliberations, 
with Fuad chairing, started on 5 October 1860 with the aim of arriving at a new 
arrange ment for Lebanon. The French tried to set up a Maronite Lebanon under 
a native Christian governor. The Austrian and Prussian commissioners aligned 
with the French, but Fuad, with Dufferin’s support and help from the Russian 
commissioner Novikov, was able to shelve the French idea. Finally, after eight 
months of talks, the six commissioners were able to reach agreement (May 1861) 
on a draft statute for Lebanon.66 
The draft was revised at a meeting of the ambassadors of the six powers at 
the Porte under the chairmanship of the Grand Vizier, which concluded with 
the signing of the Beyoglu Protocol (9 June 1861). A new system of autonomy 
was adopted, the Règlement Organique, known in Lebanon as the Mustasarrifiyya 
(Governorate). Lebanon became a separate administrative region (sanjak) from 
Syria. The six Lebanese communities (Maronites, Druzes, Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholic, Sunni and Shia) participated in a twelve-person Administrative 
Council based on their percentage. The Mustasarrifiyya was to be headed by a 
Christian governor from outside Lebanon, with the consent of the great powers. 
The first governor was Daud Pasha, a Roman Catholic Armenian by birth, which 
proved an excellent choice, for he was one of the most capable officials of the 
Empire. In effect, Lebanon, though part of the Ottoman Empire, now came under 
the collective tutelage of the powers and remained so until the First World War.67 
Assessment
Humanitarian and other motives
Humanitarian concern on the part of the French government was not insincere, 
as seen in the French internal correspondence from Napoleon III, Thouvenel and 
other French officials regarding the plight of the Maronites.68 The dismal fate 
of the Christians ‘constituted an affront to the conscience of Europe and to the 
specific susceptibilities of the French, who had long prided themselves on their 
traditional role as champion of the Roman Catholic peoples in the Near East’.69 
However, instrumental motives were also prevalent. Thouvenel had realized 
that in this case humanitarian concerns were compatible with Realpolitik.70 With 
the intervention, France sought to enhance its influence at the expense of Britain 
and place a marker for the future, should ‘the Sick Man’ dissolve: namely, to 
acquire Syria as a protectorate. Moreover, Napoleon wanted to project himself 
as a resolute leader, to be respected internationally, to divert the attention of the 
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French public and, by the same token, to enhance his waning popularity at home, 
especially with the clerical party and Catholic public opinion, which was incensed 
by his recent stance in support of Italian unification (one of the outcomes being 
the dissolution of the Papal States).71
More generally, Syria and Lebanon were at the centre of an arc between 
the British route to India and the Straits route to the Black Sea, a region of 
French–British rivalry for most of the century, though the rivalry was kept 
within reasonable bounds.72 Britain’s motives were humanitarian and it opted for 
collective intervention so as to keep a close eye on France. London’s support for 
the Druzes was motivated by a sense of justice (after all, the Maronites had started 
it) and as a counter-weight to French support for the Maronites.73
The overall verdict
All the international lawyers who have referred to this episode, from those days 
until today, regard it as ‘motivated substantially, if not entirely, by humanitarian 
considerations’.74 
Jooris, a contemporary French jurist, had claimed that the intervention was 
not only humanitarian but also due to the fact that European flags had been 
insulted and Europeans living in Syria had been killed and their properties 
destroyed.75 Lawrence asserted that as ‘the Great Powers intervened to put a stop 
to the persecution and massacre of Christians in the district of Mount Lebanon, 
their proceedings were worthy of commendation’.76 Rougier regarded it as ‘a very 
clear application of the idea of intervention for humanity’, not least because it was 
‘disinterested’.77 Stowell referred to it as ‘an incident typical of humanitarian inter-
vention’ 78 and ‘one in which the states were actuated by motives of humanity to 
prevent religious persecutions which took the form of massacres of the Christian 
Maronites’.79 
This was also the assessment from 1945 onwards.80 Even opponents of humani-
tarian intervention, such as Brownlie, have claimed that: ‘No genuine case of 
humanitarian intervention has occurred [in the nineteenth century] with the 
possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861’.81 Franck and 
Rodley do not concur on various grounds (especially on the role of the Maronites 
in starting the mayhem) but praise the operation for being a multilateral one.82 
But three factors make this case questionable as a stricto sensu humanitarian 
intervention. One is that the Ottomans were not overtly averse to the operation. 
Secondly, Fuad had the situation well under control before the arrival of the 
French troops and French activity hardly amounted to a military intervention. 
Thirdly, those to blame for the initial aggression were the Maronites, making them 
less worthy to be singled out for intervention, although they suffered immensely.83
We will limit ourselves to the first issue. Bluntschli claimed that the acqui-
escence of the Sultan was sought in order to ‘save appearances’ and so that ‘the 
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Porte’s hand was forced’.84 Equally, Rougier regarded the consent of the Ottoman 
Empire as ‘a fiction’ sought ‘in courtesy towards the Sultan’.85 Stowell put it thus: 
‘[a]lthough the Sultan gave his official consent to this occupation, it was none 
the less a measure to which he only consented through constraint and a desire to 
avoid worse’.86
Be this as it may, there was by and large ‘relative disinterestedness’ on the 
part of the five powers, and their humanitarian concern seems ‘genuine’.87 As 
for the French, as Gary Bass points out, they acted on the basis of treaty obliga-
tions; worked alongside Fuad’s mission; ‘forswore any imperial or commercial 
gains from its mission’; ‘participated without reservations in the international 
commission’ set up there; ‘allowed the Concert to dictate the parameters of the 
expedition; and accepted European restrictions on the size and duration of the 
French occupation’.88 
The outcome in Lebanon was almost idyllic. Apart from disorder in 1864–67, 
the 1861 Lebanese settlement proved resilient, with the region enjoying peace, 
known as ‘the long peace’, until the eve of the First World War.89 
Concluding remarks
In the Lebanon case one sees several elements that appeared in the Greek case 
(Christian humanitarian plight, mixture of motives, multilateral character, 
agreements, self-denying clause, peacekeeping force, calls to end hostilities, role of 
public opinion). The new features with a bearing on the evolution of humanitarian 
intervention are the following: (1) co-optation of the state on whose territory the 
outrages had taken place, (2) an overseeing committee comprising commission-
ers of all the great powers, and (3) the setting up of a new political-administrative 
arrangement which placed a region of a state under the collective tutelage of the 
great powers, limiting that state’s control over its sovereign territory.
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The Bulgarian atrocities: a bird’s eye view of 
intervention with emphasis on Britain, 1875–78
On intervention
The great power involvement triggered by the Bulgarian atrocities was part of 
a wider international reaction to uprisings in the Balkans known as the Great 
Eastern Crisis of 1875–78, which was to change the map of the Balkans. Events 
began with the Serbs of Herzegovina (July 1875), followed a little later by Bosnia, 
the Bulgarians (April–May 1876) and the war of the autonomous principalities of 
Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire (June–July 1876).
By the mid-1870s the debate over humanitarian intervention was in full swing, 
with over forty publicists participating, among whom a two-thirds majority 
supported intervention. The 1850s and 1860s had seen some of the seminal 
advocacies of the new doctrine: those by Phillimore, Fiore and Bluntschli. In the 
1870s (before and during the Balkan crisis) there followed those by Arntz, Rolin-
Jaequemyns and Martens. The 1870s had also seen three of the main rejections, by 
Carnazza Amari, Bonfils and Renault (see chapter 4). 
Advocates argued that intervention should preferably be collective and 
in instances of outrages against humanity; remaining an apathetic bystander 
was unacceptable. Opponents pointed that interventions when a state’s proper 
interests were not at stake were unacceptable and would play havoc with state 
sovereignty and independence and were open to abuse. 
Diplomatic initiatives, the Bulgarians and the Serbs 
Great power diplomacy 
The uprisings in Herzegovina and Bosnia against Ottoman rule were a source 
of major concern, especially for Vienna, which feared the creation of a large 
Slav state bordering Dalmatia and Croatia and thus toyed with the idea of 
annexing the region.1 Russia called for three-state mediation in the crisis (Russia, 
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Austria–Hungary and Germany) within the confines of the Dreikaiserbund (the 
League of Three Emperors, created in 1873)2 and for autonomy, making Gyula 
Andrassy, the Foreign Minister of Austria–Hungary, suspicious of the Russian 
motives. The British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was incensed with the 
autonomy idea in a region whose majority were Muslims (that is, loyal to the 
Sultan) and likened the situation to Ireland.3 Andrassy came out with what is 
known as the Andrassy Note (December 1875), which called for modest reforms 
in Herzegovina and Bosnia.4 
The Note was well received by the other powers, but Disraeli, who detested 
the Dreikaiserbund (he believed that it wanted to isolate Britain and resolve 
the Eastern Question in its favour) and suspected ulterior motives on the part 
of Andrassy, was not supportive. But when the Porte asked for British assent, 
Disraeli had no choice than to acquiesce (as he put it, ‘We can’t be more Turkish 
than the Sultan’5).6
The Andrassy Note bore no fruit, due to the Porte’s evasiveness. Thus Tsar 
Alexander II and Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, took the initiative, 
although the latter was known for his lack of interest in the Balkans (as he 
had famously put it, it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier7).8 
Bismarck’s blunt Realpolitik approach was that a Balkan crisis could be fore-
stalled provided there were territorial gains on the part of the great powers in the 
Ottoman Empire, but his scheme was not endorsed by the other powers.9
Bismarck, Andrassy and Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, concurrently 
Foreign Minister and Chancellor of Russia, held a meeting in Berlin that produced 
the Berlin Memorandum (13 May 1876), mainly the work of Andrassy. The Porte 
was to accept a cease-fire, implement reforms, supply food for the refugees and 
rebuild houses and churches. The other powers were asked to be signatories to 
the Memorandum. Italy and France were forthcoming, but not Britain, which 
sent a squadron to Besika Bay on the mouth of the Dardanelles (sent there, as 
Disraeli put it, not to repeat the ‘bloody blunder’ of Navarino,10 but to support 
the Ottomans against the Russians). The stance of Britain emboldened the Porte 
not to accept the Memorandum and made a collective great power involvement 
impossible.11
Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, told Pyotr Shuvalov, the Russian 
ambassador in London, that the Memorandum could exacerbate the situation 
by giving the impression to the rebels that they were backed by the great powers. 
Disraeli believed that behind the Memorandum was a masked conspiracy by 
Russia and Austria–Hungary to partition the Ottoman Empire.12 
The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum was criticized in Britain by Odo 
Russell (the British ambassador in Berlin), Edmund Hammond (permanent 
under-secretary at the Foreign Office from 1854 to 1873) and the respected octo-
genarian Stratford Canning (now Stratford de Redcliffe). Even Queen Victoria 
was unhappy about this collusion with ‘Turkey’.13
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The Bulgarian uprising 
Meanwhile, an event unknown in Europe had taken place: an uprising by the 
Bulgarians in the Ottoman province of Rumelia, culminating in what came to be 
known as the ‘Bulgarian atrocities’. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, what is known as the ‘Bulgarian Revival’ 
(vŭzrazhdane)14 had taken place. The first major Bulgarian political revolutionary 
was Georgi Rakowski, who died of tuberculosis in 1867, but not before he put on 
course the idea of overthrowing Ottoman rule. He was followed by journalist 
Lyuben Karavelov, poet Christo Botev and the main organizer, Vasil Levski (the 
‘Apostle of Freedom’).15 
Karavelov, Botev and Levski, as expatriates in Bucharest, formed the Bulgarian 
Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCK). Levski organized a network of 
committees in the Bulgarian-inhabited regions, but was arrested by the Ottomans 
and hanged in Sofia in 1873, a major blow to the Bulgarian cause. Following his 
death the BRCK was split, with Karavelov opposed to an uprising and Botev 
advocating it. New figures came to the fore, such as Georgi Benkovsky, Stefan 
Stambulov (a future Bulgarian Prime Minister and regent) and Zakhari Stoyanov 
(the later historian of the April Uprising). The BRCK felt that the Herzegovina 
and Bosnia uprisings provided a good opportunity and decided to take up arms 
in April or May 1876. The revolt commenced prematurely, on 20 April 1876, for 
fear that the Ottomans would get wind of it, but it was limited to a few mountain 
towns; it was headed by Stambulov, Benkovsky and Stoyanov. Botev crossed the 
border between the principalities and with a number of armed men, to join the 
rebels, but was killed in a skirmish.16 
The April Uprising (Aprilsko vastanie), as it is known in the Bulgarian narrative, 
was badly organized and ended in disaster.17 The whole endeavour was bound to 
fail; indeed, it has been entertained by Bulgarian historians that it was deliber-
ately staged that way to provoke Ottoman retaliations and bring about external 
intervention on their behalf by the powers, which raises the agonizing question of 
whether ‘the organizers consciously led the people into massacre’.18
The Ottomans, short of money and regular troops (they were preoccupied with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), brought in irregular Bashibazouks and Circassians 
(refugees from Russia) to quell the uprising and terrorize the Bulgarian population 
into submission.19 The official Ottoman justification was that these were reprisals 
for the wanton attacks on Muslim civilians (apparently a few outrages had been 
committed by the Bulgarians20). The onslaught of the irregulars was ghastly: a 
trail of mayhem with some sixty towns and villages in ashes and a staggering 
number of massacred women and children, which came to be known in Europe 
as the ‘Bulgarian atrocities’. Reasonable estimates of dead vary from 12,000 to 
30,000. The first figure was suggested in the report by the British consul Walter 
Baring (who had been sent from Constantinople to assess the situation), who, 
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though pro-Ottoman, came out with a scathing indictment of the behaviour of 
the irregulars.21 US consul Eugene Schuyler and a compatriot, the noted war 
correspondent Januarius MacGahan, estimated the dead at 15,000 in a joint on-
the-spot investigation. The Bulgarians have claimed 30,000 to as many as 100,000 
dead, the Ottomans 2,000 to 3,000. The best-known instance of massacres was in 
the village of Batak, which was burned to the ground, with 5,000 people killed, 
including women and children.22 
The spread of the Balkan crisis
Meanwhile, the revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been quelled and now 
Serbia and Montenegro confronted the Porte. In June 1876 the two autonomous 
principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, under pressure from their respective 
publics, declared war, in search of independence and territorial gains.23 
The Serbian and Montenegrin uprisings produced a wave of support in Russian 
society, led by the Slavophiles. More than 500 soldiers and officers left the Russian 
army to come as volunteers to the assistance of the Serbs. Much to the dismay of 
the Tsar, the Serbian army was led by Victor Cherniaev, a former major general 
of the Tsarist army and hero of Russia’s Asian wars. The Montenegrins ‘marched 
from victory to victory’, while the Serbs ‘went from defeat to defeat’,24 failing 
miserably under their Russian general. Russia called for a cease-fire (threatening 
the severance of diplomatic relations if none was forthcoming) to save the Serbs 
and the Ottoman government agreed to a two-month cease-fire.25 
In the meantime, a preliminary secret agreement was reached at Reichstadt 
in Bohemia between Austria–Hungary and Russia, hammered out by Andrassy 
and the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Novikov (who, like Shuvalov in London, 
was anti-Pan-Slav), concluding with a more comprehensive agreement between 
Andrassy and Gorchakov (8 July 1876). In the event of a Russo-Ottoman war, 
Austria–Hungary would annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russia would annex 
Bessarabia, which it had lost with the 1856 Paris Treaty; Bulgaria, Rumelia and 
Albania were to become autonomous states; and Thessaly and Crete would be 
annexed by Greece. If the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Constantinople was to 
become a free city.26
Disraeli, Gladstone and the British public
Apart from apprehension about Russia, another reason for Britain’s aloofness was 
that Henry Elliot, the pro-Ottoman ambassador of Britain in Constantinople, had 
not drawn attention to the scale of the massacres, downplaying the scale of the 
massacres, claiming that they had been grossly exaggerated and that there were 
Bulgarian atrocities against innocent Muslims.27 Reports in the British press were 
delayed by two months. But when the news did appear in Britain, especially in the 
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London Daily News (23 June 1876), in an article by Edwin Pears (who had visited 
the region) with gruesome details, it created a stir. In the following eighteen 
months no fewer than 3,000 articles appeared in Britain and elsewhere in Europe 
denouncing the atrocities.28 Disraeli tried to convince Parliament and Queen 
Victoria (who was also disturbed by the reports) that the events were exaggerated 
by the press. Derby, however, instructed Elliot to tell the Ottomans that ‘any 
renewal of the outrages would be more fatal to the Porte than the loss of a battle’29 
and to demand that the crimes stop and the Ottomans rectify the damage.30
On 26 June Disraeli dismissed, in Parliament, the Daily News story of atrocities 
and on 10 July denied that torture had been practised ‘on a great scale’. ‘Oriental 
people’, he added, ‘seldom, I believe, resort to torture, but generally terminate 
their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner’31 (laughter was 
heard, much to Disraeli’s annoyance). It was then that his popularity fell and 
allusions were made to his Jewish origins, implying that this was the reason for his 
apparent callous indifference to the suffering Balkan Christians.32
When William Gladstone (the greatest Liberal British politician of the 
nineteenth century) told the House that it had been unwise to reject the Berlin 
Memorandum, Disraeli retorted acidly that the British government could not 
accept ‘coffee-house babble brought by an anonymous Bulgarian to a consul’ (he 
meant Baring) – another phrase that stuck.33 But Disraeli complained to Derby 
that he had not been given accurate information.34
The person responsible for the lack of adequate information was Elliot, who 
believed that the insurgents themselves were guilty of ‘revolting barbarities’35 
and was convinced that all the insurgencies were Russian plots orchestrated by 
his arch-rival in Constantinople, the Russian ambassador Nikolay Ignatiev, a well 
known Pan-Slavist.36 
Derby, who, unlike Disraeli, was shocked by the atrocities, wrote to Elliot 
(22 August and 5 September 1876) to say that the sympathy felt in England for 
the Ottoman Empire ‘has been completely destroyed by the lamentable occur-
rences in Bulgaria’, that it had given rise to ‘indignation in all classes of English 
society’ and that, ‘in the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, Her 
Majesty’s Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence 
of the Ottoman Empire’.37
For Disraeli, any move which could lead to the break-up the Ottoman Empire 
was to be curbed. Disraeli (as well as the Queen) believed that Russia’s aim 
was the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the seizure of the Straits and 
Constantinople and possibly even territory extending as far British India. Only 
a credible British threat to intervene on the side of the Ottomans could deter the 
Russians.38
Shuvalov assured Disraeli and Derby that his government had no such 
outlandish agendas in mind.39 But given the well known Pan-Slav current in 
Russia (see chapter 9), it was not totally unreasonable for Disraeli to have adopted 
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a worst-case analysis. Even though Shuvalov and Gorchakov were sincere (though 
it is not clear whether Disraeli was convinced of their sincerity), the Pan-Slav view 
could still prevail with the Tsar.40 Moreover, Disraeli found the oppressors more 
agreeable than the oppressed Christians. An antipathy for the Balkan Christians 
and a fascination with the ‘Turks’ (as aristocrats and fellow conservatives, like the 
Tories)41 were ingrained in Disraeli’s thinking and originated in his grand tour of 
the East in 1830 (ironically inspired by Byron’s grand tour of 1809). As he had put 
it then: ‘I find the habits of this calm and luxurious people [the Ottomans] entirely 
agree with my own preconceived opinions of property and enjoyment, and detest 
the Greeks more than ever’.42
In Britain the anti-Ottoman sentiment covered a wider spectrum of opinion 
than in the Greek case in the 1820s.43 In those days, ‘Victorian religious and 
ethical sensibility was at its apogee’.44 According to Richard Shannon, two aspects 
of Victorian moral sensibility contributed markedly to the domestic agitation 
over the Bulgarian atrocities: ‘the vision of progress and the veiling and exaltation 
of sexuality’.45 
The atrocities were seen as a flagrant anachronism. The politician and 
economist George Campbell (Duke of Argyle) was shocked at the spectacle of 
the horrors of ‘African warfare’ and the cruelties of Genghis Khan ‘in the days 
of Queen Victoria’.46 Thomas Carlyle referred to the ‘unspeakable Turk’.47 The 
historian Edward Augustus Freeman (a virulent anti-Turk), in his pamphlet 
‘The Turks in Europe’, noted that progress had been achieved in the last twenty 
years – abolition of slavery, Italy and Germany united, France rid of Bonapartism, 
Hungary no longer oppressed, Irish no longer bondsmen on their own soil – 
but ‘Turkey remained the last great blot on the face of Europe, a persistent and 
outrageous challenge to all that nineteenth-century civilisation stood for’.48
The dishonouring of chastity and the debauching of the conjugal union touched 
on the most sensitive of Victorian nerves.49 William Stead, the famous journalist, 
editor of the daily Northern Echo, saw the outrages perpetrated against Bulgarian 
women as if they had been committed against his mother. Freeman referred to the 
Turkish reputation for pederasty.50 
Soon none other than Gladstone, the undisputed leader of British popular 
liberalism,51 chose to abandon his retirement and join the fray. He began with 
careful speeches in Parliament and upon receiving no satisfactory answers from 
Disraeli he decided to write a pamphlet. Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East, written within three days while he was in bed with lumbago, sold more than 
200,000 copies within less than a month. This fiery pamphlet ‘did more than any 
other publication of the century to destroy pro-Turkish feeling in Britain’.52 
Curiously, Gladstone had not come on board from the beginning. As Shannon 
has put it, this was ‘far less a case of Gladstone exciting passion than of popular 
passion exciting Gladstone’.53 Three fellow Oxonians played a considerable role 
in his conversion, all three his friends: Freeman, the theologian James Fraser, and 
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Henry Liddon, Professor of Theology at Oxford University. A fourth Oxonian 
should be mentioned who was close to Gladstone and was an authority on matters 
of international law, Robert Phillimore.54 Stratford was the first to bring the 
atrocities to Gladstone’s attention. Mention should also be made of a formidable 
Russian lady residing in London, Madame Olga Kireeva Novikova (see chapter 9), 
the Duke of Argyle, Stead, the Reverent William Denton and Canon Malcolm 
MacColl.55 
In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine Gladstone indifferent on a matter that 
‘ignited the moral passion of the great section of the British public on an issue 
which engaged every element of his politico-religious existence – his Catholic 
Christianity, his European sense, his Liberalism, his democratic sympathies’.56 
Gladstone in his pamphlet painted a bleak picture of the situation and of 
Ottoman culpability and added: ‘I entreat my countrymen … to require and to 
insist that our Government … shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other 
States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in 
Bulgaria’.57 He famously continued:58 
Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely 
by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and 
their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, 
shall, I hope, clear out of the province they have desolated and profaned. 
The expression ‘bag and baggage’ was Stratford’s from the 1820s and Gladstone 
did not mean that the Ottomans should leave Europe, but only Bulgaria.59 In a 
previous passage (as well as in Parliament60) he referred to upholding the ‘ter-
ritorial integrity of Turkey’, though he added that there were ‘higher objects of 
policy’, such as ‘humanity, rationally understood’ and ‘justice’.61
Disraeli was furious with the pamphlet and regarded it ‘vindictive and ill-
written’, and ‘of all the Bulgarian horrors the greatest’.62
Three days later, at a rally in Blackheath (9 September 1876), 10,000 to 15,000 
people, in pouring rain, listened enthralled to Gladstone’s captivating speech. 
He repeated the argumentation of his pamphlet, accusing the Ottomans of mis-
government, repression and massacres, and pointed to the Tory government’s 
complicity by withholding information from the British public and supporting 
the Sultan. His proposal, however, was moderate: Bulgarian autonomy under 
Ottoman suzerainty.63 
A national convention was organized by Stead and the Liberals, which took 
place at St James Hall in Piccadilly, London (8 December 1876), with the par-
ticipation of a wide spectrum of leading personalities. Gladstone’s speech at the 
meeting was a sensation. At the close of the meeting he offered his arm to Madame 
Novikova and escorted her from the platform to the door.64
Gladstone’s overall stance during this period had several effects, according 
to Gerald Clayton: it completed the estrangement between himself and Disraeli 
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(and the Queen); it made it impossible for Disraeli to resort to war on behalf of the 
Ottoman Empire; it introduced a note of bitterness into public life that divided 
the country; and it encouraged the consideration of moral values as an important 
aspect of foreign policy.65
The Disraeli–Gladstone clash over the Bulgarian atrocities was also a discord 
between realism and idealistic liberalism in international politics. For Disraeli it 
was inconceivable that Realpolitik should give way to ‘a moral crusade’ and that 
the ‘interests of humanity’ should prevail over ‘the permanent and important 
interests of England’.66 For Gladstone, the very opposite was the case: moral and 
humanitarian concerns had to override narrow national interests. As he put it: 
‘What is to be the consequence to civilisation and humanity, to public order, if 
British interests are to be the rule for British agents all over the world, and are to 
be for them the measure of right or wrong?’67 No doubt had Gladstone and not 
Disraeli been the Prime Minister, then British policy during the Balkan crisis 
would have been different. As Blake has put it: ‘That Disraeli of all people should 
have been Prime Minister at this particular moment seems indeed an irony of 
history’.68
For the next two years the country was divided between ‘Turks’, Turcophiles, 
‘home-Turks’ or Russophobes, and ‘Bulgarians’, ‘Russians’, Russophiles, Turco-
phobes or ‘Muscovites’.69 The latter, the so-called ‘atrocitarians’, were in a great 
majority in the north of England, in the south-east and in Wales, but not in the rest 
of England and negligible in Scotland and Ireland, and generally among Catholics 
(probably due to the fact that the Bulgarians were Orthodox Christians). The 
Church of England was also for the most part anti-atrocitarian, as were the army, 
navy, high financial circles, top bankers and most of the nobility.70 
In addition to an array of prominent Liberal politicians, such as Lord John 
Russell, William Harcourt, the Duke of Argyll and John Bright, an impressive 
number of thinkers and academics, the ‘high Victorian intelligentsia’, condemned 
the atrocities and called for British involvement on behalf of the Bulgarians. They 
were personalities of different ideological hues, who on other matters were at 
loggerheads. Apart from Freeman and Liddon, they included Charles Darwin, 
Herbert Spencer and Thomas Carlyle, philosophers Henry Sidgwick and Thomas 
Hill Green, the blind economist Henry Fawcett, the Oxford jurist and Liberal 
politician James Bryce, political theorist William Lecky, historian and social critic 
Goldwin Smith, art critic and polymath John Ruskin, poet Robert Browning, 
artist and writer William Morris, and novelists Antony Trollope, James Anthony 
Froude and Thomas Hughes. The intellectuals against were fewer but included 
an equally odd assortment, such as theologian Benjamin Jowett, judge Fitzjames 
Stephen, essayist Walter Bagehot, socialist writer Henry Hyndman, the exiled 
Karl Marx71 and poets Matthew Arnold, Lord Tennyson and Algernon Charles 
Swinburne (who pointed out that the ‘Turks’ were no worse than the British and 
other oppressors across the world).72
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The Balkan crisis gave rise to another intriguing phenomenon, British humani-
tarian aid, which went both ways, including wounded Ottomans during the 
Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, which is quite striking, given the well known 
European bias against ‘the Turks’ (see chapter 3). The bulk of assistance was 
provided by trained medical personnel, that is, nurses, medical doctors and 
surgeons, but there were also some former military supporting the Serbs. 
There were three variants of humanitarianism by voluntary groups. There 
were those supporting the Balkan nationalist struggles that assisted the sick and 
wounded Balkan Slavs. The main spokespersons of this trend were Freeman, 
Lindon, James Lewis Farley and the medical doctor Humphrey Sandwith, based in 
Belgrade. In this context we see the activities of the League in Aid of the Christian 
Rayahs in Turkey, the Bulgarian Peasants Relief Fund and the Sick and Wounded 
Russian Soldiers’ Relief Fund. There were those who wanted to remain equi-
distant (along the standards set by International Commission of the Red Cross) 
and were thus prepared to assist all victims of the wars. They were headed by Lady 
Strangford, Vincent Barrington-Kennett and Colonel Robert Loyd Lindsay, and 
this line was obvious in the activity of the Eastern War Sick and Wounded Fund, 
the National Aid Society and the Red Cross Society. There was also a smaller group 
providing humanitarian aid to the wounded Ottoman soldiers in both the Balkan 
and Caucasus war theatres. The main figures in this endeavour were Lady Burdett-
Coutts and the Duke of Sutherland (Lady Strangford and Barrington-Kennett also 
contributed), and its main organizations were the Turkish Compassionate Fund 
and in particular the Stanford House Committee.73 
The Conference of Constantinople and the prelude to war 
Derby, upon the suggestion of Gorchakov, called (on 4 November) for a conference 
to be held in Constantinople to settle the Balkan crisis, but a few days later 
Disraeli delivered a bellicose veiled anti-Russian speech at a dinner at Guildhall, 
London (see chapter 9). The powers agreed to take part in the conference, as did 
a reluctant Porte. Derby urged that, in the conference, no power was to gain terri-
torial advantages and called for autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, status quo 
in generous terms for Serbia and Montenegro and nothing for the Bulgarians.74
Lord Salisbury (the Minister for India) was appointed by Disraeli to head the 
British delegation. In his visits before the conference, to Paris, Berlin (Bismarck), 
Vienna (Andrassy) and Rome, he got the impression that the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire could not be upheld.75 As he reported to Derby, ‘In the course 
of my travels I have not succeeded in finding the friend of the Turk. He does 
not exist. Most believe his hour has come’.76 Bismarck tried to dispel British 
suspicions of Russia and Salisbury found him indifferent to the possibility of 
a Russo-Ottoman war, but ready to do everything possible to avert an Austro-
Russian or Anglo-Russian clash.77
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In the Constantinople Conference (11 December 1876–20 January 1897) the 
main figures were Salisbury and Ignatiev, the latter chairing the conference. The 
most fruitful period of the deliberations was the preliminary phase, in December, 
in which the Porte was not allowed to participate. The humanitarian aspect 
loomed large in the discussions. According to the minutes of the first meeting 
of the conference (11 December) they were dealing with a collective, European 
question ‘which does not interest Russia alone, but the whole of Europe, the general 
prosperity, humanity, and Christian civilization. May the peace of Europe and the 
well-being of the Christian populations of Turkey serve as a recompense for the 
troubles and difficulties connected with the undertaking [of the conference]’.78
Surprisingly, confidence developed between Salisbury and Ignatiev. Their 
ability to work closely was due – apart from Ignatiev’s adroitness and charm – to 
the fact that Salisbury, unlike Elliot (who participated in the conference), had no 
illusions about the Ottoman Empire; he accepted the idea of eventual indepen-
dence of the Balkan peoples and was not obsessed by the Russian bogey. Ignatiev 
and Salisbury agreed to the formation of two autonomous Bulgarian entities 
(see chapter 9). Ignatiev favoured a short-term European collective humanitarian 
intervention79 and Salisbury was not completely averse to some kind of short-term 
military occupation. The powers agreed that some coercive measure would be 
indispensable to enforce the reforms and to ensure that such massacres were not 
repeated. Serbia was to retain the status quo, Montenegro was to gain an outlet 
to the sea, Bulgaria was to be divided into two parts and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were to be united.80 
When the Ottoman representative, Erdem Pasha, was admitted to the 
conference (24 December), he referred to Ottoman sovereign rights and told the 
representatives that a modern Constitution was to be adopted, a two-chamber 
Parliament was to be elected and substantial reforms were to be made by the 
Ottoman state anyway, and thus the proposals of the conference were redundant 
and overtaken by events.81 
Indeed, a Constitution was promulgated, elections were duly held 
(January–March 1877) and the first Ottoman Parliament emerged, with all 
major communities represented, making the measures suggested by the powers 
seemingly irrelevant. But when the conference ended its work inconclusively 
(20 January 1877), the new Sultan, Abdulhamid II, sacked Grand Vizier Midhat 
Pasha (5 February), the main initiator of the liberalization process, though the 
Parliament was allowed to function for some ten months.82
The conference’s failure was ostensibly due to the Ottoman posture. But it has 
been argued that the failure of the conference was due to Britain, because it spoke 
with two voices, with Elliot, at daggers drawn with Ignatiev, regarded – not least 
by the Ottomans – to be the true representative of the British Prime Minister.83 
Characteristically, Derby wired Salisbury on 22 December asking him to tell the 
Porte ‘that England will not assent to, or assist in, coercive measures, military 
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or naval, against the Porte’.84 In April 1877 (on the eve of the Russo-Ottoman 
War) Elliot was replaced by Austen Henry Layard (a former archaeologist of 
Mesopotamia), who was pro-Ottoman, like Elliot, and a close friend of Disraeli, a 
clear sign that the British favourable stance towards the Porte had not changed.85
In the meantime, exploratory talks had commenced in secrecy from November 
1876 onwards between Russia and Austria–Hungary, and secret agreements were 
signed (15 January and 18 March 1877) that in the event of a Russo-Ottoman war, 
Vienna would adopt a benevolent neutrality and ‘occupy’ (and not ‘annex’, as the 
Austrians wanted) Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the Ottoman Empire collapsed, 
Constantinople was to become a free city, no great Slav state was to be created in 
the Balkans and the two parties were to lend each other assistance at the diplomatic 
level in reaching a final settlement that would be favourable to both of them.86 
Following the failure of the Constantinople Conference, Gorchakov sent 
Ignatiev to the European courts in a last-ditch attempt to establish a united front. 
An ambassadors’ conference was held in London, which adopted the London 
Protocol (31 March 1877), a watered-down version of what Ignatiev had proposed, 
mainly the work of Derby and Shuvalov. The Protocol called upon the Ottomans 
to demobilize and introduce reforms. Were such reforms to fail, the powers 
reserved the right to consider what common measures to adopt.87 
Gorchakov was unhappy with the Protocol and it remains unclear whether the 
Russians desired it, for if accepted by the Porte it would have tied their hands. The 
Tsar was initially against resorting to war but told the British, via Shuvalov, that 
he desired peace, although not at any price.88
Abdulhamid made the fatal mistake of rejecting even this mild Protocol, on the 
grounds that it violated the 1856 Treaty of Paris (which guaranteed Ottoman ter-
ritorial integrity)89 and that it amounted to ‘humiliating tutelage by Europe’;90 his 
rejection permitted Russia to take matters into its own hands, and it declared war 
(24 April 1877). Russia justified its aggression by its traditional role as protector 
of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire and on humanitarian grounds (see 
chapter 9). 
Given how things had transpired, with the Porte the obstructing party, the 
other parties (bar Britain) were hardly at odds with Russia’s resort to war. Russia 
entered the war in favourable international circumstances, having an arrange-
ment with Austria–Hungary and having been assured of benevolent neutrality on 
the part of Germany, France and Italy. As for Britain, it could scarcely act without 
at least one ally, and no such ally was forthcoming.91
The British divided over the war
The Russian forces advanced on two fronts against the Ottomans, in the Balkans 
directed towards the Bulgarian regions and in the southern Caucasus towards 
the Armenian-inhabited regions. Upon the start of the war Derby sent a note to 
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Russia through Shuvalov (6 May 1877) referring to the danger to British interests 
in Suez, Egypt, the Persian Gulf and Constantinople.92 The reply was that Russia 
would not touch Suez and Egypt, and as for Constantinople, Gorchakov could 
give only one assurance: that there would be no annexation, specifying that a 
pledge against temporary occupation would, if it became known, only encourage 
the ‘Turks’ in their obstinacy. Shuvalov told Derby that once the British realized 
that Russia did not want Constantinople they could put pressure on the Porte 
and save them from the need to occupy the city. Derby believed that the Russians 
were sincere but Disraeli was convinced that the Russians sought to take over 
Constantinople and dictate their terms to Europe on that basis.93 
At this juncture Gorchakov wrote to Shuvalov: ‘The English find it hard to 
understand a war of religious and national sentiment, and being incapable of one 
themselves, they consequently look for arrières pensées’.94
Throughout the hostilities and its aftermath, the British were bitterly divided as 
supporters or foes of Russia as never before on a matter of foreign policy, or at least 
since the French Revolution.95 The issue was so acute that personal relationships 
were severed, families clashed, and Tories and Liberals were divided even among 
themselves. As for the animosity between the two great statesmen, Disraeli (since 
June 1876 Earl of Beaconsfield, a gift of the Queen) and Gladstone, it now reached 
its peak.96 As Harcourt put it to Charles Dilke: ‘Gladstone and Dizzy [Disraeli] 
seem to cap one another in folly and imprudence, and I do not know which has 
made the greatest ass of himself ’.97 Gladstone became very unpopular in fashion-
able circles, was hissed in public, hooted at the lobby of the House of Commons 
and had the windows of his house smashed (he was derided by the Tory press as 
a Russian agent, especially in view of the Novikova connection98). Gladstone was 
deeply hurt but told the House (on 14 May 1877) that if the Russians, who were 
‘capable of noble spirits as any people in Europe’, succeeded in the war, ‘as an 
Englishman I shall hide my head, but as a man I shall rejoice’.99
The mood grasped the public as well. According to a popular music hall 
song:100 ‘We don’t want to fight but by Jingo if we do / We’ve got the ships, we’ve 
got the men, we’ve got the money too / We’ve fought the Bear before, and while 
we’re Britons true / The Russians shall not have Constantinople’. It was from this 
mention of ‘Jingo’ (apparently meant as a minced oath, to avoid saying Jesus) that 
the contemporary radical thinker George Holyoake coined the term ‘jingoism’101 
to mean extreme and aggressive nationalism.102 
The Queen in jingoist pitch sent an avalanche of letters and telegrams to 
Disraeli. As he put it: ‘The Faery [Victoria] writes every day and telegrams 
every hour: this is almost literally the case’ and a little later he added, ‘it rains 
telegrams morn, noon and night’.103 She wrote that if the Russians reached 
Constantinople ‘the Queen would be so humiliated that she thinks that she will 
abdicate at once’.104 In January 1878, when the Russians had won the war, she 
was beside herself with rage, writing to Disraeli that ‘[s]he feels she cannot … 
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remain the sovereign of a country that is letting itself down to kiss the feet of the great 
barbarians, the retarders of all liberty and civilization that exists’. And added: 
‘Oh, if the Queen were a man, she would like to go and give those Russians, whose 
word one cannot believe, such a beating! We shall never be friends again till we 
have it out’.105
The cabinet remained divided between those espousing a vigorous response, 
headed by Disraeli, and those calling for restraint and the avoidance of war, 
headed by Derby, Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, and Salisbury, ‘the three 
Lords’ as they were known.106 Derby in his attempt to avoid a war with Russia 
went as far as revealing to Shuvalov – directly or through his wife, Lady Derby, 
who was on close terms with the Russian ambassador 107 – the lack of unity in 
the cabinet for going to war. Derby was convinced that the Russians meant what 
they said, that they sought reforms in the Balkans and not Constantinople, and he 
feared that war could come about as a result of the bellicosity of Disraeli, which 
could provoke the Tsar to do exactly what Britain did not want him to do.108
In spite of the differences in the British government, Disraeli was able to 
extract a unanimous decision from the cabinet to declare war if Russia occupied 
Constantinople without arranging for the immediate retirement from the city, 
and the British fleet under Admiral Hornby was send to the Dardanelles.109 
From San Stefano to Berlin 
The Russian army, after initial success, faced tough resistance from the modernized 
Ottoman army, notably in the fortress of Plevna in northern Bulgaria. The war on 
two fronts dragged on for ten months and the previously confident Russians 
had to ask for the military assistance of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, as 
well as Greece (the first three entered the war). Finally the Russians took Plevna 
(11 December), and then entered Sofia (in 4 January 1878) and Adrianople (20 
January 1878).
An armistice was concluded on very severe Russian terms (27 January 1878), 
a development that, incidentally, gave Abdulhamid the excuse to dissolve 
Parliament (14 February) and assert his own brand of reactionary despotism and 
Muslim conservatism.110
Ignatiev and the Ottoman Foreign Minister signed the Treaty of San Stefano 
(3 March 1878), which provided for a large autonomous Bulgaria, from the Aegean 
Sea to the Danube, far larger than present-day Bulgaria, with a considerable 
Aegean coastline, covering even areas in which Bulgarians were not the majority 
population (Skopje, Prizren, Monastir, the lakes of Prespa and Ohrid) – areas 
that could have gone, on the basis of ethnic composition (if the Muslims were not 
taken into consideration), to Serbia, Greece or a future Albania.111 
San Stefano was obviously a major mistake on the part of Russia, however, for 
it upset the power balance in the Balkans and showed no consideration for the 
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interests of other states, especially Austria–Hungary, disregarding the two secret 
agreements with Andrassy.112
The terms of San Stefano brought Britain and Austria–Hungary ‘to the verge 
of open rupture’ with Russia.113 London and Vienna called for a fundamental 
revision of San Stefano and threatened war.114 From February 1878 onwards, and 
for some ten weeks, an Anglo-Russian war seemed likely.115 As Disraeli put it, 
‘We are drifting into war’, but he added ‘If we are bold and determined we shall 
secure peace, and dictate its conditions to Europe’.116 Clearly, war was not what he 
really wanted but his threat at this stage was no bluff. Russia seemed impressed 
by British stance and, with its forces depleted by battle and disease and with its 
finances strained, was keen to avoid a war with Britain.117
Derby resigned as Foreign Secretary, to be replaced by Salisbury, who presented 
the British views for a settlement in a letter he sent to the other great powers, 
known as the ‘Salisbury circular’. Shuvalov, after some initial hesitation, was able 
to meet Salisbury eye to eye, when the latter made it clear that the views of the two 
governments were not far apart; that the main aim of Britain was a much smaller 
Bulgaria; and that, for its part, Britain wanted to acquire an outpost that would 
safeguard its Asiatic interests (Cyprus was to be that outpost, though it was not 
mentioned). A secret protocol between Salisbury and Shuvalov was signed (30 
May), whose terms included drastic modification of the Bulgarian boundaries, no 
Bulgarian opening to the Aegean Sea, Ottoman troops not to be allowed in the 
Bulgarian province (a Russian sine qua non), Greece to have a voice in the future of 
Thessaly and Epirus (a British desire), Bessarabia to revert to Russia and Batoum, 
Ardahan and Kars to be annexed by Russia.118
The Congress of Berlin was held at the highest level, with the participation 
of Bismarck and Bülow (the German Foreign Minister), Disraeli and Salisbury, 
Gorchakov and Shuvalov, and Andrassy as the main protagonists, with Italy 
under Corti and France under Waddington in the background. Ironically, the 
Ottoman Empire was represented by two non-ethnic Turks, the Ottoman Greek 
Karatheodori Pasha (the Foreign Minister) and Mehmed Ali Pasha, a renegade 
Prussian, both of whom were snubbed and side-lined, not least by Bismarck. 
Bismarck was made president of the Congress and proved a very effective one at 
that. Yet even though previous understandings had been reached as to the general 
outline of the forthcoming treaty, there was considerable wrangling, especially 
over the limits of Bulgaria, with Disraeli threatening to leave the conference and 
Shuvalov being as accommodating as possible.119 
According to the Treaty of Berlin, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, with 
some additions to their territories, were to become fully independent states. The 
Bulgarian-inhabited region was split into two: a vassal state of Bulgaria with 
Sofia as its capital; and a semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelia. Russia acquired 
Bessarabia and Kars, Ardahan and Batum from the Ottoman Empire, Britain 
got Cyprus (under Ottoman suzerainty) and Austria–Hungary was to occupy 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Sanjak of Novipazar. The Berlin Treaty 
also referred to the treatment and protection of the Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire and to the well-being of the Christians.120
The Berlin Treaty holds a special place in the history of humanitarian interven-
tion. It was agreed that ‘intervention for humanity becomes a basis of a special 
public law in the relations between Europe and the Porte’, whereby the Porte was 
henceforth ‘under the permanent control of the Concert of Europe regarding 
internal administrative acts’.121 The Treaty allowed for a right of intervention on 
the part of the signatory states ‘in all the cases in order to guarantee a minimum of 
rights of the inhabitants of Turkey in Europe and in particular to assure religious 
liberty’.122
Assessment 
A basic characteristic of this case was the unprecedented role played by public 
opinion,123 especially in Russia (see chapter 9) and Britain. The 1877 war was 
at the time not regarded as humanitarian by European policy-makers,124 
the obvious exception being Russian policy-makers and commentators (see 
chapter 9). However, it was not seen unsympathetically. According to the au-
thoritative Bluntschli for instance (writing in 1879), Russia was motivated by its 
honour and ‘sentiments of sympathy for the oppressed Christians’, which led it ‘to 
force Turkey to abide by its duties’.125
More generally, according to Rodogno the European powers regarded inter-
vention against massacre in the Ottoman Empire conceivable but in the end their 
security priorities prevailed, which did not make a collective humanitarian inter-
vention possible. For Britain in particular ‘humanity’ was given up in the name 
of ‘balance of power’ interests.126 Rodogno argues that this was a case of ‘non-
intervention’ on humanitarian grounds, though the plan of the Constantinople 
Conference of 1876 ‘was quite close to a humanitarian intervention for it encom-
passed coercive measures to enforce the reforms aimed at avoiding the repetition 
of massacre in the future’.127 
But, over time, an increasing number of scholars have come to regard it as 
a case of collective humanitarian involvement, which, in view of the Ottoman 
intransigence, led to Russian military intervention, amounting to a full-scale 
war within a humanitarian rationale, as seen by the stance of publicists such as 
Rougier128 and Stowell,129 apart from Russian publicists such as Martens130 and 
Mandelstam.131 More recently, a number of international lawyers have regarded 
it as a case of military humanitarian intervention by Russia with the support of 
the other powers bar Britain. They include Ganji,132 Fonteyne,133 Behuniak,134 
Bazyler,135 Abiew136 and Grewe,137 and, more circumspectly, Fenwick,138 and 
among international relations scholars dealing with humanitarian intervention, 
Finnemore,139 Bass140 and Knudsen.141 
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Concluding remarks
In the Bulgarian case one sees a similar pattern with the previous two cases 
(saving Christians, great power consultations, conferences in Constantinople 
and London, agreements and so on). The main new features in dealing with 
 humanitarian plight are the following: final whole-sale military intervention 
(war), unilateral this time, but with benevolent neutrality by the other great 
powers, save Britain; the far greater role of the press and public opinion, especially 
in Britain and Russia, in the former case putting a lid on the British govern-
ment’s pro- Ottoman behaviour and in the latter spurring intervention; and a final 
high-level peace conference, the Congress of Berlin, which drastically altered 
the situation in the Balkans (new borders, three new independent states and two 
tributary states) and also addressed the well-being of religious minorities in the 
Ottoman Empire. On the downside there were four problems: (1) deviation from 
previous agreements by one great power (Russia in San Stefano), (2) a real danger 
of war between great powers (in this case Russia and Britain), (3) bitter internal 
split in one of the great powers, Britain, over the question; and (4) the aggressive 
stance of many influential Russians based on pan-nationalist grounds, namely 
Pan-Slavism, triggered by the humanitarian plight.
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The Balkan crisis of 1875–78 and Russia: 
between humanitarianism and pragmatism
In this chapter our focus will be wider. It will include other aspects of humani-
tarian intervention and not only diplomatic exchanges and the views of major 
protagonists. We will attempt to pinpoint the elements of a rising Russian and 
European sense of identification and empathy with the suffering. Moreover, we 
will trace the links and vehicles through which the suffering of ‘strangers’ in the 
unknown Balkans (the ‘Christian East’ of the Asian Department of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry) were brought to the attention of the wider Russian public and 
not only to elite circles. We will also include the contemporary critique of Russia’s 
policy and the questioning of whether its humanitarian motives were pure.
Russian foreign policy and the Eastern Question, 1856–78
The overall picture
The ‘geo-schizophrenia’1 of Russia, situated between Europe and Asia, created in 
the nineteenth century an ‘uncertainty’ as to the place of the Russians within the 
‘civilized’ (read ‘European’) world. Russian educated society pondered whether 
Russia was European, Eurasian or basically Slavic and Orthodox, that is, in a 
special category of its own civilization-wise. 
Nineteenth-century Russian foreign policy was based on European inter-
national norms, the balance-of-power system, geopolitical and economic 
considerations and the limitation of costs for the Russian Empire. Most Russian 
diplomats and other high-ranking officials, most of them aristocrats, though 
not immune to the ideological, political and cultural differences within Russian 
society, were attuned to the reigning spirit and culture of Europe. Thus they upheld 
the concept of legitimacy, diplomatic dialogue and limited war as a last resort in 
order to resolve outstanding conflicts that could not be settled by concord.2 
Despite the overall Russian conformity with the European modus operandi, 
the other European states regarded Russia as bent on expansion and world 
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domination. This often led to recurring bouts of Russophobia, buttressed by 
semi-Orientalist stereotypes which placed Russia, as well as the emerging Slavic 
Orthodox states in the Balkans, between civilization and semi-civilization, in 
the twilight zone between Europe and Asia. The fact that the Russians were 
Orthodox, hence ‘schismatic’ according to Catholicism, was also a factor in down-
grading them. The wars of Russia with the Ottoman Empire did little to lessen 
these fears, as they were seen as an effort to dissolve the ‘Turkish Empire’, with 
Constantinople and the Straits as the ultimate prize. The expansion of Russia in 
the Caucasus and central Asia did little to allay these suspicions.3
In fact, the eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was not solely a 
Russian interest but was widely discussed among the great powers, especially 
by Austria–Hungary. Russian policy was aimed at the survival of its weakening 
neighbour, in which Russian influence would be constant and intrusive. Russian 
decision-makers were aware that the balance of power was at no time so favourable 
as to give them full freedom of action and permit them to control Constantinople 
(which many Russians coveted), and that a unilateral move by Russia in the 
region would lead to a European war.4
Russia – like France in northern Africa or Britain in India – was also, partially, 
a Muslim power, as the imperial state expanded in the Caucasus and central Asia, 
thereby creating porous frontier zones with the Muslim Ottoman Empire. A 
‘Christian war’ against the Ottomans could lead to the estrangement of Russia’s 
Muslims, with repercussions in its frontier regions. The Orthodox Christians 
of the Ottoman Empire could side with Russia, but there was also the danger 
of Russian Muslims creating a fifth column within Russia.5 In particular, the 
conquest of the Caucasus, a process which lasted half a century, led to the exodus 
of many Turkic Muslims, and the expulsion of the Circassians, who settled in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The 1875–76 uprisings in the Balkans were a great headache for Russian 
leaders and especially for Tsar Alexander II and Chancellor/Foreign Minister 
Gorchakov. In Europe, however, the primary focus was on the personality and 
activities of Ambassador Nikolay Ignatiev in Constantinople, who was bent 
on achieving Russian prominence in the region through the Orthodox Slavic 
population in the Balkans.
When the Balkan crisis erupted in 1875–76, various publications appeared 
in Europe, translated into several languages (including Greek), all pointing 
to Russian expansionism on Pan-Slavic grounds. Among the best-known was 
Russian Intrigues: Secret Dispatches of General Ignatieff and Consular of the Great 
Panslavic Societies, which included Ignatiev’s correspondence as well as the 
minutes of the famous Slavic benevolent societies. The text in question and other 
such texts were forgeries, written in all probability by the Porte to throw the 
blame for the alleged strategy of destroying the Ottoman Empire on Ignatiev and 
the Russian Pan-Slavists. Yet at the time they were regarded as genuine and later, 
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as Mathias Schulz has pointed out, they formed the basis for several biased studies 
on Russian foreign policy.6
‘Vice Sultan’ Ignatiev versus the European Russian Gorchakov
Ignatiev was regarded by his contemporaries as a person of great ability and 
diplomatic skill but also controversial and untrustworthy. Within the Russian 
Foreign Ministry he had made his mark as head of the Asian Department and 
was regarded the foremost expert on the ‘Ottoman East’. Gorchakov’s lack of 
interest in anything related to the Ottoman East left ample room for Ignatiev to 
try to forge his own vision of Russian foreign policy in the region.7 His various 
diplomatic successes in Constantinople, where he served from 1864 until 1877, 
and his good relations with Sultan Abdulaziz and various grand viziers, made 
him the most powerful European diplomat at the Porte, hence the nickname Vice 
Sultan.
Ignatiev was convinced that the vital interests of Russia lay in the ‘Christian 
East’, particularly in the Balkans, where Russia could expand its influence by 
leading the Slavic Balkan people to statehood.8 His active participation in the 
Slavic benevolent societies made his name synonymous with Pan-Slavism. As 
pointed out by his colleague A. N. Kartsov, his approach was not dissimilar to the 
politique des nationalités of France under Napoleon III; it was also in accord with 
the liberal tendencies of educated Russian society in the age of reforms.9 Ignatiev, 
like many nationalists in Europe, called for greater Russian independence and put 
into question the European Concert. Clearly, this approach was at odds with the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, which advocated a prudent foreign policy.10
Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, who in his youth was a classmate of 
Russia’s national poet, Pushkin, was an astute European diplomat, moderate and 
fairly liberal, at least by Russian standards. He represented a new type of Russian 
official, one devoted primarily to the state and secondarily to the Tsar. Gorchakov, 
‘the European Russian diplomat’, regarded the Eastern Question as a European 
issue. From this perspective, any unilateral Russian initiative against the status 
quo related to the Eastern Question was mistaken or downright foolish.11 Two 
factors reinforced this view: the traumatic experience of the Crimean War, and 
the need for international stability to allow time for the consolidation of Russia’s 
Great Reforms initiated under the reign of Alexander II. Hence until the 1875–78 
Balkan crisis, Russia followed a policy of recueillement, the main emphasis being 
on domestic rather than foreign affairs.12
However, Gorchakov was not impervious to the ‘racial and religious’ links of 
Russia with the Christians of the East. As he put it: ‘As regards the East, apart 
from our immediate and vital interests, there are also traditions and national 
sympathies that influence our policy’.13 A constant theme was that Russia, having 
brought Greece to life, had a ‘historical duty’ to liberate the rest of the Balkan 
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peoples. Obviously, this ‘duty’ ran counter to the pledge of Russia in the 1856 
Paris Treaty, namely to abide by the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.14 
Hence the constant advice to their Orthodox co-religionists in the Balkans to 
remain peaceful until the time when Russia would be in a position to assist them 
without running the risk of a great power coalition against it.15
Gorchakov’s reluctance to endorse Balkan nationalism was also based on his 
appraisal that the Balkan peoples were not mature enough to establish respon-
sible states. Thus his instructions to Ignatiev were not to encourage irresponsible 
nationalist activities.16 The ageing Foreign Minister could not understand, let 
alone appreciate, the fascination of the Balkan peoples with the ‘cosmopolitan 
revolutionary spirit’ of Italy, which they tried to emulate.17 This overall line was 
tempered somewhat by his great dislike of the ‘Turkish Empire’.
Peaceful intervention
When the Serbian rebellion in Herzegovina erupted, Ignatiev foresaw other 
rebellions in the Balkans.18 For him, Russia should come to their support, given 
Slav affinity and the fact that only Russia’s intervention would be selfless. He 
hoped that his cordial relations with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier would 
permit the settlement of the problem on a bilateral basis, without European in-
volvement.19 He therefore suggested a plan of broad reforms, including autonomy, 
a Christian police force, tax reductions and the handing over of the provinces 
that had revolted to the principality of Montenegro.20 But Andrassy reacted to 
the Russian suggestion with his own plan (the Andrassy Note). Gorchakov’s 
acceptance of the Berlin Memorandum expressed the willingness of St Petersburg 
(against the wishes of Ignatiev) to settle the conflict à trois.21
The Bulgarian leaders based in Bucharest were leftists (Karavelov, Levski and 
Botev) and thus beyond Russian control, as they ‘espoused doctrines dangerous 
to the Russian state’.22 Ignatiev urged the Porte to send regular troops to the 
Bulgarian regions to restore order and advised punishing the guilty and not the 
innocent; the officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry remained apprehensive 
but non-committal, as did their European counterparts.23 
It was mainly European and Russian public opinion that brought the matter 
onto the European agenda, following detailed reports of the atrocities. A case in 
point was the report of MacGahan in the London Daily News on the Bulgarian 
atrocities. MacGahan was well known in Russian society (he was married to 
Varvara Nikolaeva Elagina, who, after her husband’s death, became a correspon-
dent in Russia of various US newspapers) and was a friend of General Skobelev 
(of central Asian fame and later head of the Russian army in the 1877–78 Russo-
Ottoman War). 
Contrary to their lack of information regarding the Bulgarians, the Russian 
officials were aware of the upcoming Serbian and Montenegrin war against the 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   172 22/01/2015   10:53:51
The Balkan crisis 173
Ottomans. St Petersburg instructed Kartsov, the Russian consul in Belgrade, to 
restrain them and to warn the Serbs that if they resorted to war they would be on 
their own, without Russian support. Privately, however, Kartsov advised Prince 
Milan of Serbia not to heed the warning. It seems that the consul was trying to 
strike a balance between instructions from St Petersburg and rival instructions 
from his immediate boss, Ignatiev. Following a visit to the Russian capital, he got 
the impression that Russia’s official stance was not crystal clear on the Serbian 
question, as pointed out to him by Alexander Jomini (the son of the famous Swiss 
strategist), the third in command at the Foreign Ministry after Gorchakov and 
Assistant Foreign Minister Nikolay Giers.24
When the Serbs and Montenegrins were prepared to declare war, the Russian 
Pan-Slavs and liberals called for Russian support. Ex-general Cherniaev, editor 
of the Pan-Slav newspaper Ruskii mir, predicted that the Serbs would win and 
liberate themselves and the other Balkan Christians. The liberal Viesnik Evropy 
urged moral support for the Serbian cause. But other leading Russian newspapers 
backed the official Russian policy of not becoming involved. Alexander forbade 
Cherniaev to recruit volunteers and leave for the Balkans, which of course he did 
not heed. The Tsar could not stomach a former Russian general becoming the 
head of ‘those thieves’ as he called the Serbs.25 When Cherniaev and the other 
volunteers arrived in Belgrade (28 April 1876), openly advocating an indepen-
dent and enlarged Serbia under the Obrenovic dynasty and implying that Russia 
would come to their aid, he was made a Serbian citizen and commander of its 
eastern army. In Russia the undisputed leader of the Russian Pan-Slav movement 
was Ivan Aksakov, chairman of the Moscow Slav Committee, who urged greater 
Russian involvement and was in contact with Cherniaev.26
Alexander ordered Kartsov to sever all ties with Cherniaev and prevent Serbia 
from going to war.27 But Gorchakov was equivocal. As he put it to Kartsov: ‘Do 
not forget that although the Tsar is opposed to war, his son, the heir to the throne, 
stands as the head of the Slav movement’.28 Indeed, the Tsar’s heir as well as the 
Tsar’s wife pressed Alexander for a dynamic intervention in the name of the Slavic 
cause.29 St Petersburg did not want the Serbs to start a war but being irresolute, 
known to sympathize with the Serb cause and having sent contradictory signals, 
it prompted the Serbs and Montenegrins to resort to war on 18 June (old-style 
Julian calendar) or 30 June (new-style Gregorian calendar) 1876.30 In private even 
the Tsar and Gorchakov sympathized with the Serbians and, under pressure 
from public opinion, allowed Russian military personnel to resign from the army 
and join as volunteers. Jomini told a member of the St Petersburg Slavophile 
Committee, ‘Do anything you like provided we do not know anything about it 
officially’.31
But throughout the Serb-Ottoman war the main concern of the Tsar was to 
avoid a wider conflagration which could involve the other powers. As Gorchakov 
put it in desperation to Miliutin (the Minister of War): ‘Let us leave everything 
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to chance. Let the arms decide which party wins and which party is destroyed’.32 
Even Ignatiev had second thoughts and was not supportive of Russian military 
intervention, although he did endorse the use of diplomacy and, if possible, a 
European conference that would stop the bloodshed and settle the conflict.33 
The careful policy of Russia throughout 1876 did not allay the fears of Vienna 
and London, despite the attempts of ambassadors Novikov and Shuvalov, re-
spectively. Novikov was a distinguished Slav specialist but as a diplomat he was 
anti-Pan-Slav. Shuvalov, a diehard conservative, had previously served in various 
posts related to internal security, including the Third Department of the Imperial 
Chancellery, in charge of suppressing revolutionary movement within the Russian 
Empire. He had become so powerful that he came to be known as Pyotr IV. The 
two ambassadors had gained the confidence of Andrassy and Derby, respectively, 
and played a considerable role in not allowing bilateral relations to deteriorate. 
But the fact that they were known to be anti-Pan-Slav and against war with the 
Ottoman Empire – more resolutely so than either the Tsar or Gorchakov on both 
counts – limited their credibility as true representatives of the ‘real Russia’. 
Disraeli made a bellicose speech at a banquet held by the Lord Mayor of 
London, in Guildhall (28 October/9 November 1876), where the following words 
made their mark: ‘Peace is especially an English policy.… She covets no cities and 
no provinces.… But although the policy of England is peace, there is no country 
so well prepared for war as our own. If she enters into conflict in a righteous cause 
… her resources, I feel, are inexhaustible’.34
Two days later (30 October/11 November) Alexander, travelling from 
Livadia (in the Crimea) to St Petersburg, broke his journey to make a speech, 
addressing the Moscow nobility and civic authorities, in what seemed like a 
reply to Disraeli.35 He stated: ‘As you know Turkey submitted to my demand for 
immediate ending of the hostilities, to put an end to the aimless slaughtering in 
Serbia and Montenegro’.36 And he concluded thus:37
I know that all Russia joins with me in taking the deepest interest in the sufferings 
of our brothers by faith and by origin; but for me the true interests of Russia are 
dearer than everything, and I would do my utmost to spare precious Russian blood 
being shed. That is why I have striven and am continuing to strive to achieve by 
peaceful means a real improvement in the life of all the Christian inhabitants of 
the Balkan peninsula. Deliberations between the representatives of the six great 
powers are shortly to be begun at Constantinople … I much desire that we shall 
reach a general agreement. If this is not attained and if I see that we are not gaining 
such guarantees as would assure the execution if our just demands upon the Porte, 
then I firmly intend to act independently and I am convinced that in such an 
eventuality all Russia will respond to my appeal, when I count it necessary and the 
honour of Russia requires it.
Alexander’s aim was to publicly clarify Russian policy and to show to the excited 
Russian public that he was on the same wavelength, while indicating his preference 
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for peace and for a wider international consensus for the adequate protection of 
the insurgents. According to Richard Wortman, Alexander in his speech sought 
‘to show himself acting in concert with his people and taking account of public 
opinion’.38 Aksakov’s wife, Anna Aksakova (daughter of the famous poet and 
diplomat Tyuchev), wrote in her diary that the Tsar was clearly moved by what 
he said and this was also the case with his wife and his son (the future Alexander 
III), who were present. Many of the listeners shed tears according to Aksakova.39
The very next day, mobilization was announced. According to General Nikolay 
Obruchev, who was put in charge of setting out a plan for a war with the Ottoman 
Empire, ‘The aim of the war is to extract from the Sultan’s authority that Christian 
country [Bulgaria] where the Turks had committed atrocities and to put an end to 
every crisis of the Eastern Question’.40
When the Constantinople Conference was convened in December 1876, 
Ignatiev presented a maximum and a minimum proposal. Tsereteliev, who 
had experience as consul in various Balkan posts, and the US diplomat Eugene 
Schuyler (who had travelled to Batak together with MacGahan and had written 
a detailed account of the atrocities, which had been published as a booklet) were 
given the task of preparing the maximum plan. It provided for a large autonomous 
Bulgaria headed by a Christian administrator, a security force comprising locals, 
and other measures. Ignatiev prepared the minimal plan, to be put forward if 
Britain objected to the maximum approach. This divided Bulgaria into two 
parts, which included most of the Bulgarian-inhabited regions. When Salisbury 
accepted the minimum plan with some minor changes, Ignatiev was able to 
make some small territorial changes in favour of Serbia and Montenegro and 
recommend a level of autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. With agreement 
reached, Ignatiev was satisfied to have made Russian aims the official goals of the 
great powers and hoped that, in the future, the two parts of Bulgaria would be 
united (an aspiration which in fact came about).41 
The overall Russian aim was to bring about great power pressure for Ottoman 
reforms that would defuse the situation. Alexander, Miliutin, Reutern (the 
Economics Minister) and Gorchakov were averse to war and regarded the 
Bulgarian and other uprisings of Slavic peoples in the Balkans with deep suspicion, 
viewing the activists as socialists, radicals and atheists, the ‘worst possible revo-
lutionaries’, and were fearful that the Balkan rebellions would send shockwaves 
within Russia itself, triggering insubordination against the imperial order.42 The 
various reforms that had commenced in the army and elsewhere, the considerable 
economic difficulties facing the country (in 1874 there was a major famine), the 
lack of funds, the limited industrial and military hardware as well as the lack of 
infrastructure and transportation (railways towards the south or adequate roads), 
called for caution and not for a military adventure.43
It is within this spirit that Ignatiev was sent to the European capitals, though 
the choice of envoy was hardly ideal in that it created great nervousness, especially 
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in London. The final outcome was of course the watered-down London Protocol. 
When Disraeli, following the Protocol, called for the demobilization of the 
Russian army, Alexander mused: ‘They forgot the subject of the amelioration of 
the life of the Christians and they are only interested in disarming Russia’.44
The Russo-Ottoman War: ‘a generous crusade’
As Seton-Watson has argued, the correspondence before the war between Ignatiev 
and Shuvalov and of both to Gorchakov, ‘leave[s] no possible room for doubt as 
to the pacific intentions of the Tsar and his Government’, whose aim was limited 
to obtaining an agreement with Britain to protect the Christians ‘against Turkish 
misrule’.45
Following the failure of the Constantinople Conference, Russia presented the 
crisis not as ‘a Russo-Turkish or Slav question, but one of humanity and Christen-
dom’ (the very words of the Tsar).46 The Tsar was in a dilemma: ‘pacific though he 
was, he could not abandon the cause of Christian kith and kin without alienating 
those upon whose support his throne rested’.47
As pointed out by Alfred Rieber: ‘Officially Alexander opposed the grandiose 
designs of the Pan-Slavs, but his moral commitment to Orthodoxy as a kind 
of substitute for national unity left him helpless to resist their pressure at the 
decisive moment’.48 His assessment is that by 1877 the Tsar had reached the point 
‘where he had unwittingly staked his own honor and that of the empire upon 
saving the rebellious Christian population of the Ottoman Empire from their 
legitimate sovereign’.49
Above all, it was a matter of prestige and honour for Alexander to implement 
Russia’s will, if necessary by force. Within the imperial ideology and mentality, 
the Tsar was sensitive to the need to be seen to maintain an ‘ethical authority’ in 
policy matters, which in this case was keeping his promise to save the Christian 
Balkan peoples.50 He was of the belief that, by now, the prospect of war had been 
justified in the eyes of Europe as humanitarian, as a reaction to the extreme 
violence against the Christians and to Ottoman intransigence. He also had in 
mind the precedent fifty years previously, when the three powers had saved the 
Greeks.51
By now not only the Tsar, but even Gorchakov and Miliutin, who had been 
opposed to war, had given in. The only minister to oppose war until the end (for it 
would upset fiscal stability) was the Economics Minister, Reutern, who resigned.52 
The moderate Jomini saw it as the best opportunity to crush the Ottomans. The 
war planner Obruchev estimated that the Russian army would be within reach of 
Constantinople within three months.53
Miliutin saw the prospect of war as ‘a sad but inevitable reality’54 in view of 
the stance of the European powers, which were prepared ‘to sacrifice the fate of 
the Balkan peoples to Turkish barbarity’. ‘[E]nvy towards us has made Europe 
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abandon its dignity in the deep belief that any bolstering of the Turkish Porte 
would be a blow to our traditional policy’. He concluded that the goal of war was 
‘a real peace, a dignified peace … that would protect the existence of the Balkan 
Christians from all bestiality and violence’.55
When the war started, Professor F. F. Martens, the legal adviser to the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, wrote that ‘Russia was obliged to draw the sword, in order to 
safeguard the interests recognized worthy of sympathy by all civilized nations. 
Russia could not consent to the abandonment at the mercy of the Bashibazouks 
the life and honour of the Christians’.56 He called the Ottoman regime ‘an outrage 
to human nature’ and asserted that ‘Russia declared war against Turkey in the 
name of the interests of humanity … to put an end to a state of affairs that revolted 
the most respectable sentiments of the Russian people’.57
In his proclamation to the army in Kishinev, where the official declaration of 
war was made on 12/24 April 1877, Alexander pointed out that the war was waged 
for high moral reasons: for the honour of Russia, to save the Christian population 
from the wrath of the Turks, to bring about necessary reforms and to establish a 
lasting peace. War was rendered a necessity in view of the intransigence of the 
Porte. Moreover, the self-definition of Russian dignity at the time made the war 
inevitable and necessary.58 
In the proclamation for the Bulgarians, the Tsar stressed ‘the sympathies of 
Russia for her coreligionists in the East’, ‘the sacred rights of your nationality’ 
gained not by ‘armed resistance, but at the cost of centuries of suffering, and the 
cost of blood of martyrs with which you and your ancestors have soaked the soil 
of your country’.59 However, humanitarian motives, including safeguarding the 
moral integrity and prestige of Russia, were not unrelated to political objectives, 
namely acquiring greater influence in the Balkans by saving its Slav Orthodox 
peoples.
It was made abundantly clear that Russia had no intention of dissolving the 
Ottoman Empire; it had ‘neither the interest to do so, nor the desire or the 
means’. If Constantinople was to be occupied, this would be provisional and 
only for short-term military purposes. Any final arrangement would involve 
all the Europeans.60 When the Russian army did in fact reach the outskirts of 
Constantinople, Alexander did not permit its seizure, despite the strong pressure 
to do so by a segment of the military, by his brother Grand Prince Nicholas (after 
his army entered Adrianople) and by the nationalist and Pan-Slav circles headed 
by Aksakov.61
Alexander also made it a point to be present as the army advanced. Wortman, 
who has studied the symbolism of ceremonies in the Russian Empire, points 
out that ‘Alexander’s presence at the theater of war was widely publicized and 
dramatized his personal leadership’ and eyewitnesses presented him as ‘a senti-
mental hero, acting purely out of the altruism that inspired his people’, ‘a military 
leader and a moral one’, who had ‘the ability and compassion for suffering’.62 In 
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the conservative national discourse of the time, these were regarded as the virtues 
of the Russian people – love for the stranger, emotion for the suffering of others – 
thus the Balkan cause was one of altruism, sacrifice for the high goal of liberating 
the Balkans from the Muslim yoke, and all this without an inkling of national 
ambition or insatiable appetite for gains. 
Interestingly, the war has been presented as humanitarian even by foreign 
witnesses hardly associated with Russian expansionism or Pan-Slavism, as seen in 
the case of Francis Greene, a lieutenant in the US army who covered the war from 
the Russian ranks. He assured his readers that Alexander’s attempt was to ‘free his 
cο-religionists from the intolerable oppression of the Turks. No more generous or 
holy crusade was ever been undertaken on the part of a strong race to befriend a 
weak one’.63
The victory of the Russian army brought Ignatiev to the highest point of 
his career. Now was his chance to remodel the Ottoman Empire according to 
his taste.64 An imperial council was convened and Ignatiev presented (as at 
Constantinople earlier) a maximum and minimum proposal. The first suggested 
the creation of a large independent Bulgaria with an extended outlet to the Aegean 
Sea, including Salonica (where a large segment of the population were Sephardic 
Jews) as well as major gains for Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. The minimum 
plan was accepted, which limited the gains to Montenegro and the Bulgarians 
(the climate was not favourable to Serbia). Independence for Bulgaria, including 
Salonica, were not accepted, but a large Bulgaria with an extended Aegean outlet 
was endorsed. Ignatiev left for Constantinople triumphant and regarded as the 
most likely successor of the ageing and almost senile Gorchakov.65
The Treaty of San Stefano was seen as a worthy reward for the war and the 
sacrifices of the Russian people but it could not be implemented due to the 
resistance of Europe, which regarded Great Bulgaria as a Russian satellite that 
brought Russian power and influence to the Aegean and not far from the Straits 
and Constantinople.66 According to Shuvalov, San Stefano was ‘the greatest act of 
stupidity we could have committed’, adding that ‘Ignatiev’s Bulgaria is nonsense’.67 
As regards San Stefano, apart from the Ignatiev factor and the clamouring of the 
Pan-Slavists and the Russian press, it seems that the Russians were momentarily 
carried away by their victory and now wanted gains commensurate with their 
difficult victory (the war had cost Russia more men and money than defeat in the 
Crimean War68). There were the territorial demands of the Balkan states to reckon 
with, not least for reasons of Russian credibility and prestige. Moreover, it seems 
that Gorchakov wanted to confront the other powers with a maximum number of 
faits accomplis69 or, put differently, ‘they took more than they expected to keep in 
order to have some surplus for bargaining’.70
Ignatiev was sent to Andrassy to convince him of the need to retain the essence 
of San Stefano but the demands of the latter were so excessive that, in effect, 
Vienna would have made the greatest gains without having fired a single shot.71
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The Berlin Congress, when Russia was obliged to back down from San Stefano, 
was seen as ‘a black page’ in Russian diplomacy. Gorchakov, who avoided sessions 
in Berlin when Russia had to yield (and thus was able to throw the onus as well as 
the blame for yielding on Shuvalov), wrote: ‘I only regret having had my signature 
to such a transaction’ and told Alexander that ‘I consider the Berlin treaty the 
darkest page of my life’, to which Tsar’s answer was ‘and in mine too’.72
Ignatiev used the following words: ‘My whole soul rebelled against destroying 
with my own hands my … work of fifteen years, killing all the hopes of the Slavs 
and strengthening Vienna’s predominance in the east … I considered granting 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria to be a crime against the Slav population and 
shameful to Russia’.73
But not all Russian officials felt this way. Shuvalov regarded the compromise 
as inevitable, since Russia was in no position to wage another war, this time 
against Europeans.74 Giers was optimistic. He wrote to Jomini during the Berlin 
Congress to say that the results were satisfactory, pointing to the independence of 
three principalities and the creation of two Bulgarian entities, and that everything 
was done with the ‘sanction of Europe’.75
Three years later, Alexander II was assassinated (1/13 March 1881) by a 
member of a revolutionary organization named Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will). 
Alexander III, who as heir to the throne had been a supporter of war on behalf 
of the Bulgarians and Serbs on Pan-Slav grounds, changed his mind following 
the Berlin Congress. In 1885, when relations with Bulgaria were worse than ever, 
following an uprising in Eastern Rumelia, which declared union with Bulgaria, 
he was not prepared to spend even a coin for them.76 Similar views were held 
by Giers, the successor of Gorchakov to the Foreign Ministry. As he told the 
British ambassador in 1885: ‘a lesson we can never forget and one which is most 
wholesome for us – Never again to go forth making moral conquests with our 
blood and money but to think of ourselves and our interests only’.77
San Stefano, Ignatiev’s brainchild,78 can be seen as ‘the fullest practical 
expression ever given in Russian foreign policy to the Panslav ideal’.79 But the 
Russian government (with the exception of Ignatiev and the consuls under his 
command) did not adopt the Pan-Slav agenda.80 However, Alexander II had every 
reason to bow to public opinion and to the rhetoric of protection of life, and to 
present it as the justification for war, a war that could also serve Russian influence 
and prestige in the region, as both had faced a severe blow with defeat in the 
Crimean War.81 War had the added advantage of silencing internal divisions and 
redirecting interest to external matters.
As we have seen in the 1875–78 Balkan crisis, Pan-Slavism looms large and 
was seen by European Russophobes as the bogey. Thus a brief discussion of Pan-
Slavism is in order.
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Russian Pan-Slavism
Pan-Slavism (an offshoot of Slavophilism) was an assortment of contrasting 
narratives. It was not merely the terrain of right-wing conservatives and national-
ists, but represented an array of ideologies across the political spectrum. Adherents 
included: conservative intellectuals such as Mikhail P. Pogodin, Aleksey S. 
Khomyakov, the brothers Konstantin S. and Ivan S. Aksakov, Juriy F. Samarin 
and Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevskiy; liberals such as Aleksander Pypin; radicals 
and socialists such as Aleksander Gertsen, N. I. Kostomarov, M. P. Drahomanov 
and others; and even anarchists such as M. Bakunin.82
The Pan-Slav discourse was developed by different Slavic peoples who lived 
in the three continental empires, Austria–Hungary, the Russian Empire and 
the Ottoman Empire. The common elements were Slavic ancestry (actually a 
perceived common ancestry based on language) from which the need for Slavic 
solidarity arose and the principle of nationalities. The whole discourse put into 
question the basis of legitimacy of the three empires and was linked in part to the 
famous Eastern Question.
In Russian society this narrative came to the fore following the traumatic 
Crimean War. The Slavic idea was part and parcel of the discussion of the national 
question in Russia and the creation of Russian national identity. There were no 
fewer than three versions of Russian identity: ethnically or culturally russkiy, 
racially Slav or state rossiskiy.
The Crimean War – the European ‘invasion’ into Russia’s ‘soft underbelly’ – 
coupled with Europe’s Russophobia and the dogma of the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, convinced an increasing number of Russian intellectuals that Western 
Europe’s object of enmity and hatred was no longer Islam and the ‘Turk’ but 
Russia and the Slavic world. Thus some conservative Pan-Slavs, such as Nikolay 
Danilevskiy and General Fadeev, jumped to the conclusion that Europe was not 
only different but also the ‘absolute Enemy’.83 The Slavophiles and other con-
servatives argued that the Western European model of historical evolution was 
not the only way forward and far from ideal. However, the majority of Russian 
intellectuals of various ideological hues came to perceive the difference between 
Europe and Russia as an intra-European family affair rather than a clash between 
Europe as a whole and Russia. The Slavophiles, particularly those of the second 
generation, though anti-European, defined Europe as part of their world, of their 
own ‘Christian world’, with common Indo-European roots.84
The Russian Slavophiles felt a greater affinity for the southern Slavs, who 
were Orthodox. The issue of the relationship of Russia to Europe soon became 
the relationship of the Slavic world as a whole towards Europe. The situation 
was conceived as one of exclusion of the Slavic world from the rest of Europe. In 
the words of M. Pogodin: ‘The Slavs are forgotten by history, they are forgotten 
by geography, by diplomacy and by politics’.85 The Slavs were ‘the plebeians of 
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   180 22/01/2015   10:53:52
The Balkan crisis 181
history’ according to Orest Miller. However, this predicament had a positive 
twist: these very plebeians had historical time on their side, as youthful nations; 
they were in a process of revival and political struggle. Thus, according to Miller, 
the future belonged to these very plebeians.86 For second-generation Slavophiles 
such as Ivan Aksakov, V. I. Lamanskiy or Orest Miller, Russia’s historical mission 
in the East (and with regard to the Eastern Question) derived not only from its 
Christian Orthodox faith but also from its Slavic credentials. The Slavic question 
overlapped and was interlinked with the Eastern Question and the ultimate 
fate of the ‘Sick Man’. Hence the Eastern Question was perceived largely as ‘the 
narration of the gradual emancipation of the Slavs’.87
The Slavophiles tried to reorient the foreign (and internal) policy of Russia. 
Russia should go ahead and play a leading role in liberating the Slavic peoples, 
and in so doing follow an unfettered foreign policy not wedded to the traditional 
Russian line of trying to forge a common great power policy towards the unwieldy 
Eastern Question.88
The conservative version of Pan-Slavism went hand in hand with Russian state 
imperialism and Russian nationalism. Conservative Pan-Slavs, such as Fadeev, 
Danilevskiy and Ivan Aksakov, sought Russian dominance of the Slavs, with 
Russia functioning as the Slavic Piedmont for a future union of all the Slavs. 
Others, such as Miller, put emphasis on two prerequisites: on the principle of 
nationalities, which should apply to the Slavic peoples as well as to all the nations 
of Europe; and on selflessness on the part of Russia, which, in helping its Slav 
brothers, should not aim to gain territory from the Ottoman Empire when the 
Eastern Question was resolved.89
For the liberals, the Slav nations were European nations that had to follow 
the road of European civilization and progress. Α case in point among the liberal 
Slavophiles was Pypin, who, in his long academic carrier and through the liberal 
journal Vesntik Evropy, studied Slav solidarity. For Pypin, Russia should par-
ticipate in a Pan-Slav federation of equal members, provided that it had shed 
absolutism and become a modern democratic society. He criticized the repressive 
Russian policies against the Slavs within Russia, as in the case of the Poles and 
Ukrainians, and endorsed the Ukrainian cultural movement, although without 
endorsing its separatist ideas.90 As Alexei Miller points out, he shared the idea of 
the all-Russian nation but opposed forced assimilation.91
Radical and socialist Slavophiles, such as Gertzen, Chernisevsky and Bakunin, 
claimed that Pan-Slavism and nationalism could be democratic and lead to the 
liberation of suppressed Slavic peoples in a confederation of equal independent 
states.92
Ukrainian Slavophiles, such as Kostomarov and Drahomanov, supported the 
Ukrainian renaissance but not secessionism, provided Russia became a modern 
democratic state. Their approach had intellectual links with the Decembrists, 
notably with Pavel Pestel, and with the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 
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which envisaged the creation of a large Slavic union, a federation, comprising 
Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Lusitians, Illyrian 
Serbs, Serbs, Croatians and Bulgarians.93
Public opinion in Russian and Russian–British–American entanglements
Russian society was transformed in the 1860s and 1870s as a result of Alexander’s 
reforms; new social strata and an array of social organizations came to the fore 
calling for the ‘common good’, ‘public duty’ and effective participation and greater 
change than that provided by the reforms. From the 1860s onwards a new political 
and social conscience crystallized with novel notions, such as obshchestvennost’, 
a complex term which refers to public space, educated society engaged in the 
common good and progress, and a sense of public duty, implying a civil society 
and citizenship. The concept of intelligentsia also came with the Narodnics, as 
people equipped with critical thought, independent of the state, who acted on the 
basis of high ideals and aiming at human progress.94
The daily and weekly press multiplied. The printed press was of great importance 
in the absence of institutionalized political dialogue. The role of publishers was 
also of importance.95 New forms of contact and information flourished, such 
as letters, distributed handwritten manuscripts, and trips abroad, all of which 
contributed to the exchange of ideas like running water, with information and 
views across frontiers as never before in the history of Russia. 
When the Balkan uprisings occurred, various currents in Russia’s educated 
society supported them in the hope that liberty would arrive at home as well.96 
Educated society increasingly criticized absolutism, which it regarded as respon-
sible for the backwardness and other problems of the country in comparison with 
most of Europe. There was a widening gap between the authoritarian state and 
‘unruly’ society.
Khevrolina, who has studied the archives of the police and the Imperial Third 
Department, found that following the defeat of the Serbs in the autumn of 1876, 
there was revolutionary ferment, indeed, a real danger of a revolution, especially 
among young students. If the state did not take measures in support of the Balkan 
Slavs, the prospect of revolution in Russia along Pan-Slav lines could become real.97
The Russian press had had since the 1860s a good information network 
regarding Balkan affairs, due to southern Slavic emigration to Russia. A case in 
point was the daily Golos, which had correspondents in various Balkan cities, and 
published articles on the Slavic and Eastern questions by progressive radicals from 
the Balkans, such as the Serb Zhivoin Zhuevich and the Bulgarian Karavelov, who 
wrote on Ottoman misrule and independent statehood for Serbia and Bulgaria as 
the only way out of their predicament.98
When the Bulgarian April Uprising took place there were constant reports 
in the Russian press from its network in the Balkans, in Cherniaev’s newspaper 
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Russkiy Mir, and in the newspapers Moskovskoe Vedomosti and Novoe Vremya, 
which painted a grim picture of the suffering of the Bulgarians as martyrs at the 
hands of the atrocious ‘Turks’.99
When the first report by Pears appeared in the Daily News it was immediately 
translated into Russian, as was a booklet by MacGahan (Turkish Atrocities in 
Bulgaria), who was fluent in Russian. MacGahan was close to Schuyler, the US 
diplomat, who also knew Russian (he had translated into English Tolstoy and 
Turgenev, whom he knew personally), who wrote the preface to the booklet. 
Gladstone was highly regarded in Russia. His Bulgarian Horrors was immedi-
ately translated as a booklet and it was introduced in Vsemirnaya Illiustratsiya, with 
an engraving of him speaking in the pouring rain at Blackheath, with fist raised. 
The publication noted that Gladstone recognized the selfless aims of the Russians 
and supported a common policy for the two European states. Jomini noted that 
even the British accepted the Russian demands for Bulgarian autonomy under 
Ottoman suzerainty.100 The money raised from Gladstone’s pamphlet was handed 
to the relatives of the Bulgarian victims.101
The anarchist Kropotkin, in exile outside Russia, remembered that his 
anarchist friends, among them the radical intellectuals Stepnyak and Clements, 
after having read the Daily News, went to volunteer for the Bulgarian cause as 
soldiers or hospital assistants.102
Pears, MacGahan, Schuyler and their views were constantly referred to, as 
were those of Stead, who supported Gladstone and was considered the prime 
Russophile journalist in Britain. Stead stressed the need for a crusade in the name 
of outraged humanity – blurring the boundaries between the medieval crusade 
and a nineteenth-century humanitarian crusade against the Turks.103 The entry of 
Reed’s diary for 14 January 1877 makes it clear: ‘The honour of Bulgarian virgins 
is in the custody of the English voter. And what is true of Bulgaria is true of larger 
things.’104 It also won him the compliments of two of his heroes: Gladstone and 
Carlyle. He became a key figure in the British journalistic landscape and was 
invited to the London salons of the expatriate Russian propagandist Olga Kireeva 
Novikova (Novikoff in her English writings), where he first met Gladstone, Carlyle 
and Froude, among others. Stead was one of the three Englishmen, alongside 
Gladstone and the liberal journalist Peter Clayden, the editor of the Daily News, 
to receive a vote of thanks from the first Bulgarian National Assembly in 1878 for 
their role in the Bulgarian agitation movement in Britain.105
Novikova had cultivated Gladstone since 1873, when they were introduced 
by the Russian ambassador in London, and they were united by their common 
interest in religious questions. Novikova, of aristocratic background, while 
in Russia was part of an intellectual circle comprising Turgenev, Dostoevsky, 
Tolstoy, Tiuchev and others. After her divorce from the brother of ambassador 
Novikov, she passed from 1866 onwards her winters in London, surrounded by a 
circle of like-minded people in her salon at Claridge’s Hotel. Following the death 
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of her brother, Nicholas Kireev, in Serbia, she started writing to her many British 
friends, including Napier, Froude, Kinglake, Freeman, Villiers, Harcourt and of 
course Gladstone. To her surprise and grief Gladstone was one of the few who 
did not answer. But he did something more worthwhile: a little later he sent her a 
copy of his famous pamphlet.106 During the crisis Aksakov kept her well informed 
on Russian foreign policy and she in her turn wrote many articles in Stead’s 
Northern Echo, where she translated the views of Aksakov and his speeches to 
the Slavic Committee of Moscow. At the same time she wrote a column ‘News 
from England’ in the conservative Moskovkye Vedomosty of Katkov. Among 
her best-known articles are the following, with characteristic titles: ‘Is Russia 
Wrong?’ (1878), ‘Friends or Foes’ (1879), ‘Russia and England, a Protest and an 
Appeal’ (1880), which Gladstone appreciated very much, and ‘Skobelev and the 
Slavonic Cause’ (1884).107
Russian society’s sympathy for the Slavs
In the years preceding the Balkan crisis there had been considerable advances in 
literacy in Russia, among the peasants and workers.108 ‘Once the farmers learned 
to read they covered all the news of the paper’, especially events in the Balkans, 
the head of police in Siberia wrote in a report.109 Though this may have been an 
overstatement, it is a fact that far more than in the Greek case half a century 
previously, members of the lower classes who could now read joined in the 
pro-Balkans call. The elaborate Pan-Slavist argumentations of Pagodin, Miller 
or Lamanski may have been very difficult to understand but there were also the 
sermons in the churches which referred to the agony of the Slavs at the hands of 
the ‘barbaric Muslims’. 
The publishers of the daily press reacted accordingly to this rising literacy, 
trying to augment the circulation of their newspapers. There were also the so-called 
lubki, cheap publications with many illustrations accompanied by short texts. The 
events of 1875–78 led to a great rise in demand for such publications. As put by Ivan 
Dmitrievich Sytin, a successful publisher of lubki, I ‘hired the best graphic artists 
and first class printers, did not bargain with them over wages, but demanded high 
quality work; finally, I followed the market and with the greatest effort studied 
people’s preferences’.110 There were also new periodicals with wide circulation 
which included evocative illustrations, such as the weakly Niva, intended for 
reading by families, and the popular scientific Vsemirnaya Illiustratsiya (World 
Illustration), whose target audiences were the middle strata. Contrary to the elitist 
‘thick journals’, the periodicals, especially Vsemirnaya Illiustratsiya, presented a 
visual form of narration easily understood by simple folk. The Bulgarian horrors 
and other atrocities in the Balkans were presented by dramatic illustrations that 
depicted all kinds of barbarities, arson, pillage, rape (the raping of semi-nude 
women was one of the most common images), sodomy, torture, people in chains, 
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priests in chains, the slaughtering of women, children, the elderly and priests, 
with various symbols of Christianity wrecked or downtrodden, such as the cross, 
the Bible, icons, church bells and so on. The image of the Turks (usually presented 
as very dark-skinned) was of ferocious men equipped with an array of daggers and 
swords. The captions were also very suggestive: ‘Turkish barbarities’, ‘Brutalities’, 
‘The Balkan drama’, ‘Bulgarian village robbed by the Bashibazouks and the 
Circassians’. Noted artists also joined in, such as Konstantin Makovskiy, with his 
1877 painting The Bulgarian Martyresses, which depicted the rape of two women 
(one of whom is killed) within a church by two African-looking Bashibazouks (a 
year later the painting appeared in France as part of the Russian contribution to 
the Paris Art Exhibition).
The same publications also had articles and illustrations of peaceful events 
in the secure, civilized world, such as the 1876 World Fair in Philadelphia, and 
advertisements for beauty lotions for ladies. These made a stark contrast between 
‘civilization’ and ‘barbarity’, peace and tragedy. Readers might have felt a sense of 
shame for doing little for the Slavs. 
Turgenev, the liberal writer who lived in Paris and often travelled to Britain 
(where he was widely acclaimed), was so moved by the news of the horrors that he 
wanted to go to the Balkans as a volunteer, as was the case with Tolstoy (both of 
them were dissuaded from going due to their old age). Turgenev, while travelling 
by train from Moscow to St Petersburg, wrote a satirical poem entitled ‘Croquet 
at Windsor’, whose first version in English (a prose version from the French 
translation) runs thus:111
The Queen is sitting in her forest of Windsor, around her the ladies of her court play 
at a game which not long since came into fashion – a game called croquet.… The 
Queen looks on and laughs; but suddenly she stops; her face grows deathly pale. 
 It seems to her that, instead of shapely balls driven by the lightly-tapping mallet, 
there are hundreds of heads rolling along, all smeared with blood. Heads of women, 
of young girls, of children: faces with marks of dreadful tortures and bestial 
outrages, of the claws of beasts, and all the horror of death-pangs.…
 ‘My doctor, quick, quick, let him come to me!’ And she tells him her terrible 
vision. But he then answers: ‘It doesn’t surprise me; reading the newspapers has 
disturbed you. The Times explains to us so well how the Bulgarians have deserved 
the wrath of the Turks.… 
The Russian newspapers did not publish the poem (it was circulated by hand), 
in order not to offend Queen Victoria, and this was also the case in Britain. 
But it was translated into French, German and Bulgarian, and into English first 
by Henry James (the above prose version), who was an admirer and friend of 
Turgenev, and published in the American journal The Nation. James explained 
why he liked the poem: ‘At any rate the cynical, brutal barbarous pro-Turkish 
attitudes of an immense mass of people here (I am no fanatic for Russia, but I 
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think the Emperor of Russia might have been treated like a gentleman!) has 
thrown into vivid relief the most discreditable side of the English character’.112
The events also moved Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, who was commissioned by 
the Russian Musical Society to write an orchestral piece for a concert in aid of the 
Red Cross Society, for the benefit of wounded Serbian veterans. He initially called 
the piece the ‘Serbo-Russian March’ but when it was performed in Moscow in 
November 1876 (conducted by his close friend Nikolai Rubinstein) it was named 
‘Slave March’ (Slavonic March).
Art and literature, as an aesthetic experience, are connected to perceptions 
and the emotions connected to perceptions are another way to make sense of 
international politics. Emotions have a social character and can construct com-
munities of understandings and like-mindedness and in this way can play an 
important role in political events. In this case sentiment for those suffering was 
the basis for the construction of a community of saviours of the Balkan Slavs, 
stirred by images of martyrdom and torture, not least represented by the frail but 
alluring bodies of women. As one Russian volunteer put it in a letter back home, ‘I 
have joined to defend freedom, the human rights of my brothers and the disgraced 
honour of their wives and daughters’.113
According to reports of the police forwarded to the Third Department, 
sympathy of all the social classes for war was sweeping the country, as was the 
belief that the Tsar should save and liberate the Balkan Slavs.114 Andrey Zhelyabov 
(who set up in Odessa ‘The People Will’, a secret revolutionary organization, 
which organized Alexander’s assassination in 1881) wrote that ‘[t]here was much 
discussion about the various efforts for collecting monetary contributions for 
the Serbian refugees. The humanitarian concerns were widespread, in particular 
among the little people and the peasantry: they were all ready to sacrifice their 
own lives and families fortunes for the cause that they considered sacred’.115
The patriotic enthusiasm expressed itself in different ways. The Slavic 
benevolent societies were especially active, led by Ivan Aksakov, gathering money 
for the cause, an activity initially prohibited by the Tsar (he later accepted the 
contribution if they were for the benefit of victims).116 The Russian Red Cross 
Society worked in Serbia with its doctors and nurses, with the Russians helping 
their Serbian colleagues, who were generally ill-trained as medical doctors. 
Several hundred thousand volunteers left for the unknown Balkans from various 
social strata and backgrounds. The Southern Russian Union of Workers and the 
Odessa Railroad Workers were among the first to announce their solidarity with 
the Balkan insurgents. Half of the several thousand volunteers to Serbia were 
Ukrainians.117 Members of the Young Latvians, involved in planning the Latvian 
national revival, became volunteers, such as the romantic writer Andreis Pumpurs 
(he met Aksakov, who sent him to the volunteers).118 Among the volunteers 
were radical friends of Kropotkin as well as monarchists, such as the brother of 
Novikova, one of the main organizers of the volunteers.
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Rethinking the ‘noble cause’
Russian solidarity with the Slavs in the Balkans has been characterized as a 
spontaneous democratic movement and compared with the great Patriotic War of 
1812 (against Napoleon’s invasion).119 In fact, the movement had lost much of its 
allure and enthusiasm once the first defeats of the Serbs became known and the 
volunteers themselves found that their Serbian ‘brothers’ were not particularly 
enthusiastic about their ‘saviours’ who had come to shed their blood for the 
Serbian cause. 
The writer and prominent Narodnik Gleb Uspensky, who had gone to Serbia, 
sent reports in the form of letters. The gist of these is that the volunteers had 
gone there above all for the experience and in order to leave behind the various 
dead-ends of Russian life. It was, he said, ‘in order to live at a thousand different 
levels’ that the volunteers left for Serbia.120
But best known is the controversy between Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, as a 
result of the eighth and last chapter of Anna Karenina (Russian novels at the 
time were serially published in journals before being released in book form). In 
a scene where various positive as well as negative views are presented regarding 
the volunteer body sent to Serbia, the main protagonist of the novel, Levin, 
expresses the conviction that Russian society did not associate itself with the 
southern Slavs and, worse, did not even understand their national movements. 
Levin went even further, questioning the size and mass character of the pro-
Serbian movement. 
Tolstoy’s doctrine of non-resistance to evil and strict pacifism (which later 
impressed Gandhi, who corresponded with Tolstoy) put into question the pos-
sibility of a ‘just war’, which he regarded as unattainable, however noble the goal. 
He questioned how one could ever be certain what the general good is. The central 
hero of Anna Karenina contemplated that the achievement of this general good was 
possible with strict adherence to the law of goodness, which is inherent in every 
person, and as a result he could not desire war or propagate it for general aims. 
Dostoyevsky, from the pages of A Writer’ Diary, voiced his strong disagreement 
with Tolstoy. Dostoyevsky’s discourse of Slavophile and romantic nationalism 
is founded on the belief that ‘Russia’s psyche’ is imbued with a unique blend of 
universal humanism and selflessness which empathizes with alien pain. Thus 
the Russian people could not but participate in the Balkan quest for freedom, 
equipped as they were ‘with an inherent and well-developed historical instinct’. In 
this endeavour the Russian people were also putting into effect what was no less 
than God’s will. From a humanistic perspective, the Russian people had the moral 
duty to afford support to their suppressed Slav Orthodox brethren. Furthermore, 
by pursuing a foreign policy aimed at saving the southern Slavs, Russia was ac-
celerating the process of Slavic national emancipation, which would eventually 
lead to Slavic unity, which was a godly end.121 
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When the Russo-Ottoman War was declared, Dostoyevsky stated in ‘The 
Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ (April 1877) that this step gave the Russian people 
the opportunity to create a new Christian order. In an article entitled ‘The 
Paradoxalist’, referring to the Christian ethical belief that war brings only blood 
and violence (and obviously intended for Tolstoy’s pacifism), he retorts that wars 
take place because humanity cannot live without noble ideas, and he underlines 
that ‘I suspect that humanity loves war precisely because it wants to be part of a 
noble idea’.122
A few months later, in October 1877, Vsevolod Garshin, one of the most 
talented authors of his generation (who committed suicide at the age of thirty-
three), wrote his acclaimed first short story, ‘Four Days’, a statement on modern 
war, in the Narodnik journal Otechestvennye Zapiski, based on a real incident from 
his experience as a volunteer in the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War, in which he 
had fought bravely and was wounded. The hero of the story, Ivanov, goes to war 
in the belief that he is serving a noble cause. He is wounded and taken for dead, is 
left on the battleground for four days, face to face with the corpse of the Ottoman 
soldier he had killed. The story is a basically a monologue by the wounded Russian 
soldier, who asks himself ‘why did I kill him?’ He ponders about the duty of an 
intellectual when faced with the horror of killing another human being.123
There was also the question of Russia itself, which, immersed in the war, 
had left many of its own daunting problems unresolved. As put in the pages of 
Οtechestvennye Zapiski, ‘In view of the fate of the Slavs Russia has forgotten that it 
exists in the world … it has all transformed itself into a society of self-sacrifice … 
in fact we also need help no less than the [Balkan] Slavs’.124 As acidly put by Jomini 
to Giers in September 1877, while the war was still raging:125
I continue to think that instead of pursuing these Slavic fantasies, we should have 
done better to have taken care of our own Christian Slavs. If the emperor wished 
to descend from official heights and splendors and play Haroum al Rashid, if he 
wished to visit incognito the suburbs of Bucharest and his own capital, he would 
be convinced of all that there was to do to civilize, organize and develop his 
own country and he would be convinced that a crusade against drunkenness and 
syphilis was more necessary and profitable to Russia than the ruinous crusade 
against the Turks for the profit of the Bulgarians.
Criticism came on other grounds as well. The Ukrainian academic Drahomanov 
questioned the humanistic motives of the Tsar. For one, the war started late, when 
all the uprisings had been quelled and a great number of Serbs, Bulgarians and 
Russian (the volunteers) had been killed. He argued that the Tsar had in fact 
started a war not in order to save human beings but for his honour and fame, not as 
the representative of the Slavs but as the leader of a great European power poised 
to show resolve and power; in other words, the humanitarian rhetoric was simply 
a smoke-screen for political and other tangible interests. In a series of articles 
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with characteristic titles such as ‘Internal and External Turks’, ‘Clean Cases Need 
Clean Hands’ and ‘Internal Slavery and the War of Liberation’, he pointed to the 
hypocrisy of Russia’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ against the Turks in support of 
the Slavs, while the Russian state suppressed a number of Slav nations in its midst. 
He also pointed to the contradiction of, on the one hand, the so-called historical 
Russian mission to liberate the Slavs and, on the other, having ‘Turkish structures’ 
and absolutism within the Russian Empire. And he referred to discrimination 
against many ethnic groups, including the Jews, and the use of violence by the 
Russian state in the Caucasus and against the Poles, the Ukrainians and others, 
violating the right to life which it supposedly wanted to defend in the Balkans.126 
He called for the creation of a democratic federal Russia, for Russia was not 
‘Turkey’, with its innate inability to join the ‘civilized’ states.
The east of the semi-east
In 1876 an important international scientific event took place in St Petersburg, the 
conference of Orientalists, little noticed by educated society, which was absorbed 
by events in the Balkans. The introductory speech by Orientalist Grigoriev 
referred to events of ‘religious passions’ and ‘one race arming against the other’, 
but reassured his audience that they were secure in the safe embrace of science, 
where even rival parties can search for truth.127 The scientific committee of the 
conference had set forth thirty-eight subjects to address, the twenty-sixth being 
whether in the history of the Arabs the motivating force was Islamic fanaticism or 
the thirst for plunder and booty which characterized all nomadic peoples. Note 
that the massacres in the Balkans were largely depicted as outbursts of religious 
fanaticism, which was regarded an inherent characteristic of all those who hailed 
from Asia.
Such Orientalist thinking was in line with the views of the young science of 
international law, which distinguished between civilized and semi-civilized or 
barbarous states (see chapter 3). In Russia, this view was set forth in the second 
half of the nineteenth century by international jurists Kamarowski and Martens, 
who asserted that between civilized states no intervention for humanitarian 
reasons was conceivable; this was applicable only between civilized states against 
barbarous states if the latter persecuted Christian communities (see chapter 4).
As pointed out by Susan Layton, the events of 1875–78 contributed to the 
further ‘Easternization’ of the Ottoman state, which, though obliged to reform 
and treat its Christian subject decently, was seen as unable to truly reform and act 
in a civilized way. In the case of Russia, the Turkic Circassians showed that the 
‘Turks’ in the Ottoman Empire, as well as Russia, were unredeemable barbarians, 
on the prowl and capable of the most despicable acts of inhumanity. This was seen 
in popular illustrations as well as in high literature. She describes a picture which 
appeared in 1878 in Niva, entitled ‘Circassians Returning from a Raid’:128
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[The illustration] shows a band of tribesmen crossing a river with captives, rustled 
horses, and cattle. Near the center rides a swarthy mountaineer with a blonde 
woman on his horse. She is naked to the waist with some cloth loosely draped 
about her legs. Another woman with an infant is visible on a raft in the foreground. 
This iconography gave even illiterate Russians access in the postwar mythology of 
national victory over Asian fiends.
Dostoevsky in A Writer’s Diary referred on a number of occasions to ‘a Muslim 
conspiracy in the interior of the empire’, reacting in this way to the various calls 
that treating the Muslims disdainfully was inappropriate when so many millions 
of them lived peacefully and loyally within the confines of the Russian Empire. 
The Diary dramatizes Islamic savagery with the story of a simple soldier who 
was caught by the Muslims during the conquest of central Asia, and was offered 
his freedom and wealth if he became Muslim. He did not want to convert and 
suffered terrible torture as a martyr to the Christian faith.129 And it was probably 
no co incidence that the Russian heroes of the Russo-Ottoman War were also 
previously heroes of the colonial expeditions of Russia to central Asia or the 
Caucuses. 
This image of the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus or central Asia or in the 
Balkans with the Circassian onslaught against the Bulgarians served a distinct 
purpose: to justify Russian violence and absolve Russia of the guilt of the ethnic 
cleansing of the Circassians in the Caucasus in the 1860s. Needless to say, such 
a posture left little room for the discourse of the ‘Other’, of the Muslim, Turk 
or Turkic, while the Russian conquest was dubbed pacification and a civilizing 
mission. The Christian slaughters and atrocities against Muslims were not 
registered at all, for the Muslim as a victim was simply not visible.
The Russian (and European) image of the Balkans, as shown by the work of 
Maria Todorova,130 is more complex, the presentation not only of the ‘Turks’ 
but also of all the Balkan Christians as beyond the purview of civilization, as 
Metternich saw it the first part of the nineteenth century and Bismarck in the 
1870s. According to the journal Otechestvennye Zapiski: 131 
Hearing of the violent behaviour of the Turks we should bear in mind that it is 
not a unique characteristic for them alone, but one of the East and of the southern 
Christians as well. Harshness and violence are an everyday occasion and it is used 
by all against all. Human life may cost little to the Ottomans but this also applies 
to the [Balkan] Christian peoples, who are at a low level of cultural development. 
Even in the present insurgency the most popular are those leaders who never give 
in, such as Peiko Pavlovits, who collected as his trophies human heads. 
Humanitarian sentiments went hand in hand with the patronizing attitude of 
the ‘saviour’ towards the victim, another aspect of humanitarian interventions in 
the nineteenth century. 
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The US and Cuba, 1895–98
On intervention
Among the handful of humanitarian interventions of the nineteenth century the 
intervention in Cuba is the most controversial, in view of the US reluctance to 
leave Cuba and the huge advantages it accrued, including the acquisition of even 
the faraway Philippines. 
Any discussion of the US stance on intervention before 1914 has to take into 
consideration the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.1 The Doctrine contained three 
principles: (1) that the Americas were ‘henceforth not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonization’ by any European power; (2) that the US would abstain 
from interfering in European affairs; and (3) that there will be no ‘interposition’ 
by the European powers in ‘this hemisphere’.2 Conversely, there was to be no US 
interference in the existing European colonies in the Americas. Thus it was not 
applicable to Cuba, which was held by Spain. 
According to John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, the doyen among 
inter national lawyers in the US during that period, ‘the most pronounced 
exception ever made by the United States, apart from cases arising under the 
Monroe Doctrine, to its policy of non-intervention, is that which was made in the 
case of Cuba’.3
As for the justification of the intervention in Cuba on humanitarian grounds, 
the US government was well aware of this concept and its practice as it had 
evolved in Europe. The US administration included acclaimed lawyers, such as 
Secretary of State William Day, many of them proficient in international law, 
such as Attorney General John Griggs, Elihu Root4 and Moore, who served as 
Assistant Secretary of State in 1897–98 and was Day’s main adviser on foreign 
affairs. Moreover, American jurists had for decades contributed to the debate on 
humanitarian intervention, with Kent and Halleck in earlier periods having come 
out against the idea; and a majority in support, namely Wheaton, Woolsey, as well 
as Pomeroy and Hershey prior to 1898 (see chapter 4, especially table 4.1). 
More generally, the intervention in Cuba was to prove a turning point. As 
Charles Fenwick has put it: ‘Henceforth the role of the United States was to be 
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no longer that of a leader of the American States in opposing intervention of 
Europe in American affairs but was to be itself the intervening power with the 
other American States ranged against it’.5 The subsequent 1903 treaty with Cuba 
provided the US with a right to intervene ostensibly for the good of Cuba (see 
below); Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904 said 
that ‘chronic wrongdoing’ in Latin American states could lead to intervention; 
and the Wilson Doctrine (1913) led to US interventions in Mexico (1914), Haiti 
(1915) and the Dominican Republic (1916). Such blatant interventionism led to 
a strong reaction on the part of the Latin American states, and intervention was 
declared ‘inadmissible’ at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance 
of Peace.6
The setting
In the first part of the nineteenth century all the overseas territories of Spain’s 
Siglo de oro (golden age) had gained independence save Cuba (and Puerto Rico), 
earning it the name ‘the ever-faithful isle’. Spaniards emigrated to Cuba well 
into the 1880s. Of some 1.6 million inhabitants, 150,000 were peninsulares (first-
generation immigrants), 950,000 creoles (their offspring) and 500,000 were 
Afro-Cubans and mulattos. Spain’s imperial rule was reactionary, ensuring the 
peninsulares a privileged position.7 
The first bid for Cuba libre was the Ten Years’ War (1868–78), initially headed 
by Carlos de Céspedes, who freed his slaves and declared Cuban independence, 
followed by Máximo Gómez (a former colonel from Santo Domingo), Antonio 
Maceo (the mulatto hero of the peasants), Calixto García and others. The war 
ended with the Pact of Zangón (1878), after victory by the Spaniards under 
General Martínez de Campos. There were some meagre reforms and in 1886 the 
long-awaited abolition of slavery. A second independence attempt, known as the 
Little War (1879–80), headed by García, was also abortive.8
April 1892 saw the formation of the Partido revolucionario cubano, by poet and 
political theorist José Martí, who recruited seasoned soldiers from the previous 
war, Gómez, Maceo, García and others. On 24 February 1895 the Guerra de 
independencia was declared. Martí issued the Proclamation of Montecristi (25 
March), which stated that the struggle was also for liberation from economic 
oppression and racial discrimination. Martí together with Gómez arrived in Cuba 
on 11 April, the latter becoming the overall military leader, seconded by Maceo.9 
In Spain, Antonio Cánovas, the leader of the Conservative Party, had stated 
(in 1891) that Spain would fight to ‘the last man and the last peso’ to retain Cuba.10 
When the revolt broke out, Premier Práxedes Sagasta, the leader of the Liberal 
Party, blamed the uprising on external agitators and declared that ‘[t]he Spanish 
nation is disposed to sacrifice to the last peseta … and to the last drop of blood 
of the last Spaniard before consenting that anyone snatch from it even one piece 
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of its sacred territory’.11 A few days later the Sagasta government fell and Cánovas 
took over, but he was even more determined to crush the rebellion. 
Why the last drop of blood and the last peso? Spain in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century was a country whose people were disgruntled and poor and 
whose governments were often corrupt. Spain, in contrast to the days of its ‘golden 
age’, trailed behind the other Western countries. Yet all Spaniards were united by 
the memory of a glorious past, now symbolized by the possession of Cuba (the 
island had been claimed by Columbus for Spain in his very first voyage, of 1492). 
Cuba and the immense overseas empire were regarded as God’s gift to Spain 
for the Reconquista (the re-conquest) of Christian Spain from the Muslims and 
an integral part of the Spanish nation.12 As put by one contemporary, Cuba was 
‘the flesh of the flesh of Spain; it is part of the history, the glory, and the grandeur 
of Spain’, and surrendering it would be tantamount to denying Spain’s national 
identity and heritage.13 Thus the Spaniards scoffed at the repeated US attempts to 
purchase the island and pressed on till the very end for a military solution; in the 
process Spain sustained 50,000 soldiers dead and 50,000 disabled by wounds and 
disease, out of more than 200,000 men who fought in the Cuban jungles, many of 
them mere teenagers, in what was the largest number of troops ever sent by Spain 
to the Americas.14
Around 100 miles to the north of Cuba lies the US, the ‘Colossus of the North’ 
as Martí called it.15 US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams had commented 
(in 1823) that there ‘are laws of political as well as physical gravitation’ and Cuba 
‘can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law of 
nature cannot cast her off from its bosom’.16 Similar views were voiced by an array 
of office-holders, from ex-President Thomas Jefferson to Secretary of State James 
Blaine in the early 1880s.17 Four US Presidents, from John Quincy Adams in 1825, 
to James Buchanan in 1858, tried to purchase the island from Spain.18 Here, a 
phrase from another country bordering the US comes to mind, attributed to the 
Mexican President Porfirio Díaz: ‘Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to 
the United States’. Cuba had become ‘an object of desire’ because of its fertility, 
commanding geographical position and proximity to the US.19 
There is also another side to the US attitude that played its part in bringing 
about military intervention, which followed what Julían Juderías dubbed, a 
decade later, the ‘black legend’ regarding Spain and the Spaniards peddled in 
Europe and North America since the Enlightenment.20 In US school textbooks of 
the nineteenth century, the image of Spain was strikingly negative, a stereotype 
buttressed by scholarly books.21 Tyrannical rule, cruelty, decadence and bigotry 
were regarded as Spain’s trademarks for centuries. When a journalist dared 
mention Las Casas’s pithy criticism of the Spanish conquerors, the view was that 
even he had indicted his compatriots.22 The influential US senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge called Spain ‘medieval, cruel, dying’, ‘three hundred years behind the 
rest of the world’.23 Moreover, in the racist narrative dominant in the country, 
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the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’, the Americans in particular, were regarded the ‘superior 
race’, with the Africans and American Indians at the lowest scale, and Latin 
people, such as the Spaniards, somewhere between the two extremes. At various 
times during 1895–98 the Cuban insurgents were disparaged on the basis that the 
majority of fighters were Afro-Cubans and mulattos.24
US intervention: humanitarian or not?
One can discern two main versions of the 1898 Spanish–US war, the ‘splendid little 
war’ as labelled by John Hay, Secretary of State in the McKinley and Roosevelt ad-
ministrations. The version which can accommodate the humanitarian dimension 
is that the initial overriding goal was humanitarian: colonization and imperialism 
were unintended and came about by chance;25 they were a ‘great aberration’, 
as famously put by Samuel Flagg Bemis (the father of American diplomatic 
history);26 it was a case of ‘empire by default’.27 
According to the other version, the switch was hardly accidental. As George 
Herring has put it, ‘[i]t was less a case of the United States coming upon greatness 
almost inadvertently than of it pursuing its destiny deliberately and purpose-
fully’.28 The uprising in Cuba and the slipping away of the Spanish overseas empire 
in the two great oceans provided the US with an unprecedented opportunity. 
From such a perspective there are no accidents in history; ‘great nations’ seek 
opportunities to symbolize their great power status and deliberately propagate 
greatness.29 
As regards the first version, the head of the administration from 1897 onwards, 
President William McKinley, was by all accounts against resorting to war and 
innocent of expansionist intentions until mid-1898. When he finally decided that 
war was on, he did so reluctantly, and humanitarian reasons loomed large in his 
thinking and were no sham.30
Secondly, big business was against intervention until the eve of the war. This 
has been ‘conclusively demonstrated’31 by historian Julius Pratt (in the 1930s), 
who refers to the attitude of chief industrialists and bankers and the articles in 
leading financial journals, such as Journal of Commerce, American Banker and the 
Wall Street Journal, and, to an almost equal extent, business linked with Cuba 
(mainly sugar interests).32 The upper crust of the business community initially 
stood firmly against intervention, men such Andrew Carnegie, John Pierpont 
Morgan, John Rockefeller, Alfred du Pont and Grenville Dodge.33 Business 
people were so opposed that they were pilloried by the public and in the ‘yellow 
press’ (sensational ill-researched journalism) as ‘soulless’, ‘the syndicated Judas 
Iscariot of Humanity’ and the like.34 The switch to interventionism on the part 
of big business took place a few weeks prior to the war, and was based initially 
on humanitarian grounds and patriotism and not on business opportunities and 
prospective gains.35
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Thirdly, there was genuine sympathy for the Cuban plight among the public 
and on Capitol Hill, which called for US intervention on humanitarian grounds 
that would bring about Cuban independence.36 Even sceptics of US intentions 
acknowledge that there is ‘no reason to doubt the authenticity of popular 
perceptions’.37 
There is also the related question of the yellow press, mainly William Randolph 
Hearst’s New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World, and its role 
in bringing about war, with its often exaggerated and sensationalized presenta-
tions of Cuban suffering.38 Recent scholarship has convincingly contested this 
view and even without the yellow press, the public would have learned about the 
abhorrent conditions in Cuba from more reliable sources.39 
But other factors seem to point to another direction, making humanitarian 
reasons appear skin deep.
First was the maturing of an older approach, held by Secretaries of State Sewell 
in the late 1860s and Blaine in the early 1880s: ‘national extension and aggrandize-
ment’, ‘the large policy’. In the last decade of the nineteenth century several 
influential people, who could sway foreign policy were associated with the large 
policy.40 A central figure was Captain Alfred Mahan, President of the Naval War 
College (one of the founding fathers of the new field of geopolitics, together with 
the British geographer Halford Mackinder and the German geographer Friedrich 
Ratzel), who advocated naval strength, along the British model, as the road to 
great power status for the country. Mahan was close to two avowed expansionist 
Republican politicians, Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt (then Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy). Others who shared these views were the influential Republican 
senators William Frye, Cushman Davis, Joseph Foraker, the Democratic senators 
John Tyler Morgan, Whitelaw Reid (former ambassador to Paris, long-serving 
editor of the New York Tribune and Republican vice presidential nominee in 1892) 
and John Hay (ambassador to London and Secretary of State immediately after 
the war). However, when it came to Cuba, most expansionists called for interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds and not for annexation.41 
A rehashed ‘Manifest Destiny’ (the concept coined by John O’Sullivan in 
1839) also entered the scene, a ‘New Manifest Destiny’, now infused with racism 
and crude social Darwinism, based on the notion of ‘survival of the fittest’.42 
Two widely read authors, the historian John Fiske (who reiterated the Manifest 
Destiny theme and popularized the views of Darwin and Spencer on evolution) 
and the clergyman and Social Gospel leader Josiah Strong, presented the ‘Anglo-
Saxons’ as the most gifted ‘race’, destined to civilize and lead the world in the 
name of progress. Such views were endorsed by the leading political scientist 
of the day, Professor John Burgess, of Columbia University, who called on the 
Teutonic races (Anglo-Saxons and Germans) to expand and civilize the world 
(ironically, however, Fiske, Strong as well as Burgess were against military inter-
vention in Cuba43).44
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Research has also shown that, for the ‘jingoes’, expanding and acquiring 
colonies was a reaffirmation of their manhood that had suffered a shock from 
the 1893 economic crisis that devastated the US.45 In the gendered imagery of 
the 1890s, Cuba was presented as a feminized victim, as a voluptuous damsel in 
distress calling to be rescued by the manly Yankee, or an unruly female child in 
need of a firm father.46
Secondly, when Commodore George Dewey vanquished the Spanish fleet in 
Manila Bay (1 May 1898), business journals switched their position, pointing to 
the advantages of an independent Cuba. They toyed with colonies, an isthmian 
canal and US presence in the Pacific, the very ideas previously derided. The ‘fabled 
China market’ in particular loomed large, though some authors have disputed 
this.47 The ‘glut thesis’ prevailed, namely that a surplus of goods was piling up 
in the US, which needed an outlet in Latin America and Asia. For the American 
Banker the opportunity to expand in the Pacific was ‘a coincidence which has 
a providential air’.48 With the turn of events, expansion and the search for new 
markets were presented as a necessity and doing otherwise a folly.49
Thirdly is what occurred in the wake of the US victory: (1) acquisition of 
Puerto Rico and distant Guam, (2) annexation of Hawaii, (3) holding on to Cuba 
and (4) acquir ing the faraway Philippines. 
The economic dimension is worth returning to, together with the role of 
President McKinley. The economic aspect, which had dominated scholarly 
literature in the 1920s, was discarded by Pratt’s intervention in the 1930s. But 
in the 1960s and 1970s it resurfaced, with the works of new left historians, such 
as W. A. Williams, Philip Foner and Walter LaFeber.50 The thrust of LaFeber’s 
subtle version is not that Pratt was mistaken regarding the period up to March 
1898, but that, in view of the sudden conversion to imperialism, which ‘grabbed 
greatness with both hands’, the aberration thesis is unconvincing as an explana-
tory paradigm.51 
The role of McKinley is intertwined with the economic dimension, given 
the President’s partnership with leading business people. Until the 1950s the 
pre domin ant scholarly view was that the President was well meaning but weak, 
buckling to public opinion, Congress and the expansionists; to remember 
Roosevelt’s phrase, McKinley had a backbone like a chocolate éclair. This 
assessment is evident in the works of Bemis and Pratt in the 1930s, Ernest May 
in the 1950s and Gerald Linderman in the 1970s. However, in recent decades 
the image of McKinley has been redeemed, with the twenty-fifth US President 
emerging as a ‘master of men’, able to orchestrate foreign policy, as argued by 
H. Wayne Morgan, Lewis Gould, Richard Hamilton, John Offner as well as 
LaFeber. In this sense McKinley was perhaps the first modern US President.52 
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Main events 
1895–96
Martí and Gómez sought US recognition and aid but not military intervention, 
for fear of domination. As Martí mused, ‘To change masters is not to be free’.53 The 
inspiring Martí died in an ambush (19 May 1895) and Cuba declared itself inde-
pendent (15 July), with Salvador Betancourt as President. The Cuban movement 
in the US, known as the Cuban Junta, was headed by Tomás Estrada Palma (a 
general in the Ten Years’ War in Cuba and associate of Martí), who believed 
that a special relationship with the ‘colossus’ was inevitable and to the benefit 
of the Cuban people.54 The Junta vigorously lobbied the State Department and 
Congress, organized demonstrations, raised funds and sent arms to Cuba via 
filibustering operations and fed the press with information, mostly exaggerated, 
of Spanish brutalities. In Cuba the overall strategy of Gómez was ‘abominable 
devastation’ aimed at rendering Cuba ‘an economic desert’, making the cost of 
Spain’s retention of the island unbearable.55 
Cánovas’s reaction was to send General Campos. But the veteran soldier was 
reluctant to use extreme measures to stem the uprising and was replaced by 
General Valeriano Weyler. The energetic and ruthless Weyler (previously governor 
of the Philippines) as governor of Cuba initiated a brutal policy of ‘reconcentra-
tion’, namely building trenches 100 yards wide, equipped with barbed wire and 
blockhouses, to separate the governmental region from that of the rebels, burning 
villages and crops, killing all the cattle and herding the inhabitants (mostly 
peasants) into various fortified areas and towns. The result was horrendous: more 
than 200,000 died from malnutrition and disease.56 
All this was widely reported, not least by the yellow press in the US and in 
cartoons which presented the Spaniards as barbarians.57 Weyler came to be known 
as ‘Butcher Weyler’, for having ‘turned the island into a prison’, a ‘wasteland of 
human misery’.58 Weyler’s strategy met with some initial success by slowing the 
insurgent advance and by killing the legendary Maceo on 7 December 1896 (he was 
replaced by García as second in command). Thus 1896, which had started with the 
prospect of victory for the Cubans, had ended with demoralization and victory as 
distant as ever. But the Spanish forces for their part were hardly closer to victory.59
The Democratic President, Grover Cleveland, feared the creation of a ‘Negro 
republic’ like Haiti and thus adopted a policy of strict neutrality. Secretary of State 
Richard Olney offered US mediation to Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the Spanish 
Minister in Washington, stressing that the sole aim of the US administration 
was the pacification of the island and that it was opposed to independence, for 
the Cubans were not fit to govern themselves. Cánovas did not accept mediation 
and his Foreign Minister, the Duke of Tetuan, called for the support of the great 
powers in Madrid’s dispute with Washington.60 
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In April 1896 a joint resolution of the two Houses deplored the situation 
in Cuba and called for belligerent status for the Cubans, which the President 
ignored.61 The new US consul-general in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, painted a dismal 
picture of the situation in Cuba and deadlock, and recommended US intervention 
or the purchase of the island.62
Cleveland, in his farewell address to the nation (7 December 1896), lamented 
the ‘spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the most 
fertile and charming on the globe’, and warned that ‘the United States is not a 
nation to which peace is a necessity’.63 The outgoing President in the night before 
the inauguration of McKinley told him that he was afraid that he had left him with 
a war, to which the latter answered graciously that he hoped that he could do as 
well as he had done to avoid it.64
From 1897 until the eve of the war
The new President upon taking office seemed determined to avoid going to war. 
As he put it to the respected independent politician Carl Schurz, a few weeks after 
his inauguration, ‘there will be no jingo nonsense under my Administration’.65 
McKinley wanted to first establish the facts in Cuba before charting his 
Administration’s position. He thus sent a trusted political friend, William 
Calhoun, to Cuba to assess the situation. Calhoun, upon returning, painted a 
bleak picture of Cuba as a result of reconcentration (‘children with swollen limbs 
and extended abdomens’), and claimed that if Spain continued in its policy of 
seeking a military solution, the total destruction of the island and the almost total 
extermination of its population could not be avoided.66 
The President sent Stewart Woodford as the US Minister to Madrid to try 
to iron out differences with Spain,67 but sent a stern message to the Spanish 
government, stating that ‘the rights of humanity exceeded the rights of states’ and 
demanded the revocation of reconcentration ‘in the name of common humanity’.68 
Cánovas was assassinated on 8 August 1897 and the new Spanish Premier, 
Sagasta, promised a humane policy in Cuba. Woodford advised Cuban autonomy 
and was able to develop a relationship of trust with the main moderate, Professor 
Segismundo Moret, a distinguished politician, then Minister of Overseas 
Colonies. On 25 November Madrid adopted a policy of autonomy for Cuba in 
principle and Weyler was replaced by General Rámon Blanco, with instructions to 
end reconcentration.69 McKinley in his annual message to Congress (6 December 
1897) called reconcentration ‘not civilized warfare’ but ‘extermination’,70 but 
referred to the autonomy scheme in favourable terms and noted that Spain ‘should 
be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted 
efficacy of the new order of things’.71 
The autonomy offered by Spain to the Cubans was ‘too little, too late, too 
slowly’.72 It was unacceptable to Gómez and Estrada Palma. It was also rejected by 
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the peninsulares, who embarked on anti-autonomy riots in Havana (January 1989), 
shouting ‘death to Blanco’ and blaming the US for Spain’s offer of autonomy.73 
Many peninsulares prayed for the annexation of Cuba by the US to save them from 
the insurgents.74 
At this juncture McKinley tried to purchase the island from Spain. In January 
Reid was charged to undertake private negotiations with Madrid to purchase Cuba 
but the mission failed. In March Woodford tried to convince Moret that selling the 
island to the US was the best way to ‘part with Cuba without loss of self-respect’.75
A series of unfortunate events were to bring matters to a head. One concerned 
a personal letter by Lôme that was published by the New York Journal (the letter 
had been passed on by the Junta) on 9 February 1898 under the title ‘Worst Insult 
to the United States in History’. The letter portrayed the President as ‘weak’, ‘on 
good terms with the jingoes’ and a ‘wound-be politician’, and implied that talks 
with the US and autonomy were a ruse to gain time.76 
Six days later a prized US battleship, the USS Maine, at anchor in Havana, was 
destroyed by an explosion, killing 266 officers and men out of 354. Spain expressed 
its deep sorrow but, predictably, the two states’ respective investigations reached 
different conclusions: the US report found that an external explosion, a mine 
or torpedo, had caused it, while the Spanish report concluded that internal 
combustion (an explosion within the ship) had caused it (the Spanish version is 
more likely).77 But the public, even before the publication of the US report, was 
convinced that Spain was guilty of ‘foul play’.78 ‘Remember the Maine, to hell with 
Spain’ became an everyday catchphrase in ‘a hysterical demand for immediate 
intervention’.79 Most students of 1898 regard this episode as the single event that 
made war impossible to avoid.80 McKinley, for his part, had no intention of being 
‘swept off his feet’, as he put it, as a result of the Maine episode.81
Specialists of ‘1898’ attach great importance to a speech made a month later 
by the respected Senator Redfield Proctor (a former Secretary of War), in the 
Senate on 17 March, following a visit to Cuba (the Republican senator was a 
close friend of McKinley and had seen him shortly before the speech, so it can 
be deduced that he had cleared it with him).82 Proctor, speaking dispassionately 
presented a situation of ‘desolation and distress, misery and starvation’, children 
with ‘abdomen bloated to three times the natural size’.83 He estimated that of the 
400,000 reconsentrandos, half had died and one-quarter could not be saved. He 
pointed out that the autonomy scheme had failed. Proctor’s intervention had the 
effect of swinging towards war those in big business (Proctor was a self-made 
millionaire), Congress and the general public, including Protestant and Catholic 
organizations which until then, though sympathetic to the Cuban cause, were 
against armed intervention. Now the conservative press called for intervention as 
a duty to humanity.84
Proctor’s speech was followed in the next days by several emotional speeches in 
both Houses, by others who had visited Cuba, who confirmed Proctor’s findings.85 
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There were also many petitions and letters to Congress and the President, calling 
for Cuban independence and war with Spain.86 In several petitions the colourful 
phrase ‘carnival of blood’ appeared, fuelled by the Junta, a phrase that had been 
used by Las Casas to describe the cruelties of the conquistadores.87 McKinley’s 
name was hissed in public and his effigy burned, but he hoped to avert a showdown, 
believing that Spain would give up Cuba to avoid a disastrous war. Apparently, 
several factors made McKinley switch. Firstly, the view prevailed that the war 
was at a stalemate and would continue with catastrophic consequences if no 
intervention took place. Secondly, autonomy, even if genuine, was unacceptable 
to the Cubans and peninsulares alike, and thus impossible to implement. A third 
factor was the switch of the business community and the nationwide support for 
intervention. Congress was on a war footing, Lodge, Root, Garret Hobart (the 
Vice President) and some fifty members of the Republican House caucus told the 
President that if no intervention took place the party would face the worst defeat 
ever in the upcoming November elections, and the formidable Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Thomas Reed, told McKinley that he could not hold 
the House anymore – it would declare war together with the Senate.88 
The final proposal to Spain, on 27 March 1898, was for a peaceful settlement, 
the end of reconcentration, an armistice, talks with the insurgents, and ‘full self-
government, with reasonable indemnity’, which the next day was changed to 
‘Cuban independence’. With this final touch, it was obvious that the die was cast.89
Spain was in dire straits. The unintended clash with the US had raised national-
ist fervour in Spain, with demonstrations rocking major cities, and crowds 
shouting muerte a los Yanques. As was the case in the US, newspapers had their 
share in rousing the masses (they referred to US horrors towards the Indians 
now cramped in reservations).90 Madrid believed that conceding to Washington 
would lead to the government’s fall and the overthrow of the monarchy (the 
bastion of stability),91 so it tried to wriggle itself out of the situation by providing 
some last-minute concessions short of independence and gaining the support of 
the European great powers. 
The Spanish government retorted that reconcentration had ceased, armistice 
would be implemented, provided the insurgents did the same, and autonomy was 
on course. The Spanish diplomatic initiative bore little fruit. Vienna, Berlin and 
Paris were sympathetic to the Spanish call but did not want to alienate Washington 
and bring about an Anglo-Saxon alliance. The British Prime Minister, Salisbury, 
regarded the matter a US question and supported McKinley.92 
Mediation was offered by Pope Leo XIII, which was declined by McKinley, 
and a visit by the ambassadors of the six European powers to McKinley took 
place (6 April), in which a text was read out calling for restraint in the name of 
peace. The New York World aptly parodied the meeting as follows: ‘we hope for 
humanity’s sake you will not go to war’, to which the President answered ‘We 
hope if we go to war you will understand that it is for humanity’s sake’.93
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Apparently, Spain preferred war to the ignominy of giving in: defeat to the US 
with honour was better than surrender.94 Under the circumstances, McKinley 
felt he had little choice but to ask Congress for the authority to wage war (11 
April 1898). In his message to Congress the President pointed out that ‘[t]he 
forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according 
to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where 
neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by inter-
necine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds’.95 He 
summarized the grounds for intervention as follows: (1) ‘In the cause of humanity 
and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries 
now existing there’; (2) to protect US citizens in Cuba; (3) to end ‘the very serious 
injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people’; and (4) ‘[t]he present 
condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon 
this Government an enormous expense’.96 Before concluding, he declared: ‘In 
the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in [sic] behalf of endangered 
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the 
war in Cuba must stop’.97 But McKinley ‘did not exclude a peaceful settlement’,98 
referring to the Spanish suspension of hostilities and calling Congress to address 
this aspect as well.99 
The lack of recognition of Cuban independence in McKinley’s speech aroused 
Cuban indignation and was denounced.100 It also disappointed most of the 
senators and congressmen when the message was read out, but they all listened 
in profound silence, broken only once by a wave of applause for the phrase ‘in 
the name of humanity’.101 The debate in the Senate and Congress, however, 
largely on the question of independence, lasted a whole week. The stalemate was 
broken by Senator Henry Teller, who proposed a self-denying ordinance: the US 
would disclaim any ‘intention to exercise sovereignty’ over the island (the Teller 
Amendment). Congress empowered the President (20 April 1898), with 42 to 35 
votes in the Senate and 310 to 6 in the House, to make the people of Cuba ‘free and 
independent’ and to utilize the armed forces in order to do so. Spain, upon hearing 
of the resolution, declared war (24 April 1898); Congress followed the next day 
with its own a declaration of war, which was made retroactive to 21 April.102 
The consequences of intervention: the Philippines and Cuba’s predicament
The Spanish–American War (24 April–12 August 1898), as it came to be known in 
the US, a designation that ignores the Cubans and their role in the US victory,103 
was waged by sea and land, the decisive event being the naval Battle of Santiago 
de Cuba of 3 July. Puerto Rico was also occupied. Beforehand, Commodore 
Dewey was instructed to begin ‘offensive operations’ against the Spanish in the 
Philippines and the US Asiatic squadron entered Manila Bay and sank the Spanish 
Pacific squadron at anchor (1 May). This battle was the first major engagement of 
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the war and opened the prospect of the US acquiring the Philippines, though 
this had not been the original goal. The Philippine theatre had been sought for 
military strategic reasons, to put the squeeze on Spain at little cost to the US and 
to shorten the war (in the Atlantic there was another contingency, but one that 
was not realized, in the form of the US occupying the Canary Islands).104 
The expansionists were on the alert not to miss the opportunity of acquiring 
the Philippines.105 But the anti-expansionists also came to the fore, seeking to 
prevent that from happening (see below).106 McKinley remained undecided and 
the cabinet was split over the issue. Following French mediation, peace talks were 
to start in Paris, with Spain reluctantly accepting the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and Guam, with the fate of the Philippines open to negotiation.107
The President selected five commissioners for the peace talks: three expansion-
ists, Davis, Frye and Reid, anti-expansionist Democrat Senator George Gray and 
Day (who resigned as Secretary of State to act as chairman of the commission and 
was succeeded by Hay), who was wary of acquiring the Philippines.108 McKinley 
told the commission (16 September) that ‘we took up arms only in obedience to the 
dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligation’,109 
and to end Spanish colonialism in the Western hemisphere.110 But the US approach 
to the Philippines was on a different basis. As he pointed out to the commission 
in his instructions: ‘we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design 
on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we 
must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career 
from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command 
and pledge of civilization’.111 He instructed the commission to secure control of 
Manila and extend US jurisdiction to the whole of the island of Luzon.112 
When the Paris peace conference was in session, McKinley made a tour of the 
US, delivering speeches. He stressed that they had entered the war for humani-
tarian reasons and to help the Cubans liberate themselves and he got the clear 
impression that the public was elated and not averse to expansion. Thus Hay 
telegraphed the commissioners that the rest of the islands should not be left to 
Spain.113
The end result was that Spain ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines 
(the latter with payment of $20 million to soften the blow), and relinquished 
sovereignty over Cuba. The war with Spain provided the momentum to resolve 
the pending question of Hawaii, which was annexed.114 
As Foster Rhea Dulles has put it, many Americans ‘dazzled by the vision 
of empire but reluctant to confess to economic or prestige motives … found 
their justification for expansionist policy in the obligation of the United States 
to assume its share of the civilizing mission of the Anglo-Saxon race’.115 In 
February 1899, Rudyard Kipling came out with his famous imperialist poem 
‘The White Man’s Burden’, which makes explicit reference to the US and the 
Philippines (indeed, it was first published with the subtitle ‘The United States and 
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the Philippine Islands’), much to the delight of Lodge and Roosevelt. The ‘white 
man’s burden’ dovetailed with ‘new manifest destiny’, legitimizing US imperial-
ism, presenting it as the ‘imperialism of righteousness’.116 Protestant clergymen 
went further, viewing US expansion as ‘divinely inspired’, as God having handed 
the Philippines to the ‘American Christians’ (forgetting that the majority of 
Filipinos were Christians).117
Regarding divine inspiration and the white man’s burden, a revealing vignette 
is worth mentioning. A year after the crucial decision, McKinley told a Methodist 
delegation (the President was a Methodist) that when faced with what to do with 
the Philippines he asked for guidance with prayers to ‘Almighty God’. ‘And one 
night it came to me this way …: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain – 
that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over 
to France or Germany … that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that 
we could not leave them to themselves – they were unfit for self-government …; 
and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate 
the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace 
do the best’.118
One need not regard the religious touch as mere window-dressing or the 
epitome of hypocrisy. Apart from McKinley’s genuine religious feelings,119 
bringing together the sacred with the secular, however absurd it may appear to 
us today, is a proclivity in US foreign policy with a long tradition.120 In any event, 
similar pronouncements, though more down to earth, were made by McKinley 
on a number of occasions privately as well as in his public speeches in late 1898 
and early 1899. It seems that he initially deemed the ‘wisest course’ taking a 
coaling station for vessels in the Philippines (early May 1898),121 then a port in 
the Philippines and a coaling station in the Marianas (3 June),122 then Manila Bay 
(30 June),123 then Luzon (September) and finally all the islands. What probably 
did the trick, apart from feedback from the public, were the tidings of General 
Greene, who, after having toured the Philippines, told the President that handing 
the island to the insurgents would bring anarchy; Germany and Japan would grab 
them; and that due to the peculiar geography of the islands Luzon on its own 
could not be kept (the some 400 islands were so close to each other that a cannon 
shot from one could reach another). There were also reports that the Filipino 
Hispanicized elite were favourable to annexation and that Emilio Aguinaldo’s 
self-proclaimed Republic of the Philippines was unpopular, and that his fighters 
had committed atrocities against Spanish captives and priests.124
All the statements of the President give credence to the view that it was an 
unintentional expansion and not calculated;125 that the US had ‘greatness thrust 
upon it’, as it were.126 But by the same token, the fact that McKinley had taken, 
however reluctantly, this major decision after considerable deliberation with US 
interests in mind,127 ushering the country into a new age, undermines the ‘fit of 
absentmindedness’ thesis.128
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The Paris Treaty (10 December 1898) had ‘to run the gauntlet of the Senate’129 
for ratification, where a heated two-month debate took place, focusing mainly on 
the acquisition of the Philippines. 
The anti-imperialists organized themselves in the Anti-Imperialist League and 
fought expansionism ‘tooth and nail’130 from 1898 until 1900. Their campaign 
included major figures, such as ex-President Cleveland and eight of his cabinet 
members (including Olney), ex-President Harrison and an older generation of 
Re pub licans such as Senator George Frisbie Hoar, John Sherman (McKinley’s 
first Secretary of State) and Reed, William Jennings Bryan (the Democratic 
presidential nominee in 1896 and in 1900), Schurz, journalist Edwin Lawrence 
Godkin (founder of The Nation and editor-in-chief of the New York Evening 
Post), Carnegie and the major labour union leader Samuel Gompers (President 
of the American Federation of Labor). Included were top intellectuals, such as 
philosophers William James, John Dewey and Felix Adler, sociologist William 
Graham Sumner, medieval scholar Charles Eliot Norton, social reformer David 
Starr Jordan and the foremost writers of the day, including Mark Twain (see his 
essay ‘To the Person Sitting in Darkness’), Finlay Peter Dunne, Henry Fuller and 
William Vaughn Moody (see his poem ‘An Ode in Time of Hesitation’).131 
The anti-imperialist argument centred on political principles, above all that 
acquiring the Philippines was a clear break with time-honoured American 
republican values, as enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, Washington’s 
farewell address and Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, on which the US was created 
and lived by: that a government cannot rule people without the consent of the 
governed; and acquiring the Philippines amounted to blatant imperialism that 
would harm not only the Filipinos but also the US, which would find itself in 
league with the European colonialists and monarchies.132 
In the Senate, the anti-imperialist approach was headed by Hoar, who argued 
that the US, having delivered the Cubans from political oppression, must do 
the same with the Filipinos and that such imperialist ventures would lead to 
dangerous foreign entanglements and economic ruin for the country.133 
The expansionists, led by Lodge, argued that American rule was a blessing 
of civilization upon the unfortunate Filipinos, who were not prepared to rule 
themselves; that if the US did not step in others would do so, primarily Germany 
and Japan, both of them undemocratic; and that following the annexation of 
Hawaii, the next obvious step was the Philippines, opening the way to the China 
market.134 
Given the impressive list of anti-expansionists and their arguments, it comes 
as a surprise that they did not carry the day. According to Robert Beisner’s 
assessment, the most effective and articulate anti-imperialists were ‘Mugwumps’ 
(independent former Republicans) such as Schurz, James, Godkin and Norton 
and Republicans out of step with their party, foremost Hoar and Carnegie, with 
the other anti-imperialists ineffective. Another weakness of the anti-expansionists 
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was that they were disunited and that their lofty arguments seemed old-fashioned 
and did not inspire the wider public.135
The treaty was eventually ratified by fifty-seven in favour and twenty-seven 
against, that is, with one vote over the two-thirds majority required for ratification 
(6 February 1899), which, surprisingly, included even some anti-imperialists, such 
as Bryan. Ironically, two days before (4 February) the Filipinos under Aguinaldo 
resumed fighting to gain independence, this time against the US.136 The anti-
imperialists felt vindicated, the imperialists appalled and the debate continued, 
becoming a central theme in the 1900 presidential elections, between McKinley 
and Bryan. The Filipino insurrection was to be subdued under Roosevelt’s admin-
istration, though, interestingly the new President, for all his well known jingoism, 
was alienated from the whole affair, regarding it as ‘our heel of Achilles’.137
But let us revert to Cuba. In 1898–1902, the worst nightmares of Martí and 
Gómez had come to life. As a sign of things to come, when Spain surrendered, 
the US general in Cuba refused to allow the Cubans under García to participate 
in the surrender ceremony or enter Havana. García protested in writing in a 
dignified manner but to no avail.138 The US forces did not leave the island, but 
stayed on until 1902. When the Roosevelt administration allowed the adoption 
of an independence Constitution and Estrada Palma was elected President, 
Roosevelt withdrew US forces but secured Guantanamo Bay as a base with a lease 
in perpetuity. The Platt Amendment (drafted by Root, the Secretary of War, and 
introduced by Senator Thomas Platt)139 was thrust upon the Cubans as a parting 
gift. It stated that ‘the government of Cuba consents that the United States may 
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the 
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and 
individual liberty’.140 Washington did not fail to use the Amendment on several 
occasions until its abrogation in 1934, by sending troops to prop up friendly 
governments in power or to protect US investments.141
Unfettered Cuban independence was to arrive more than half a century later, 
in 1959, with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro. Upon 
taking power, Castro and other Cuban figures alluded to the 1895–98 experience, 
pointing out that the goals of the liberators had been dashed in 1898, with the US 
intervention and the hegemony that followed it, pointing out that it was more 
than a century later, in 1959, that the dreams of those heroic fighters had finally 
become a reality.142
Assessment
Cuba, the US, Spain
Most US and Spanish historians have claimed that the Cubans would not have 
been able to overwhelm the Spaniards and gain independence without US 
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intervention. By contrast, most major Cuban historians (well before the arrival 
of Castro), including Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, Herminio Portell Vilá and 
Fernando Ortiz, dispute this hegemonic US paradigm.143 They argue that the 
Cuban forces were on the verge of winning, and that the intervention of the US 
was unnecessary and ‘robbed them of their fruits of victory’.144 But a minority 
of equally reputable Cuban historians, including Cosme de la Torriente, the 
father of Cuban diplomatic history, who also happened to be García’s chief of 
staff, doubts their ability to vanquish the Spanish army without the interven-
tion.145 More recently, Pérez has produced evidence that Gómez was convinced 
that Cuban victory over the Spaniards was imminent and that this was also the 
assessment of US officials, including Sherman, Day, Lodge and consul general 
Lee from Havana.146 
As regards the US, contemporary commentators stressed three themes: 
(1) the war re-united ‘the nation’, healing the wounds of the American Civil War; 
(2) crushing Spain marked the historical moment when the US emerged as a great 
power; and (3) the victory confirmed that the US was ‘the nation of progressive 
civilization’.147
As Josiah Strong had put it: ‘This race has been honored not for its own sake, 
but for the sake of the world. It has been made powerful, and rich, and free, 
and exalted-powerful’.148 A central theme was the ‘mission’ to instil freedom 
and democracy across the world.149 How this tallies with Washington’s ugly war 
against Filipino independence and on the prevention of Cuban independence is 
another matter. 
For Spain, the events in Cuba and the Philippines became known as ‘the 
Disaster’, and prompted nationwide protests and agonizing soul-searching. The 
proud Spaniards felt humiliated at having been defeated by the North Americans, 
whom they held in low esteem (as ‘sausage-makers’). The Spaniards, in a state of 
shock, pondered why it was the case that when other states were still building 
empires, Spain had lost its own, which was much older. Were they, after all, a 
decadent nation? Whatever might be the shortcomings of fin de siècle Spain, was 
true ‘regeneration’ of the once great Spain possible?150
US motives revisited: in search of a thread
A way out as to the motives of US intervention is ‘to disentangle the imperialist 
outcome of the war from the conflict itself ’,151 or, put differently, the events from 
1895 through to the consequences of the Battle of Manila. 
In its bare essentials, the search for Washington’s stance boils down to seven 
dichotomous questions: (1) humanitarian concern or quest for world power, 
(2) aberration or culmination, (3) action taken in response to public outrage or as 
part of a well-thought-out strategy, put differently, emotion or design; (4) public 
opinion (with or without the yellow press) or drive for markets (glut thesis), 
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(5) genuine support for Cuba libre or control of the island, (6) chocolate éclair or 
resolute President and (7) stalemate or imminent victory for the Cuban fighters?152 
One can make a reasonable case by selecting evidence to support any of the 
above fourteen polar opposites, for there is much in abundance for all to be 
content.153 Some polar opposites seem equally valid, or ‘reality’ lies somewhere 
in between. For instance, as regards humanitarian concern or quest for world 
power, the public and several politicians, including McKinley, were motivated 
by humanitarian concern, to alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people.154 Many 
supporters of intervention for humanitarian reasons and in order to liberate 
Cuba, such as Hoar, Carnegie and Twain, were anti-expansionist and against 
the annexation of the Philippines.155 But the President had tangible interests in 
mind as well, which he hardly concealed, and the expansionists had their own 
agenda. Regarding aberration or culmination, Washington may have unexpect-
edly found the Philippines on its lap, but it then pursued its destiny ‘deliberately 
and purposefully’.156 As for chocolate éclair or resolute leader, McKinley may have 
been more flexible, less forceful and more attuned to the voice of the people than 
his predecessor, Cleveland, or his successor, Roosevelt, but this hardly makes him 
‘a well intentioned bungler’ as portrayed by Bemis and others. He was in control 
of the situation most of the time and when intervention seemed inevitable he went 
along on his own terms.157 
Reverting to the aberration or culmination dilemma, cognitive psychology 
can provide a clue. Before a crucial decision is taken there is great uncertainty and 
angst, but when a decision is finally taken the decision-makers are unwavering, 
as if the decision was in the making for years. This is done in order to discard the 
previous agonizing dilemma and uncertainty reigning prior to the decision.
The publicists’ verdict
Overall, international lawyers have failed to agree on the character of the US 
action in 1898.158 Contemporary jurists such as Theodore S. Woolsey claimed 
that it was an ‘intervention on the grounds of humanity’ and the motives pure, 
even though they were not the only motives; the US was so deeply involved in 
Cuba that one can also speak in terms of self-defence.159 Amos Hershey referred 
to the humanitarian plight but also to the cost of the war to US interests and 
the hardships of its citizens in Cuba.160 George Grafton Wilson, an opponent of 
humanitarian intervention, opined that ‘the United States interfered in the affairs 
of Cuba on the ground of humanity’.161 Elbert Benton, on the contrary, was of the 
view that the civil war in Cuba ‘did not present clearly and unmistakably such 
tyranny or cruelty as writers on international law seem to regard as justifying 
intervention’.162
Moore referred to ‘the ruin of the island’, to ‘abhorrent conditions’ and to the 
Maine episode,163 concluding that US ‘intervention rested upon the ground that 
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there existed in Cuba conditions so injurious to the United States … that they 
could no longer be endured. Its action was analogous to what is known in private 
law as the abatement of a nuisance’.164 Ellery Stowell criticized the nuisance idea, 
maintaining that the US intervention in Cuba was ‘[o]ne of the most important 
instances of humanitarian intervention’.165 Charles Fenwick concurred with the 
nuisance thesis but regarded the ‘cause of humanity’ as first in the list as the 
grounds for intervention, followed by the rest.166
Some contemporary European publicists rejected a US right to intervene in 
Cuba for it was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the pledge not to intervene 
in the existing colonies of the European states in the Americas.167 Others, such as 
Le Fur,168 Lapradelle,169 Rougier170 and Westlake171 claimed that it was basically 
humanitarian. And there was also the nuisance approach, first introduced by 
Rivier.172 
From the 1950s onwards, various international lawyers who supported the 
concept of humanitarian intervention regarded the US intervention as humani-
tarian, as in the case of Lillich,173 McDougal and Reisman,174 and others.175 
Brownlie regards it as an ‘intervention in terms of American interests’.176 Franck 
and Rodley dismiss it with the following comment: ‘if the suppression of “bar-
barities, bloodshed, and misery” were the sole yardstick for U.S. intervention 
in the Latin America of that period, Washington would have been extremely 
busy ousting regimes, some of which it was rather active in establishing and 
upholding’.177 Fonteyne, who refers approvingly to a number of humanitarian 
interventions in the nineteenth century, does not regard it as humanitarian.178
We will conclude with the views of three present scholars engaged with the 
wider question of humanitarian intervention. Michael Walzer in his classic Just 
and Unjust Wars is dismissive, characterizing it ‘as an example of benevolent 
imperialism, given the “piratical times”, but it is not an example of humanitarian 
intervention’.179 He bases his view mainly on the fact the US intervened militarily 
supposedly on behalf of the oppressed but against their ends, namely true inde-
pendence, as seen by the three years of military occupation, the Platt Amendment 
and the limited independence of Cuba for decades.180 More recently, Gary Bass 
concluded that what could have been regarded as the US’s first humanitarian 
intervention ‘was sullied by imperialism’, since it was not limited to driving Spain 
out of Cuba.181 Tonny Brems Knudsen regards it humanitarian, given the Spanish 
policies and McKinley’s justification to Congress (including his reference to 
European precedent), but also open to abuse given the instrumental motives and 
the lack of a collective framework for intervention.182 
Concluding remarks
The elements in common between the US intervention in Cuba and the previous 
cases were the humanitarian plight, the pressure by the press and public opinion 
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on humanitarian grounds, in this case also the pressure from Capitol Hill, the 
mixture of motives, the attempt to mediate in the conflict as well as the self-
denying ordinance (here, the Teller Amendment). There were also bilateral 
consultations with European great powers (despite the Monroe Doctrine, which 
made that unnecessary) and the green light from most of them to go ahead. The 
final military intervention was an all-out war (as with Russia in 1877–78), with 
benevolent neutrality on the part of the European great powers. The main new 
features which made humanitarian intervention appear in a negative light are 
the following: the expansionist agenda of the imperialists, the whetting of the 
appetite of Washington and above all the huge benefits brought about by the 
intervention – colonialism and overseas empire, no real independence for Cuba 
itself – which made the whole venture as humanitarian seem hollow. Put differ-
ently, it brought in the abuse factor in humanitarian plights more starkly than ever 
before, especially when a great power is the protagonist. 
Notes
 1 E. Root, ‘The Real Monroe Doctrine’, American Journal of International Law, 8:3 (1914), 
430.
 2 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), 110.
 3 J. B. Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1918), 
205.
 4 Root, Secretary of War (under McKinley) and Secretary of State (under Roosevelt) was 
the first president of the American Society of International Law. For a scholarly article 
of his which touches upon intervention, see E. Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens 
Residing Abroad’, American Journal of International Law, 4:3 (1910), 517–28.
 5 C. G. Fenwick, ‘Intervention: Individual and Collective’, American Journal of Inter­
national Law, 39:4 (1945), 651.
 6 Ibid., 652–6.
 7 J. Smith, The Spanish–American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895–1902 
(London: Longman, 1994), 2–3.
 8 A. Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 15–89; P. T. McCartney, Power and Progress: 
American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2006), 88–9.
 9 D. F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 2–3; McCartney, 
Power and Progress, 89; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 6–8; J. L. Offner, An Unwanted 
War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895–1898 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 3–4; L. A. Pérez, Jr, The War of 1898: The United 
States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998), 7.
10 Quoted in Smith, The Spanish–American War, 6.
11 Quoted ibid., 9.
12 Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 15, 44; H. W. Morgan, America’s Road to Empire: The 
War with Spain and Overseas Expansion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 2.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   215 22/01/2015   10:53:54
216 Part II: Practice
13 Ibid., 6, 15.
14 Ibid., 6; A. Smith and E. Dávila-Cox, ‘1898 and the Making of the New Twentieth-Century 
Order’, in A. Smith and E. Dávila-Cox (eds), The Crisis of 1989: Colonial Redistribution and 
Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 8.
15 Smith and Dávila-Cox, ‘1898 and the Making of the New Twentieth-Century Order’, 10.
16 Quoted in Smith, The Spanish–American War, 28.
17 Pérez, The War of 1898, 3–7.
18 B. M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish–
American War of 1898 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), 6. 
19 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 28–9; McCartney, Power and Progress, 87–8, 92, 93–5; 
Pérez, The War of 1898, 1–7. 
20 C. Gibson (ed.), The Black Legend: Anti­Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New 
(New York: Alfred A. Knupf, 1971). 
21 R. L. Kagan, ‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of 
Spain’, American Historical Review, 101:2 (1996), 423–46. 
22 G. F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish–American War 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 122.
23 Quoted ibid., 123.
24 M. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
58–60; Linderman, The Mirror of War, 115, 120–4; McCartney, Power and Progress, 87–8; 
J. Offner, ‘United States Politics and the 1898 War Over Cuba’, in Smith and Dávila-Cox 
(eds), The Crisis of 1989, 18–21; T. G. Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: 
Interpretations of the Spanish–American–Cuban–Filipino War’, History Teacher, 29:3 
(1996), 353–4; Kagan, ‘Prescott’s Paradigm’, 425–40.
25 J. W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1965, 2nd edition) [1955], 201, 205, 212–16; J. A. Field, Jr, ‘American Imperialism: The 
Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book’, American Historical Review, 83:3 (1978), 644–68. For 
a rebuttal see W. LaFeber and R. Beisner, ‘Comments’, ibid., pp. 669–78; see also Field’s 
‘Reply’, ibid., 679–83. 
26 S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: A. Holt, 1965, 5th 
edition) [1936], 469, 475, 503; M. T. Gilderhus, ‘Founding Father: Samuel Flagg Bemis 
and the Study of U.S.–Latin American Relations’, Diplomatic History, 21:1 (1997), 1.
27 I. Musicant, Empire by Default: The Spanish–American War and the Dawn of the American 
Century (New York: Henry Holt, 1998). See also J. Dobson, Reticent Expansionism: The 
Foreign Policy of William McKinley (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1988).
28 G. C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 309.
29 Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba’, 344–5.
30 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 21, 61–2; L. L. Gould, The Spanish–American War 
and President McKinley (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 104, 117–19; Trask, 
The War with Spain in 1898, 31; J. L. Offner, ‘McKinley and the Spanish–American War’, 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34:1 (2004), 54–61; R. F. Hamilton, President McKinley, 
War and Empire (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), vol. I, 136; W. Zimmermann, 
First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: 
FSG, 2002), 386–92, 494–9; M. Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and 
Imperialism: The American War with Spain, 1898, and After’, in B. Simms and D. J. B. 
Trim (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 303, 309, 316.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   216 22/01/2015   10:53:54
The US and Cuba 217
31 As acknowledged even by Walter LaFeber, a critic of Pratt’s approach. See W. LaFeber, 
‘That “Splendid Little War” in Historical Perspective’, Texas Quarterly, 11:4 (1968), 90. 
However, other leftist revisionist historians are not convinced by Pratt’s evidence. See 
e.g. N. L. O’Connor, ‘The Spanish–American War: A Re-evaluation of Its Causes’, Science 
and Society, 22 (1958), 129–43; P. S. Foner, ‘Why the United States Went to War with Spain 
in 1898’, Science and Society, 32:1 (1968), 39–65.
32 J. W. Pratt, ‘American Business and the Spanish–American War’, Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 14:2 (1934), 163–75; Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 
120–35.
33 Ibid., 120–6; Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba’, 355.
34 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 14.
35 Pratt, ‘American Business and the Spanish–American War’, 163–201; F. R. Dulles, 
1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) [1954], 39 
n.1, 41; Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 111–13, 119–33, 135; Offner, An 
Unwanted War, 30–1; Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 
307, 310.
36 Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 207, 215; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 
13–14; Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 58; McCartney, Power and Progress, 91; Hamilton, 
President McKinley, War and Empire, 149–65.
37 As accepted even by Louis Pérez, a scathing critic of the US administration’s intentions. 
See Pérez, The War of 1898, 24. 
38 Hearst was reported to have telegraphed artist Frederic Remington, whom he had sent 
to Cuba, ‘furnish the pictures, and I’ll furnish the war’. Hearst has denied this. See W. J. 
Campbell, ‘Not Likely Sent: The Remington-Hearst “Telegrams”’, Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 77:2 (2000), 405–22.
39 Offner, An Unwanted War, 229–30.
40 J. W. Pratt, ‘The “Large Policy” in 1898’, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 19:2 (1932), 
220–2, 228–31, 239–42; Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba’, 350–1.
41 Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 114–15; Herring, From Colony to 
Superpower, 308–9; Zimmermann, First Great Triumph.
42 J. W. Pratt, ‘It Was a Courant Manifest Destiny’, in R. H. Miller (ed.), American Imperial­
ism in 1898: The Quest for National Fulfillment (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), 
24–7. 
43 See Field, ‘American Imperialism’, 647, 649–50. 
44 Pratt, ‘It Was a Courant Manifest Destiny’, 24–30; Pratt, ‘The “Large Policy” in 1898’, 
219–42; Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 202–6; Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s 
Rise to World Power, 30–6, 39; R. Hofstadfer, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 
1860–1915 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1944); Morgan, America’s Road 
to Empire, 15; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 299–300, 302–5; Hamilton, President 
McKinley, War and Empire, 113–15; Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba’, 350–2. 
Contra as regards social Darwinism in the US, see R. C. Bannister, ‘“The Survival of 
the Fittest in Our Doctrine”: History or Histrionics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 31:3 
(1970), 377–98.
45 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 300, 302.
46 Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in Cuba’, 352–3; K. L. Hoganson, Fighting for 
American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish–American and Philippine–
American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 43–5, 67–73, 85; Miller, From 
Liberation to Conquest, 25–32.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   217 22/01/2015   10:53:54
218 Part II: Practice
47 On the controversy see the Varg–McCormick debate: P. A. Varg, ‘The Myth of the China 
Market, 1890–1914’, American Historical Review, 73:3 (1968), 742–58; T. J. McCormick, 
‘American Expansion in China’, American Historical Review, 75:5 (1970), 1393–6.
48 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 47.
49 D. M. Pletcher, ‘Rhetoric and Results: A Pragmatic View of American Economic 
Expansion, 1865–98’, Diplomatic History, 5:2 (1981), 95–6; LaFeber, ‘That “Splendid Little 
War”’, 90–8; Pratt, ‘American Business and the Spanish–American War’, 190–201.
50 See J. A. Fry, ‘William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish–American War: A 
Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image’, Diplomatic History, 
3:1 (1979), 93–5.
51 LaFeber, ‘That “Splendid Little War”’, 90, 92, 95–8.
52 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, xi; Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 
135–6; Gould, The Spanish–American War and President McKinley; Offner, An Unwanted 
War, 38–9; LaFeber, ‘That “Splendid Little War”’, 96, 98; Fry, ‘William McKinley and the 
Coming of the Spanish–American War’, 77–97; Paterson, ‘United States Intervention in 
Cuba’, 341–61.
53 Quoted in Smith, The Spanish–American War, 32. For Martí’s negative assessment of 
the US, see L. A. Pérez, Jr, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2003), 77–81. 
54 Offner, An Unwanted War, 3–4.
55 Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 1–6; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 9, 15, 32–3; 
Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 105, 112, 115; Offner, An Unwanted War, 
3–7; Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 82–3.
56 H. E. Flack, Spanish–American Diplomatic Relations Preceding the War of 1898 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1906), 60; E. J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy 
of the Spanish–American War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908), 27–8; 
Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 206–7; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 
7–8; Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 8–9; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 18–23.
57 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 13–14; Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 
105; Miller, From Liberation to Conquest, 33–6.
58 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 6–8, 13; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 33–4; 
Miller, From Liberation to Conquest, 33–4.
59 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 170.
60 Offner, An Unwanted War, 25–30; Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 84–6; Smith, The 
Spanish–American War, 31, 34–6.
61 Smith, The Spanish–American War, 34.
62 Offner, An Unwanted War, 26–7.
63 Quoted in Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 11–12.
64 Ibid., 18.
65 Quoted in R. L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti­Imperialists, 1898–1900 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 24.
66 Offner, An Unwanted War, 46–7.
67 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish–American War, 61; Smith, The 
Spanish–American War, 38; Offner, An Unwanted War, 54–9.
68 Quoted in Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 27. 
69 Offner, An Unwanted War, 68–76.
70 W. McKinley, ‘McKinley’s View of the Cuban Crisis, 6 December 1897’, in Miller (ed.), 
American Imperialism in 1898, 61.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   218 22/01/2015   10:53:54
The US and Cuba 219
 71 Ibid., 67.
 72 Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 304.
 73 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 30–1, 40, 49; Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 19–20; 
Linderman, The Mirror of War, 25–6; Pérez, The War of 1898, 8–11.
 74 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 88–9.
 75 Ibid., 91–2.
 76 Offner, An Unwanted War, 116–22; Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the 
Spanish–American War, 74–5; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 41–2. 
 77 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 51; McCartney, Power and Progress, 105. 
 78 Offner, An Unwanted War, 123; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 53.
 79 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 41.
 80 L. A. Pérez, Jr, ‘The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography of the 
Spanish–American War’, Pacific Historical Review, 58:3 (1989), 293–322. 
 81 Flack, Spanish–American Diplomatic Relations, 41–7; Pratt, A History of United States 
Foreign Policy, 208–9; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 45–8; Trask, The War with Spain 
in 1898, xii–xiii, 28–9; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 40–1; McCartney, Power and 
Progress, 98–9; Offner, An Unwanted War, 122–5.
 82 M. B. Davis and R. W. Quimby, ‘Senator Proctor’s Cuban Speech: Speculations on a 
Cause of the Spanish–American War’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55:2 (1969), 140. 
 83 Quoted ibid., 134.
 84 Ibid., 131–41; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 50–1; McCartney, Power and Progress, 
100–2; Offner, An Unwanted War, 130–5.
 85 McCartney, Power and Progress, 103–6.
 86 Ibid., 102–6.
 87 Ibid., 91.
 88 Offner, An Unwanted War, 15–16, 150–3, 227; Linderman, The Mirror of War, 26–8, 32–4; 
Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 117–18; Musicant, Empire by Default, 
168–75.
 89 Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 39–41; Linderman, The Mirror of War, 26; Smith, The 
Spanish–American War, 43; Offner, An Unwanted War, 153–8.
 90 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish–American War, 107; Herring, 
From Colony to Superpower, 313.
 91 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 51–2; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 43–4.
 92 Flack, Spanish–American Diplomatic Relations, 89–92; Benton, International Law and 
Diplomacy of the Spanish–American War, 85–90; Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 45–52; 
Offner, An Unwanted War, 159–76. 
 93 Quoted in Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 58.
 94 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 313; Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 32, 57; 
Smith, The Spanish–American War, 43–4; Offner, An Unwanted War, 121, 155, 157.
 95 W. McKinley, ‘The President Asks for War’, in Miller (ed.), American Imperialism in 1898, 97.
 96 Ibid., 97.
 97 Ibid., 99.
 98 Offner, An Unwanted War, 181.
 99 McKinley, ‘The President Asks for War’, 100.
100 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 95.
101 McCartney, Power and Progress, 129.
102 Ibid., 141; Flack, Spanish–American Diplomatic Relations, 38–41; Trask, The War with 
Spain in 1898, 54–6.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   219 22/01/2015   10:53:55
220 Part II: Practice
103 See D. C. Corbitt, ‘Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba’s Struggle for Indepen-
dence’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 43:3 (1963), 400; Pérez, The War of 1898, 
81–107.
104 J. A. S. Grenville, ‘American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896–1898’, Journal 
of American Studies, 2:1 (1968), 33–7; E. K. Smith, ‘“A Question From Which We Could 
Not Escape”: William McKinley and the Decision to Acquire the Philippines’, Diplomatic 
History, 9:4 (1985), 363–75. 
105 Pratt, ‘The “Large Policy” in 1898’, 221–3, 241–2; Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World 
Power, 45.
106 F. H. Harrington, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898–1900’, 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 22:2 (1935), 211–19; Beisner, Twelve Against Empire.
107 J. Offner, ‘The United States and France: Ending the Spanish–American War’, Diplomatic 
History, 7:1 (1983), 12–13, 17–18.
108 Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 215–16.
109 Quoted in Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 317. 
110 Smith, The Spanish–American War, 196.
111 Quoted ibid., 196.
112 Ibid., 195.
113 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 50; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 
198–9.
114 Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 216, 218; Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise 
to World Power, 50; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 199–200.
115 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 48.
116 Ibid., 48.
117 Offner, ‘United States Politics and the 1898 War Over Cuba’, 22.
118 Quoted in Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 51. 
119 Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 316, 318. 
120 See A. Preston, ‘Bridging the Gap Between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of 
American Foreign Relations’, Diplomatic History, 30 (2006), 783–812; Sewell, ‘Humani-
tarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 316–20. 
121 Offner, ‘The United States and France’, 4. 
122 Ibid., 5.
123 Ibid., 12–13. 
124 Smith, ‘A Question from Which We Could Not Escape’, 363–75; Offner, ‘United States 
Politics and the 1898 War Over Cuba’, 37–38; Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, 
Democracy, and Imperialism’, 313–17.
125 Offner, ‘The United States and France’, 3, 13, 15–16. 
126 Gould, The Spanish–American War and President McKinley, 117–19; Smith, ‘A Question 
from Which We Could Not Escape’, 369–70. 
127 Pletcher, ‘Rhetoric and Results’, 100; Smith, ‘A Question from Which We Could Not 
Escape’, 373. 
128 Smith, ‘A Question from Which We Could Not Escape’, 374; E. P. Crapol, ‘Coming to 
Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American Foreign 
Relations’, Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 587–90.
129 Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 217.
130 Harrington, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States’, 211.
131 Ibid., 211–19; Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 52–5; Smith, The Spanish–
American War, 201–3.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   220 22/01/2015   10:53:55
The US and Cuba 221
132 Harrington, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States’, 211–13.
133 Smith, The Spanish–American War, 202.
134 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 53; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 
203.
135 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire.
136 For US outrages (the burning of villages, the order to ‘take no prisoners’, the ‘water cure’ 
torture and others) and racism during the Philippine–American War (1898–1902), see 
P. A. Kramer, ‘Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine–
American War as Race War’, Diplomatic History, 30:3 (2006), 169–210.
137 Dulles, 1898–1954, America’s Rise to World Power, 54–8; Pratt, A History of United States 
Foreign Policy, 218; Smith, The Spanish–American War, 204–5; Offner, ‘United States 
Politics and the 1898 War Over Cuba’, 36–7.
138 Linderman, The Mirror of War, 142. 
139 ‘The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment’, American Journal of International Law, 
8:3 (1914), 585–6.
140 Quoted ibid., 589.
141 Pérez, The War of 1898, 32–4.
142 Ibid., 126–30.
143 See Corbitt, ‘Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba’s Struggle for Independence’, 
395–404; Pérez, The War of 1898, 125–6.
144 Corbitt, ‘Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba’s Struggle for Independence’, 400. 
145 Ibid., 402. 
146 Pérez, The War of 1898, 11–12.
147 McCartney, Power and Progress, 148.
148 Quoted ibid., 159.
149 Ibid., 161.
150 R. Carr, ‘Liberalism and Reaction, 1833–1931’, in R. Carr (ed.), Spain: A History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 224–5.
151 McCartney, Power and Progress, 87.
152 Our list is inspired by Beisner’s three questions and five issues, in R. L. Beisner, 
‘Comments to “American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book”’, 
American Historical Review, 83:3 (1976), 673.
153 See Field, ‘American Imperialism’, 646.
154 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 21, 61; McCartney, Power and Progress, 87–8; 136; 
Trask, The War with Spain in 1898, 31; Zimmermann, First Great Triumph, 494–9.
155 Sewell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism’, 310.
156 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 309.
157 Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, xi; Hamilton, President McKinley, War and Empire, 
135–6; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 311–12, 314.
158 S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 35.
159 T. S. Woolsey, America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Century, 1898), 75–6, 106–7. 
160 A. S. Hershey, ‘Intervention and the Recognition of Cuban Independence’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11 (1898), 74–80.
161 G. G. Wilson, International Law (New York: Silver, Burdett, 1922, 8th edition) [1901], 
91–2.
162 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish–American War, 107.
163 Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, 206–8.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   221 22/01/2015   10:53:55
222 Part II: Practice
164 Ibid., 208.
165 E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Washington, DC: John Byrne, 1921), 481.
166 Fenwick, ‘Intervention: Individual and Collective’, 651.
167 Referred to ibid., 651.
168 L. Le Fur, ‘Chronique sur la guerre hispano-américaine’, Revue générale de droit interna­
tional public, 5 (1898), 664–5.
169 A. de Lapradelle, ‘Chronique sur les affaires de Cuba’, Revue de droit public et de la science 
politique en France et à l’étranger, 1 (1900), 74.
170 A. Rougier, ‘La théorie de l’intervention d’humanité’, Revue générale de droit inter national 
public, 17 (1910), 476.
171 J. Westlake, International Law, Part I: Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1904), 307.
172 According to Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, 208.
173 R. B. Lillich, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Con-
structive Alternatives’, in J. N. Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 233–4.
174 M. McDougal and M. Reisman, ‘Response’, International Lawyer, 3 (1968–69), 439. 
175 See also C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The Conundrum of Recourse to Force – To Protect Persons’, 
International Organizations Law Review, 3 (2006), 26; A. V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, 
Non­Intervention – The Law and Its Import in the Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1956), 22; M. J. Bazyler, ‘Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia’, Stanford Journal of 
International Law, 23 (1987), 583; F. K. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 53–4.
176 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963), 46.
177 T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Interven-
tion by Military Force’, American Journal of International Law, 67:2 (1973), 285.
178 J.-P. L., Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter’, California Western International 
Law Journal, 4 (1973–74), 206.
179 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 104.
180 Ibid., 104.
181 G. J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2009), 317.
182 T. B. Knudsen, ‘The History of Humanitarian Intervention: The Rule or the Exception?’, 
50th ISA Annual Convention, New York, 15–18 February 2009, 30.
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   222 22/01/2015   10:53:55
Part III
Conclusion
Humanitarian Intervention.indb   223 22/01/2015   10:53:55




In the nineteenth century, a humanitarian justification was invoked by govern-
ments, press, public opinion and international jurists from the three-power 
intervention in the Greek War of Independence (1821–31) through to the more con-
troversial US intervention in Cuba in 1898, but also for other instances short of the 
use of armed force in humanitarian plights. The doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention was at its zenith in international law discourse from the mid-nineteenth 
century until the 1930s and in particular from the 1870s onward (see chapter 4). 
As regards the practice of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century, 
we will highlight a number of characteristics.1
Within a period of nine decades (1821–1914), there were barely four military 
interventions justified on humanitarian grounds, contrary to the 1990s, with as 
many as seven within a decade. Clearly, this new tendency from the 1820s onwards 
did not open the flood gates to constant intervention. 
The interventions were taken (1) by the great powers in concert, as seen with 
the 1860 Paris protocols regarding Lebanon; (2) by an ‘alliance of the willing’, 
as with the three powers in the 1827 Treaty of London and its consequences 
(Navarino and French expeditionary force); and (3) by declaring war following 
several attempts at good offices and mediation (Russia in 1827 and 1877, or the US 
in 1898). Although some aspects of one-power intervention were criticized, there 
was no overall condemnation but benign neutrality, regarding Russia in 1828–29 
and 1877–78 (bar Britain, with the cabinet and people divided) or the US in 1898. 
Moreover, the intervening states were aware of the abuse factor and thus made 
sure to adopt self-denying clauses or to limit the time frame for the presence of 
troops (bar the US in Cuba). More generally, in the cases examined one can see 
a repertoire of international norms and rules of conduct in instances of humani-
tarian plight, most of which are applicable today (see end of chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10).
Three of the four cases involved Christians suffering at the hands of Muslims, 
where the ‘effusion of blood’ and other suffering were shocking. The great powers 
and the rest of Europe or the Americas were blind to atrocities committed by 
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Christians against Muslims, which in instances of liberation wars were committed 
first by the Christian insurgents, who had opted for the use of violence, with the 
Ottomans over-reacting (in the Greek and Bulgarian cases) and then facing the 
wrath of ‘civilized’ Europe.
Military intervention was never contemplated for the excesses and barbarities 
of the British in Jamaica, South Africa and elsewhere in Africa, the French and 
Belgians in Africa, quasi-genocide in British Australia or US policy against the 
indigenous peoples or for acts of violence by the great powers when conquering 
neighbouring territories, as in the case of Russia in the Caucasus and central Asia. 
Such acts were not even acknowledged by the governments in question. As Mowat 
had put it: ‘Civilized Governments do not openly acknowledge themselves to be 
bandits or plunderers; they can always put forward a “case” in their favour. This 
they do … partly because, for political reasons, they do not wish to offend brutally 
the opinion of moral people in their own or other countries’.2
The four interventions were successful in stopping the ‘effusion of blood’. 
They were not merely better than nothing (as in the case of Somalia today), too 
late (Rwanda) or leading to inordinate destruction, refugees and civilian deaths 
(Kosovo/Serbia).
The insurgents themselves sought foreign armed intervention to save them. 
With the exception of the Cubans in 1895–98, they did not seem apprehensive 
of future domination by the intervening parties, probably for one or more of 
the following reasons: because their yearning for freedom from a ‘foreign yoke’ 
obscured all other considerations and fears; confidence reigned that when inde-
pendence was achieved they could neutralize their patron’s influence or use it to 
their advantage; or the belief that even circumscribed independence was better 
than nothing and in due course would lead to unfettered independence.
Criticism and counter-criticism 
Supporters of the nineteenth-century precedent point to many commonalities 
with today’s landscape. As Gary Bass has argued:3 
All of the major themes of today’s heated debates about humanitarian interven-
tion – about undermining sovereignty … about altruistic or veiled imperialistic 
motivations, about the terrible danger of taking sides in civil wars … about multi-
lateral and unilateral uses of force, about the moral responsibility of political 
leaders – were voiced loud and clear throughout the nineteenth century.
Leaving aside those who regard humanitarian intervention as inconceiv able 
and a contradiction in terms, the practice of armed humanitarian interven tion 
in the period under study has been criticized mainly on three grounds: the 
 civilization–barbarian construction, the related selectivity (double-standards) 
factor, and abuse. 
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Franck and Rodley, for instance, have claimed that the nineteenth century 
is ‘illustrative of principles applicable to relations between unequal states in a 
community of law which prefers one socio-religious system over another and in 
which “civilized” states exercise de facto tutorial rights over “uncivilized” ones’. 
Therefore they ‘are of little precedential value in the contemporary world’.4 Others 
have also pointed to ‘double standards’, with the ‘international community’ 
defined as the Christian community of states, and they maintain that no useful 
inferences can be drawn, for this would amount to reintroducing the unaccept-
able imperialist ethos of bygone days.5
As for the selectivity factor, why support one of many cases, for instance the 
Greeks, the Maronites or the Bulgarians, but not intervene militarily on behalf of 
the Jews of Russia or the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire?6 And why did the 
US intervene only in Cuba and not in, say, oppressive regimes of South America, 
which instead it chose to support?7 But as even Franck and Rodley are prepared to 
accept, the Greek case and some others against the Ottoman Empire ‘are probably 
not to be dismissed as bogus. At least they struck a responsive chord in Western 
European and Russian public opinion. But these motives were certainly neither 
wholly pure, nor were they consistently pursued in the absence of other power 
considerations’.8
Knudsen has reasoned that the fact that almost all of the interventions were 
against the Ottoman Empire ‘does not make them irrelevant to the evolution 
of humanitarian intervention’, for they sought to protect Ottoman subjects 
‘against outrageous treatment’; the treatment was indeed ‘outrageous’ and ‘the 
humanitarian justification was important for the general European acceptance 
of the interventions’; and the essential goal of these humanitarian interventions, 
‘namely to stop or prevent large-scale massacres, was mostly accomplished’.9
Eurocentrism, Orientalism, binary oppositions of civilized and barbarian/
savage, the standard of civilization and, not least, the negative image of the ‘Turks’ 
cast a shadow on the nineteenth-century idea of humanitarian intervention. This 
is reinforced by its practical application, aimed at saving Christians from ‘Turkish 
barbarism’. But as we have seen, this obvious double standard had been a source 
of criticism in the long nineteenth century. 
To conclude, we would argue that one is better served by avoiding throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater. If we try to judge ‘reality’ in the long nineteenth 
century on its own terms, as perceived then and not anachronistically (on the 
basis of today’s more scrupulous standards of morality and justice), then the 
following assessment is probably more fair: that despite the obvious Christian 
bias, Eurocentrism, hardly disguised ‘anti-Turkism’, incipient racism, double 
standards and national interests, not to mention the unabashed ‘civilizing’ (read 
haughty imperialist) spirit reigning in those days, the overriding motive of 
European publics (and some in government, the bureaucracy and opposition) 
was indeed humanitarian, to save lives and alleviate suffering. 
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Tentative propositions
There is, according to Knudsen, ‘plenty of evidence’10 to support Martin Wight’s 
claim that ‘[i]n the history of nineteenth century intervention, humanitarianism 
became increasingly the prime motive, as the balance of power was always the 
limiting one’.11 This may be an overstatement, but worth making are the following 
observations that are also of relevance today. 
As seen in the four cases examined, the initial reaction by foreign governments 
was one of restraint, not wanting to be involved, certainly not militarily. But as the 
problem could not be wished away and diplomatic pressure and mediation failed, 
intervention did take place, though with limited goals, save in the case of the US 
in 1898 with its sudden imperialist appetite.
The role of public opinion was decisive. Had it not been for the humanitarian 
plight and for the pressure from the press and public opinion, no great power 
would have intervened. After a while, these governments found it increasingly 
difficult to appear insensitive to a plight that moved their citizens. It is also crucial 
for a humanitarian or national cause to enlist the advocacy of celebrities, the 
Byron example (and in this sense the role of celebrities is hardly novel, as depicted 
by the recent literature on the role of celebrities in international relations12).
In humanitarian plights, the most likely supporters of intervention are the 
‘liberal humanitarians’ (Byron, Shelley, Bentham, Pushkin, Hugo, Gladstone, 
Twain) or ‘conservative humanitarians’ (Chateaubriand, Dostoevsky), and those 
against intervention are pacifists (Tolstoy) and, in particular, Realpolitik advocates 
(Castlereagh, John Quincy Adams, Disraeli, Bismarck). But from a certain point 
onwards and as the armed clash and suffering continue unabated, some realist 
decision-makers may opt for intervention if geostrategic and other interests also 
come into play or their state’s and government’s prestige is on the line (Nicholas I, 
Palmerston, Napoleon III, Gorchakov), especially if a conflict appears unending 
and catastrophic, is likely to escalate or spill over into other regions, or if a rival 
power is likely to intervene and gain advantage.13 For some pragmatists, instru-
mental considerations may go hand in hand with humanitarian concerns in a 
given case (Canning, Thouvenel, Alexander II, Ignatiev, McKinley).
When it comes to states, especially great powers, searching for pure 
humani tarian motives without an inkling of instrumental motives for inter-
vening militarily is unrealistic. As seen in the 1990s in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo prior to intervention, and at the end of the nineteenth 
century in the case of the Armenians, when vital interests are not at stake, there 
is considerable reluctance to intervene, however just a cause and shocking to the 
moral conscience of humankind. As Stowell had put it, ‘[s]tates are not generally 
willing to incur the burdens of the intervention, even on the appealing ground 
of humanity, unless they are also actuated by other and more selfish consider-
ations’.14 After all, there is no greater sacrifice than to go to war ‘for total strangers’, 
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given the heavy economic cost, casualties and risks involved. Thus humanitarian 
intervention in the nineteenth century (and today) is not to be rejected out of 
hand as a mere fig-leaf for imperialist and other designs. It is rather a question 
of degree. If affective and instrumental motives are more or less balanced, one 
reinforcing and justifying the other, then a good case can be made for intervening, 
especially if there is a fair chance of succeeding and alleviating extreme suffering, 
and provided there are no advantages for the intervening party that will make a 
mockery of intervention.
Lastly, it may well be that motivation (or the intention but not the motivation 
per se15) is basically humanitarian. However, given the heavy costs involved in any 
military venture, governments have to justify their future intervention to their 
home publics (who may see coffins arriving back home) and can hardly do so on 
lofty humanitarian grounds alone – by claiming to be the world’s conscience as 
it were – but only by invoking, perhaps fabricating, dire threats to vital national 
interests. Alternatively, governments or leaders may seek the moral high ground 
to enhance their waning international credentials, for ‘humanitarian prestige’,16 
to act in conformity with existing ‘standards of justice’,17 to mobilize their citizens 
to a noble cause, or simply in order to vilify their adversary. Thus they may invoke 
humanitarian motives to conceal their instrumental goals. But after a while they 
may regard these concocted motives as equally valid, or they may use them to 
attain a positive self-definition and to ensure their legacy for posterity.
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